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ABSTRACT
A Theory of Free Human Action
Michael J. Zimmerman, B.A., Yale College
M.A., University of Massachusetts,
Ph.D,, University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Fred Feldman
In this dissertation I attempt to draw up an adequate theory
of free human action. This project falls naturally into three main
parts. The first concerns the matter of constructing a theory of
events; the second concerns the matter of constructing a theory of
human action based on this theory of events; and the third concerns
the matter of constructing a theory of free human action based on this
theory of human action.
In the first chapter I give a detailed exposition and then a
detailed criticism of Roderick Chisholm's latest published theory of
events as it appears in Chapter IV of his book Person and Object . I
argue that this theory is defective in certain ways but that none of
its defects is sufficiently serious to warrant abandonment of the
task which Chisholm has set himself, to wit, the construction of a
theory of events which is consistent with the rest of the ontology to
which he subscribes and in which events are taken to be finely-grained
abstract entities. In the second chapter I propose a theory of events
wliich is Chisholmian in both substance and style but which does not
fall prey to the criticisms lodged against the theory discussed in the
V
first chapter.
In the third chapter I give a detailed exposition and then a
detailed criticism of Chisholm’s latest published theory of human
action as it appears in Chapter II of Person and Object
. Once again,
I argue that the theory is defective in certain ways, but this time
I contend that it suffers from a serious defect, namely, its reliance
on the concept of agent-causation. I argue that this concept ought
not to figure in the foundation of a theory of human action. In the
fourth chapter I present a theory of human action of my own, one
which does not rest on the concept of agent-causation but rather on
the concepts of intention and volition. The theory that results,
though Chisholmian in style, is not really Chisholmian in substance
(although actions are of course still taken to be abstract entities),
for it differs from Chisholm's own theory in numerous, sometimes
crucial respects. During the course of the presentation of the theory
I seek to resolve some fundamental problems concerning what acting
is, what an action is, what intentional action is, what basic action
is, what omission is, and so on. I then seek to rebut certain of the
more prominent criticisms that have been made with respect to accounts
of action similar to my own account.
In the fifth chapter I concern myself with two leading ver-
sions of compatibilism. I show that the first, which enjoys a rich
history, is defective, and I show that the second, which has only re-
cently been proposed, fails to demonstrate the plausibility of com-
patibilism. Impressed by the inadequacies of these versions of
VI
compatibilisni, I present in the sixth chapter an incompatibilist
theory of free human action. At this point I call upon the concept
of agent-causation which I earlier banished; for it is here, I
believe, that it has a proper, indeed an indispensable, role to
play.
It is hoped that the theory of free human action presented in
this dissertation may serve as the basis for the resolution of cer-
tain prominent puzzles in other areas of philosophy, particularly on-
bological problems, ethical problems (especially those concerning the
question of moral responsibility), and problems concerning legal and
social matters. But whether and how this hope may be realized is an
issue that must here remain uninvestigated.
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CHAPTER I
CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF EVENTS
The theory of events that I shall propose in Chapter II as
a basis for the theory of action that I shall propose in Chapter IV
owes very much to Roderick Chisholm's latest published theory of
events. It is appropriate, therefore, to begin with a discussion of
this theory.
In the past Chisholm has proposed several different analyses
of the concept of an event and related concepts. I shall concern my-
self here with that analysis (or portions of it) that appears in
Chapter IV of Person and Object .^ My procedure will be as follows.
I shall begin, in the first section of this chapter, by giving an ex-
position of Chisholm's theory. During this exposition no criticism of
the theory will be made. Such criticism will be undertaken, however,
in the second section, where it will be presented piecemeal.
1. Exposition of Chisholm's Theory of Events
A conspicuous and most welcome feature of Chisholm's manner of
doing philosophy is that he invariably broaches a topic by introducing
a set of unanalyzed concepts on which his analysis to follow will be
based. In so doing he is being completely honest with the student of
his philosophy on the matter of which concepts will be used as tools
of analysis and which not; as he himself has remarked on occasion, by
1
2beginning in this way he is "laying his cards on the table for all to
see." It may sometimes happen that the student is hard put to it to
understand some of the terms used to express the unanalyzed concepts
in question, but it is difficult to see how this problem is to be
avoided unless some happier term or terms be found.
In his theory of events, as expounded in Person and Object
,
Chisholm appeals to the following unanalyzed concepts: the concepts of
2a thing, a property and a relation, ^ re necessity, physical neces-
sity
,
acceptance (or belief), undertaking (or endeavor), consideration
(or entertainment), obtaining (or occurrence), exemplification (or
instantiation), time and place. He says that he will also avail him-
3
self of the "locutions of logic," which I take to include terms which
express the concepts (among others) of existence, material implica-
tion, conjunction, disjunction, and negation (some of which are of
course interanalyzable)
. Although the number of unanalyzed concepts
to which Chisholm appeals is somewhat large, it is noteworthy hov\?
small it is in comparison with the number of unanalyzed concepts to
which almost all other philosophers, who deal with the present topic,
make implicit or explicit appeal.
My presentation of Chisholm’s theory of events will follow for
the most part, but not in every detail, the order of its exposition
4in Chapter IV of Person and Object . We may begin with two defini-
tions which are in fact given right at the end of that chapter. The
first is:
3—
^ ^ individual thing =df. there exists a such
that ^ is identical with x and it is possible that
there does not exist a such that ^ is identical
with X.
The second definition is:
^ ^
• 2i is ^ person =df. x is an individual thing which is
necessarily such that it is physically possible that
there be something which it undertakes to bring about,
where £ is physically possible if and only if it is not physically
necessary that £ should not occur.
^
Armed with these definitions we may go on to give an analysis
of the concept of that entity which, along with properties (and rela-
tions) on the one hand and concrete individuals on the other, forms
the trlpodal foundation of Chisholm’s ontology, namely, the concept of
a state of affairs.^ Chisholm offers the following:
D- 1 •
3
: £ is a state of affairs =df. it is possible that
there be someone who accepts £.
Examples of states of affairs are: [Socrates walks], [Socrates walks
at 3:40 p.m., July 9, 444 B.C.], [there are round squares], and so
on.^ Note that "accepts" in D.I.3 may be replaced by "believes" or
"believes true" (or, more awkwardly, "believes to occur") without
altering the sense of the definiens. "Acceptance," of course, is here
taken as a technical term which expresses a relation between a person
and a state of affairs. That is, the range of "£" in D.I.3 must not
be thought to include, for example, gifts, bribes, or suchlike. One
may indeed accept gifts or bribes in some sense of "accepts," but not
in tlie sense which is at issue here. It might seem easier or more
appropriate to use "believes" instead of "accepts" in D.I.3; but this
4is not really so. For one may believe people, in some sense of
"believes" which is not at issue here, and hence the range of 'y
would again have to be understood to have some implicit technical
limit. Note also that "accepts" could be replaced by "considers" (or
entertains ) a term which again expresses a technical concept— in
which case the sense, but not the accuracy, of the definiens would be
altered
.
In order to give what he calls a "non-tr ivial" criterion of
identity for states of affairs, Chisholm introduces the concept of
entailment. He says:
D- 1 •
4
: £ entails ^ =df. £ is necessarily such that:
(i) if it obtains then £ obtains; and
(ii) whoever accepts it accepts £.
Chisholm then says: if a state of affairs £ is identical with a state
of affairs £ then £ entails £ and £ entails £. It is apparent that
he would also be prepared to endorse, though he in fact does not do
so explicitly, the principle that if £ entails £ and £ entails £ then
£ is identical with £.
Chisholm makes five assumptions concerning states of affairs.
The first is:
A. I .
1
: For every £, if £ is a state of affairs, then £
exists necessarily.
Special note should be made that A.I.l does not assert that every
state of affairs obtains necessarily, but only that every state of
affairs exists necessarily. Chisholm sometimes puts this by saying
that all states of affairs are "eternal objects," although only
some are "necessary"-- ! . e.
,
obtain necessarily (an example of such
5a state of affairs would be [there are no round squares]); some, in-
deed, are "impossible"-i^, necessarily fail to obtain (an example
of such a state of affairs would be [there are round squares]); the
rest are "contingent” (an example would be [there is snow]).
The second assumption is:
A; ^
^
• For any property or relation F, there is a state of
affairs £ and there is a state of affairs £ which
are necessarily such that £ obtains if and only if F
is exemplified and £ obtains if and only if F is no"t
exemplified. ~
In connection with this Chisholm also assumes the following:
For any two properties F and G, there is a conjunc-
tive property ^ which is necessarily such that it is
exemplified by a thing if and only if that thing
exemplifies both F^ and G.
We may say, then, that there are necessary properties (such as being
either round or nonround ) , impossible properties (such as being round
and nonround ) , and contingent properties (such as being white ), just
O
as there are necessary, impossible and contingent states of affairs.
The fourth assumption is:
A. I
.
4
: For every state of affairs £, there is a state of
affairs £ which is necessarily such that it obtains
if and only if £ does not obtain.
In such a case, £ and £ may be said to contradict each other. It
should be noted that, for any state of affairs, there are indefinite-
ly many other states of affairs that contradict it. Chisholm gives
the example: [Socrates is mortal] is contradicted not only by [Socra-
tes is not mortal] but also by [[Socrates is not mortal] or [two and
two are five]]. But he suggests that we could say the following:
6D^: £ IS a negation of ^ =df. (i) contradicts q- and(ii) for every r, if r contradicts then r is
necessarily such that, if it is true, then £ is true.
TliG fxfth cinci fiiisl sss unip t i o n i s i
—
* ^ ^ every state of affairs £ and every state of af-
fairs £, there is a conjunctive state of affairs r
which is necessarily such that r obtains if and only
if £ obtains and £ obtains.
Given the concepts of the negation and conjunction of states of af-
fairs, Chisholm claims, the formulae of the propositional calculus may
be interpreted as general principles about states of affairs.
Chisholm s next task is to analyze the concept of a proposi-
tion and the concept of an event; for, in his ontology, propositions
and events constitute the two major subspecies of states of affairs.
In order to achieve this analysis, Chisholm calls upon a concept he
analyzed in Chapter I of Person and Object and whose analysis runs
thus
:
D- 1 • 6
: £ entails the property of being =df. £ is neces-
sarily such that:
(i) if it obtains, then something has the property
of being and
(ii) whoever accepts £ believes that something is
With this concept Chisholm will seek to analyze what it is for a state
of affairs to obtain or occur at a time.
Consider the state of affairs [Brutus kills Caesar]. Some of
the properties that it entails are had, or exemplified, only by con-
tingent ( i.e. , individual) things. Among such properties are, for
instance, killing someone
,
being killed by someone
,
being identical to
Brutus
,
and so on. Now, every such property is exemplified either by
Brutus or by Caesar or by both; moreover, no proper subset of the set
7{Brutus, Caesar} is such that its members exemplify all such proper-
ties. This observation leads Chisholm to propose the following defi-
nition:
D» I •
7
: £ is concretized by A at t =df.
(i) £ occurs;
(ii) for every property if £ entails F, and if
^ is had only by contingent things, then some
member of A has F at £; and
(iii) there is no proper subset ^ of A which is such
that, for every such some member of B has F.
It should be noted that "A” and in D.1.7 range over classes or
sets, and also that the undefined terms "member" and "proper subset"
are used. Chisholm claims, however, that the concept of a class is
eliminable in the manner in which it is analyzed in Principia Mathe-
matica
,
i. e.
,
in terms of properties.
The analysis of the concept of concretization enables Chisholm
to analyze the concepts of occurring at a time and occurring in a
place. He proposes:
D. 1 .
8
: £ occurs at time £ =df. there is a set A such that
£ is concretized by A at time _t.
D. 1 .
9
: £ occurs in place £ =df. there is a set A and there
is a time t such that q is concretized by A at t and
—
i- Q
all members of A are in place £ at _t . ^
Chisholm notes that, although we cannot say of every state of affairs
that, if it occurs, it occurs in some place, we can say of every state
of affairs that, if it occurs, it occurs at some time.
Given D.1.8, the analysis of the concept of a proposition is
straightforward. Chisholm says:
8I • IQ
• £ is a proposition =df.
(i) is a state of affairs; and
(ii) it is impossible that there be a time t and a
time _t’ such that p occurs at p and does not
occur at p'
.
Examples of propositions are: [Socrates walks at 3:40 p.m., July 9,
444 B.C.], [Socrates never flies], [two and two are four], [two and
two are five]
,
and so on. \\That of the concepts of truth and false-
hood? These may be reduced to the concept of obtaining or occurring.
That is, a true proposition is one that obtains or occurs (and hence
always obtains or occurs) and a false proposition is one that does not
(and hence never does). A true proposition may also be called a fact.
We may now turn to that part of Chisholm' s ontology which most
interests us here—his analysis of the concept of an event. In order
to analyze the concept of an event, Chisholm requires the concept of
a property's not being such that it "may be rooted outside the times
at which it is had." To achieve the analysis of this concept he
begins with the following definition:
D. I. 11
: p is rooted outside times at which it is had =df.
necessarily, for any x and for any period of time
p, X has the property p throughout p only if x
exists at some time before or after p.
Examples of properties that are rooted outside times at which they are
had are : being such that it will move
,
being such that it did move
,
being such that he is taking his second walk of the day , and so on.
There are some properties of which it can be said that they may be
rooted outside times at which they are had. That is, there are some
properties which satisfy the following definition:
9D. 1 . 12 : may be rooted outside times at which it is had =df.
^ is equivalent to a disjunction of two properties,
one of which is, and the other of which is not, rooted
outside times at which it is had.
l^^lat are the meanings of "equivalent" and "disjunction" here? Else-
where Chisholm has spelled this out for us, by giving the following
expanded version of D.1.12:
D. 1 . 12 . a : may be rooted outside times at which it is had =df.
There are properties ^ and il such that:
(i) neither ^ nor H is entailed by F^;
(ii) H. is not rooted outside times at which it is
had
;
(iii) ^ is rooted outside times at which it is had;
and
(iv) necessarily, for any x and any period of time _t,
X has the property ^ throughout _t if any only if
either (a) x has the property _H during _t,
or (b) X does not have the property H during
^ but has the property ^ during _t
.
(This definition invokes the concept of one property's entailing
another—a concept which Chisholm does not analyze. However, the fol-
lowing would appear adequate from his point of viev\?:
D.1.13: F entails G =df. for any thing, x» [x exemplifies F]
entails [x exemplifies ^] .
)
Examples of properties which may be rooted outside times at which they
are had are : being such that either it moves (H) or will move (iG) ,
being such that either it moves (11) or did move (^) , and so on.
Finally, according to Chisholm, there are some properties which are
not such that they may be rooted outside times at which they are had.
Examples of such properties are perhaps the following (Chisholm him-
self gives the first example): being red , being such that it moves,
and so on.
Chisholm regards propositions and events as mutually exclusive
10
subspecies of states of affairs. ([John v^alks at 9:50 a.m.
,
March 9,
1978 A.D.] is a proposition, and hence not an event.) He also be-
lieves that events entail properties that only individual things can
exemplify but that are not essential^^ to these things and, moreover,
are such that they may not be rooted outside times at which they are
had. ([John is such that he will walk] is not a proposition and in-
deed entails both a property
—
being self-identical— that is not such
that it may be rooted outside times at which it is had, and also a
property
—
being such that he will walk— that only individual things
can exemplify; but it entails no property that is not such that it
may be rooted outside times at which it is had, that is had only by
contingent things, and that is not essential to such things, and
hence it is not an event.) Moreover, Chisholm takes it that all
events occur at some time and in some place. ([There are pink uni-
corns] entails a property exemplif iable only by contingent things,
not essential to these things, and not such that it may be rooted out-
side times at which it is had—namely, the property being pink but
it never and nowhere occurs, and hence is not an event.) For these
reasons Chisholm proposes:
D.l.lA: is an event =df. p is a state of affairs which is
such that:
(i) it occurs;
(ii) it is not a proposition; and
(iii) it entails a property F[ which is such that
(a) only individual things can exemplify
(b) it is possible that no individual things
exemplify and
(c) F is not such that it may be rooted out-
side times at which it is had.
He attaches to this definition the following remark:
11
If we may assume that all individual things have spatio-temporal location, then we may deduce that every event issuch that it occurs at some place and some time.^^
Examples of events are: [Socrates walks], [John runs], [Smith adds
two and two], [California subsides], [Old Faithful gushes], and so
on.
A striking fact about events is that some of them may recur.
Socrates walked on several occasions; Old Faithful gushes every sixty-
seven minutes; John goes for a run every morning. (Perhaps California
will subside only once; however it is not being claimed that every
event must recur, or even be able to recur, but only that some are
able to do so.) Indeed, it is the phenomenon of recurrence that seems
to have led Chisholm to a theory in which events are a subspecies of
states of affairs; for it is generally agreed that, if events were
13particulars, none could recur. Chisholm claims that recurrence may
be straightforwardly characterized by Invoking the concept of con-
cretizatlon. He offers the following two definitions:
I • 15 : A is such that at _t it has concretized £ exactly n
times =df
. there are n_ periods of time such that:
(i) no two of them are continuous with each other;
(ii) none is later than _t;
(iii) A concretizes during each; and
(iv) A does not concretize p at any other time with-
in or prior to p.
D» I » 16
: p is such that at p it has been concretized exactly n
times =df.
(i) consider each set that concretizes p at p or
prior to p;
(ii) for each such set take that number which is the
number of times such that the set at p has con-
cretized p exactly that number of times; and
(ill) the sum of all such numbers is n.
12
If tliese definitions are adequate, then Chisholm has accomplished
what Donald Davidson calls (concerning a similar treatment of recur-
rence in an earlier publication of Chisholm’s) a "breathtaking"
14
task. For he has shown us how to count occurrences of events with-
out requiring there to be such things as particular occurrences. For
instance, the sentence "[An incumbent President is re-elected] has
occurred more than seventeen tines" may now be analyzed as "There is
a number n_ such that ^ is greater than seventeen and [an incumbent
President is re-elected] has been concretized n times."
This completes my presentation of those portions of Chisholm's
theory of events which are germane to the present inquiry. I shall
now subject this theory to some criticism.
2. Criticism of Chisholm's Theory of Events
My first comment concerns the propriety of Chisholm's present-
ing D.I.l through D.I.12 and D.I.14 through D.I.16 as definitions.
How are we to understand the symbol "=df."? Normally, for any two
phrases a and 3, the claim "a =df. 3” is taken to be equivalent to,
or at least to imply, the claim that Ot means the same as 3 . But if
this is what Chisholm intends by his use of "=df.," then there is a
problem. Consider D.1.2, for instance. Is Chisholm here saying or
implying that "x is a person" means the same as "jc is an Individual
thing which is necessarily such that it is physically possible that
there be something which it undertakes to bring about"? If so, it
might well seem that the concept he is trying to capture is not what
13
we would ordinarily call the concept of a person. For it might seem
that, although it is perhaps in fact, and perhaps even necessarily,
the case that it is both necessary and sufficient for one’s being a
person that one be necessarily such that it is physically possible
that one undertake to bring about something, there is yet more to
being a person than that. For instance, suppose it were the case
(as 1 think it probably is the case) that necessarily a thing is a
person if and only if it is an individual thing which is necessarily
such that it is physically possible for it to believe something, would
it be proper to elevate this criterion to the status of a definition
(v/here a definition indicates synonymy)? Surely not; for then, if we
accept D.1.2, we would be committed (via the symmetry and transitivity
of the relation of synonymy) to asserting that "jc is an individual
thing which is necessarily such that it is physically possible that
there be something that it undertakes to bring about" means the same
as "}£ is an individual thing which is necessarily such that it is
physically possible that there be something that it believes," and yet
this is false. Why then define the phrase ”x is a person" in terms of
the concept of undertaking? I can find no good reason for so doing,
and hence it seems to me that there is something odd about Chisholm's
methodology, with regard not only to D.1.2 but also to some of the
other "definitions."
Of course, Chisholm may retort that all his definitions are
stipulative, that the symbol "=df." is supposed to signify synonymy,
and that any disparity that is thereby brought to light between the
14
concepts he analyzes and other more mundane concepts is perfectly in
order. But if this what Chisholm is up to, then the question
arises as to just what the connection is between his special concepts
and the other more mundane ones. (In the present case, for instance,
how is his concept of a person related to the everyday concept of a
person?) If there is no ready answer to this question (and there
seems not to be)
,
then the relevance of the concepts that Chisholm
analyzes. Indeed the relevance of his entire project, to our attempt
to come to understand, and to understand the connections between, the
everyday concepts of an event, an action, and so forth, is itself
questionable.
All in all, 1 think it best to interpret Chisholm's project
and his use of ”=df.'' as follows. He i^ concerned with our everyday
concepts. In his attempt to come to a full understanding of these
concepts he finds that he must at times introduce technical concepts
into his analysis. Because these technical concepts are not saddled
with popular connotations, he is in a position to introduce them by
means of stipulative definitions, in which the symbol ”=df.'' is used
primarily to indicate synonymy. But the "definitions" by means of
which the everyday concepts are analyzed (such as the concepts of a
person and of an event) are not stipulative, and in such cases "=df."
serves a somewhat different function from that of the indication of
synonymy. What is this function? This is difficult to spell out
clearly, but I think that "=df.," when used in this non-stipulative
fashion, primarily has the function of indicating a necessary equiva-
15
lence that Chisholm believes the reader will find especially en-
lightening. '=df.," then, v^7hen used non-stipulatively
,
is "weaker"
than when it is used stipulatively
.
The issue of =df. s proper function or functions is tricky,
and what I have just said certainly does not adequately dispel the
mystery that surrounds Chisholm s use of that symbol. However, to
pursue this matter any further here would require that we become in-
volved in the issue of the paradox of analysis, and that is not at all
my purpose. Therefore, I shall now let the matter lie. But it should
be noted that I find Chisholm s methodology, though mysterious for
the reasons just given, to be such a powerful philosophical tool that
1 shall employ it myself in much of the rest of this work.
A final preliminary comment concerns the matter of tense.
Does Chisholm "take tense seriously" in his construction of a theory
of events? To answer this question, we must answer the further ques-
tion: l>fhat does it mean to say that someone takes tense seriously?
Again, an adequate answer to this question lies beyond the purview of
this dissertation, but, briefly, one takes tense seriously if and only
if one uses and understands phrases in such a manner that the meanings
of the phrases are taken to be contingent in part on the tense or
tenses in which the phrases are couched. For instance, when tense is
taken seriously, the phrase "_p occurs" means the same as the phrase
occurs now," and its truth does not imply and is not implied by the
facts that p did occur or will occur. But when tense is not taken
seriously, the truth of the phrase "p occurs" does not imply the fact
16
that £ occurs now, although it implied by each of the facts that £
did occur, does occur now, and will occur. There is a marked differ-
ence, then, between tliese t\^io treatments of tense. Note that, when
tense is not taken seriously, it seems to be the usual practice al-
ways to use verbs as if they were in the present tense. Now, all of
Chisholm's definitions and assumptions are couched in the form of the
present tense, and so the question arises: In his definitions and as-
sumptions, does Chisholm take tense seriously, or does he use verbs
tenselessly? Although he makes no explicit comment on this matter in
Person and Object
,
it seems best that we regard Chisholm's use of
tense in that book as serious. I say this because there is indepen-
dent evidence that in Person and Object Chisholm does take tense
seriously, and also because three of his assumptions (as we shall
shortly see) are defective, and at least one definition seems defec-
tive, if tense is not taken seriously in their formulation; whereas,
if it is taken seriously, they appear not to be defective. The issue
1
8
is therefore of some importance. Sometimes it seems not to matter
in the statement or evaluation of Chisholm's position whether or not
tense is taken seriously. At other times it does seem to matter and,
when it does, I shall make sure that it is understood how and why it
does
.
Let us now turn to the definitions and assumptions. I have no
real quarrel with D.I.l, except to point out, first, that the term
"is identical with" has not been defined. Is this a "locution of
logic"? It would seem that Chisholm takes it to be one; at any rate.
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I shall treat it as such. Secondly, if such things as sets exist
contingently, then D.I.l is inadequate. As will be seen in the next
chapter, I take it that sets do exist contingently, at least when
they have a member that exists contingently; hence, on this assump-
tion, D.I.l is defective. But this, of course, is not an assumption
to which Chisholm also subscribes (given his remark concerning the
reducibility of sets to properties) and so, from his point of view,
D.I.l remains adequate. As for D.I.2, I shall make no remarks here
in addition to those already given at the outset of this section.
D.I.3 has been attacked by Jaegwon Kim as "singularly unen-
19lightening. I think he is right. He says that "in order to under-
stand 'accept' ... we would have to knov; the domain of objects
among which the variables 'x' and '^' in 'x accepts 2 ' take values.
This strikes me as being correct. Kim goes on to say that it would
be better to take the concept of a state of affairs as primitive and
to regard D.I.3 as an axiom, since this definition affords no en-
21lightenment. But at this point I withhold my agreement. Should we
demand of a definition that it be enlightening? This is a very dif-
ficult question, and, again, I shall forgo treating it here; and so
I must leave Kim's complaint unevaluated. (Let it be noted, however,
that Chisholm's method allows for a smaller primitive vocabulary than
Kim's alternative— a point that I take to be in Chisholm's favor.)
The main question regarding D.I.3 to be considered here concerns not
its propriety as a definition but its truth: Is it in fact the case
that the definiendum and the definiens are necessarily equivalent?
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Now Kxm thinks not; for, although he appears grudgingly to grant that
acceptability may be a sufficient condition for tlie existence of a
state of affairs (but he has some doubts even here—might it not be
that sentence- tokens are or may be the objects of belief
,
he is
seriously doubtful that it is a necessary condition for the existence
of one. He acknowledges that it may well be true that propositions
may be accepted or believed true, but he claims not to be able to make
sense of the contention that nonpropositional entities such as events
may be accepted. He asks: "But what sense can be attached to believ-
ing, disbelieving or suspending belief with respect to, say, [Jones
walks at _t ] , with an unspecified *_t ' ?" He proceeds further to
note that, if his point is well taken, doubt must also be cast on the
correctness of Chisholm's analysis of the concept of entailment
(D.I.4) and hence on the identity-criterion for states of affairs.
This is one instance where I believe that Chisholm's use of
tense is crucial. If Chisholm does not take tense seriously in Per-
son and Object
,
then Kim may have a good point. Ct is not absolutely
clear to me that it is impossible to accept a state of affairs such
as [Jones walks] where the time of Jones's walking is left unspeci-
fied, but I am inclined, with Kim, to believe that it 1^ impossible
to do so. For it seems that, vjhen the time is left unspecified, there
is nothing specific to which one is disposed to give assent, and yet
24
such a disposition (all things being equal ) seems to be a necessary
condition of belief. And if the time is specified as time _t > say
then it seems reasonable to maintain that the object of belief (or
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disbelief, or suspension of belief) is the proposition [Jones walks
at and not the event [Jones walks]. If this is right (and if
Chisholm does not take tense seriously) then certainly D.I.3, D.1.4
and the Identity criterion for states of affairs are in need of
repair
.
But, as I have said, I believe that Chisholm does take tense
seriously in Person and Object
,
and in this case it makes a differ-
ence. The difference is that [Jones walks] is no longer to be thought
of as the state of affairs [Jones walks at _t] with 'V' unspecified,
but as [Jones walks nov/] . The latter is surely acceptable, even if
the former is not; and so it seems, given that Chisholm takes tense
seriously, that Kim's criticism is simply misguided.
But what of the analysis in D.1.4 of the concept of the
entailment of one state of affairs by another? Is it correct, even
when understood in a manner which takes tense seriously? I shall as-
sume that it is, although there is some room for doubt. After all,
what is it for a state of affairs to be necessarily such that whoever
2 6
accepts it also accepts some other state of affairs? Kim says in
this regard:
But the second condition [of D.1.4] gives rise to a host of
problems: the main problem is how we are supposed to apply
it to particular cases. Is it the case, for example, that
whoever accepts 2 and 2 being 4 also accepts 4 being 2 and 2?
VJliat about 2 and 2 being 4 and 2 times 2 being 4? How are
we supposed to decide? More generally, who are the cognitive
beings we should consider here? What cognitive powers, in par-
ticular what logical powers, are to be ascribed to them?
Should we consider only 'rational beings' in some idealized
or normative sense of 'rational' or should we also consider
f lesh-and-blood ordinary human beings?^^
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I must say that I sympathize with Kim on this matter, but once again
the extent to which his criticism shows up a defect in Chisholm's
theory is moot. Now, I think it is clear that the cognitive beings
Chisholm has in mind are ordinary human beings, indeed persons (see
D. 1 . 2) ; it is not so clear whether Chisholm believes such beings to
have a minimal capacity for rational thinking. (I am sure that he
would not wish to rule out the possibility that such beings have some
inconsistent beliefs; and obviously he thinks such beings are capable
of believing a necessarily false proposition.) More than this, how-
ever, 1 cannot say. Nevertheless, there seems to be an easy (though
perhaps somewhat lame) response that Chisholm might make. It is this
D.1.4 is not intended as a criterion by which one might decide in par
ticular cases whether or not one state of affairs entails another; it
is intended simply as an analysis of the concept of such entailment.
(One might make a similar point concerning the identity-criterion
formed from D.1.4; for this criterion concerns an ontological matter
and is not intended as an epistemic criterion for the individuation
of states of affairs.) If Chisholm were to make such a reply to Kim,
1 think he would be right in so doing. After all, D.1.4 does not
make use of any terms not included in the original vocabulary or al-
ready defined therefrom.
I think all of A.I.l through A. 1.5 are unobjectionable. It
should be noted, however, that tense plays an especially Important
role in the interpretation of A. I. 3 through A. I. 5. If Chisholm does
not take tense seriously, then A. I.
3
through A.].
5
are quite inade-
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quate. Consider A. I. 4. If the "obtains" of this assumption is tense-
less, then it turns out to be very difficult indeed to find, for any
nonpropositional state of affairs even one state of affairs £ that
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contradicts p. For instance, let p be [Socrates walks] and p be
[Socrates does not walk]. Do p and p contradict one another? If
the obtains' of A. 1.4 is tenseless, then the answer is "No." For
both p and p may obtain, in this tenseless sense of "obtains." To
be sure, they cannot (in this tenseless sense) obtain at the same
time, but A. 1.4 makes no mention of times. The search, then, is on
for a plausible candidate for a state of affairs that contradicts
[Socrates walks]. But I shall not join this search here, since it
proves to be both frustrating and unwarranted. For if, as I believe,
Chisholm takes tense seriously in Person and Object
,
such that a
phrase of the form "p obtains" means the same as a phrase of the
form "p obtains now," then it turns out that [Socrates walks] and
[Socrates does not walk] do contradict one another; for they cannot
both obtain, that is, both obtain now. With tense taken seriously,
the adequacy of A. 1.4 seems assured.
Similar remarks apply to A. I. 3 and A. I. 5: if tense is not
taken seriously, they are inadequate; but if it is taken seriously,
they appear to be adequate. Consider A. I. 5, for instance, and im-
agine a case where two states of affairs, p and p, both (tenselessly)
obtain, but where p obtains at and only at _t^^ and p obtains at and
only at p2 being distinct from ^2 ^* ask: When does their
conjunction, p, obtain? At p^? Surely not, for p does not obtain
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then. At
_t
2
? Surely not, for £ does not obtain then. At some time
other than
_t^ and Surely not, for neither £ nor £ obtains then.
Hence A. 1.5 commits us to saying that £ obtains but that there is no
time at which it obtains, and yet, as indicated in the first section
of this chapter, Chisholm himself denies that this is possible.
Similarly, if "exemplifies” is tenseless in A. I. 3, then this assump-
tion commits us to saying that it is possible that a conjunctive
property
^ be exemplified but that there be no time at which it is
exemplified, and again Chisholm does not countenance this possibility.
But all this is in fact obviated by Chisholm's taking tense serious-
ly, such that, according to A. 1.5, a conjunctive state of affairs r
obtains now if and only if its conjuncts obtain now
,
and, accord-
ing to A. 1.3, a conjunctive property £ is exemplified now if and only
if its conjuncts are exemplified now .
D.1.5 is a little odd. Its definiendum reads "£ is a_ nega-
tion of £," but there is evidence that Chisholm regards each state of
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affairs to have a unique negation. VHiereas the definiens is per-
haps adequate to the definiendum when the latter reads "£ is a
negation of £," it is not adequate to it when it reads "£ is the
negation of £." We may see why this is so if we let £ be [two and
two are four] and £ be [two and two are five]. Now, I take it that
£ contradicts £ but is not the negation of £; £*s negation is,
rather, [two and two are not four]. But £ is certainly such that, for
every £ that contradicts £, it is true if £ is; for no such £ can be
true
.
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Chisholm has since outlined an analysis of the concept of
negation which does not fall to this objection. As might be ex-
pected, this analysis involves the concept of consideration. Indeed,
it involves the concept of involvement. Let us say:
—
^ ^ ^
• P. involves £ =df
. £ is necessarily such that whoever
considers it considers
We may then say:
D . I . 18
. £ properly involves £ =df
. £ involves £ and £ does
not involve £.
Given this, we may say:
i
•
• P explicitly denies £ -df. £ contradicts £ and properlyinvolves only £ and what £ involves.
Hence, [two and two are four] is explicitly denied by [two and two are
not four] but not by [two and two are five]. Finally, we may say:
D . I . 20
: £ is the negation of £ =df. either £ explicitly denies
£ or £ explicitly denies £.
Note that, given D.I.20, the relation of being-the-negation-of is
symmetrical. Hence [two and two are four] is the only negation of and
is negated only by [two and two are not four].
D.I.6 seems to me to pass muster, but D.I.7 is a different
matter. Chisholm’s claim that the concept of a class or set is elim-
inable in the manner in which it is analyzed in Principia Mathematica
is one that I have not been able to verify, and so there is some
problem in evaluating his use of that concept and the associated con-
cepts of a proper subset and membership. Nevertheless, were Chisholm
to have augmented his primitive vocabulary by including either the
term "set" or the term ''membership” or both, I do not think there
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would have been much cause for complaint, and so this point is of no
real moment. More important is the question as to how tense is used in
D.1.7. It seems to be taken seriously in clauses (i) and (iii) of the
definiens but not in clause (ii) (at least with respect to "has"), and
one therefore wonders whether tlie "is" of the definiendum is tenseless
or not. Certainly, when times are specified, as in the definiendum
and in clause (n) of the definiens, it is the usual practice to take
those verbs associated with the times to be used tenselessly. For ex-
ample, since the time
_t is mentioned in the definiendum, it seems not
to matter whether it is past, present, or future; and so it seems that
is, in this instance, is used generally to cover "was," "is (now),"
and "will be," whichever the case may be. But this does not accord
the use of tense in clauses (i) and (iii)
,
where it is surely
taken seriously. That is, the "occurs" of clause (i) surely means
occurs now. If it does not mean this (and Chisholm is thereby not
taking tense seriously in D.1.7) then there is no way to connect the
time of £'s occurrence in clause (i) with the time of F's exemplifica-
tion in clause (ill)
;
and yet Chisholm obviously intends these times
to be the same.
Someone might reply on Chisholm's behalf that, although tense
is often not taken seriously in such phrases as "jc has 1^ at t" and so
on, nevertheless it to be taken seriously throughout D.1.7. But if
this is the case, then the phrases "£ is concretized by A at _t" and
"some member of A has JF at £" must mean the same, respectively, as "£
is now concretized by A at t" and "some member of A now has F at t."
25
In such a case we are faced with two options: either to interpret the
locution "at
_t" to be, in this case, synonymous with "now," in which
case the phrases make clear sense (despite some redundancy) but only
have a limited application— an application surely much more limited
than Chisholm intends’ or to interpret the locution "at
_t" in such a
manner that "_t" is seen to range over all times unrestrictedly, in
which case, it seems to me, the phrases have no clear sense.
There seems, therefore, to be an inconsistent treatment of
tense in D.1.7, which I think is best explained as follows. Chisholm
regards the "_t" of D.1.7 to signify the present moment, that is, now.
The definition would read properly, and consistently with part of
Chisholm's intention, if the locution "at were simply deleted from
both places at which it occurs. Tense would then be taken seriously
throughout the definition. But it is also part of Chisholm's in-
tention that D.1.7 be a vehicle for arriving at an analysis of the
concept of occurrence at a time (D.1.8), and for this reason he plugs
in the locution "at _t," unaware of the problems regarding the use of
tense to which this locution gives rise.
But if the locution "at jt" is deleted from D.1.7, is the
result acceptable? Kim claims that acceptance of D.1.7 requires that
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we countenance the ascription of properties to nonexistents . He
asks us to consider the proposition, [Brutus kills in 44 B.C.].
This, he says, entails, amongst other properties, the properties of
(F) being identical with Brutus
, (^) killing in 44 B.C. , and (H) being
identical with Brutus and killing in 44 B.C. Kim says that the unit
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set of Brutus is the obvious candidate for the concretizer of £, but
points out that (according to D.I.IO), since £ is a true proposition,
it occurs now. Furthermore, if it occurs now, it is concretized now
(according to D.I.8). This implies that Brutus now has those proper-
ties entailed by £. But Brutus does not exist now. Hence acceptance
of D.I.7 requires that we countenance the ascription of properties to
nonexistent objects.
Once again, it may be retorted that Kim's criticism is mis-
guided. For if tense is taken seriously, it seems not to be the case
that £ entails any of F, G or H. For, according to D.I.6, if £ en-
tails £, G and then whoever accepts £ accepts that something (now)
has F^, something (now ) has and something (now) has H; however,
since this is not the case, £ does not entail any of F, G or H. But
the question then arises: If the unit set of Brutus does not concret-
ize £, what does? For Ghisholm does claim that every state of affairs
that occurs, is concretized by some set; and £ always occurs. Note
that £ appears to entail no properties that are and may be had only
by contingent things. Thus there seems to be no property, I^, that
satisfies the antecedent of clause (ii) of D.I.7; hence that condi-
tional is satisfied no matter what set A is. But in order for clause
(iii) also to be satisfied, the sets that qualify as concretizers of
£ must be restricted to just one in number: the null set; for the null
set is the only set that satisfies clause (li) and that does not have
a proper subset tliat satisfies clause (ii). And this is not a sur-
prising result. The null set, similarly, qualifies as the sole
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concretizer of such necessary truths as [two and two are four],
[fchree is odd] or [three is even]], and so forth; for these states of
affairs, perhaps even more obviously, than [Brutus kills in 44 B.C.],
entail no properties exemplif iable only by contingent things.
The concept of concretization
,
then, seems to be consistent.
Chisholm puts it to use in many of the definitions that follow. The
first of these is D.1.8. But its employment here, as I intimated
above, is subject to criticism, and this is so because it is crucial
that the definiens read "there is a set A such that £ is concretized
by A at time £ and not simply "there is a set A such that £ is con-
cretized by A." For the whole point of the definition is that the
time of concretization be specified so that sense may be given to the
concept of occurrence at a time . But, this being the case, with
D.1.8 we become embroiled in that same inconsistency of treatment of
tense that afflicted D.1.7 (with the locution "at t" preserved). 1
shall not repeat my criticism here.
There is, furthermore, a striking fact about the definiens of
D.1.7 when the locution "at _t" is preserved, and that is that it makes
use of the concept of exemplification at a time . It is odd that
Chisholm should feel compelled to go to such lengths to explicate the
concept of occurrence at a time in terms of the concept of occurrence
and other concepts, and that he should yet overlook the fact that, in
his explication, he makes use of the concept of exemplification at a
time, a concept which is not analyzed by him and which also does not
feature in his original list of unanalyzed concepts. I take it that
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Chisholm's main motivation for appealing to the unanalyzed concept of
occurrence (or obtaining)
,
rather than to the unanalyzed concept of
occurrence at a time, is that he wishes as far as possible to avoid
presupposing the existence of times. But then it is obvious that his
approach in Person and Object is inadequate for his purposes, since
the defmiens of D.I.7 appears to make essential use, in clause (ii)
,
of the concept of a time. To show such use inessential Chisholm would
have to provide an analysis of the concept of exemplification at a
time in terms of concepts amongst which the concept of a time is not
to be found. This is a formidable task,^^ and it is one which Chis-
holm does not even acknowledge, let alone undertake, in Person and
Obj ect
.
D.1.9 inherits the inadequacies of D.1.7 also. For the de-
finlens of D.1.9 requires that the time of the location of the members
of set A be the same as that of the concretization by A of £. Yet
we have seen that the specification of the time of concretization in
D.1.7 results in confusion as to how tense is used in that definition.
One interesting aspect of D.1.9 should be noted, however. It allows
for the possibility, but does not insist on the necessity, that a
state of affairs have a spatial location. For instance, [Brutus kills
Caesar] took place in Rome, since all the members of {Brutus, Caesar)
were in Rome at the time of Caesar’s assassination. But [two and two
are four] has no spatial location, since it entails no property had
only by contingent things. All events
,
however, will have a spatial
as well as a temporal location at the time of their occurrence, simply
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by virtue of the fact that they entail some properties had only by
individual things and that individual things have a spatiotemporal
location.
Another respect in which D.1.9 is unsatisfactory is that it
appears not to allow for the "scattered" spatial location of an
event although that it does not allov\7 for this is not entirely clear.
For instance, [someone inhales smog] may now be and probably is occur-
ring in London, New York, and Los Angeles, but not in Lake Moxie,
Maine. It seems, then, not to be the case that aMl those who are now
inhaling smog are in one place—unless the concept of a place is un-
derstood in such a fashion that a place may be perforated, and even
completely separated from itself, by some intervening places, whilst
yet retaining its identity.
Finally, it should be noted that appeal is made in the de-
finiens of D.1.9 to the concept of existence-in-a-place-at-a-time.
This has not been analyzed by Chisholm; nor does it feature in his
list of unanalyzed concepts.
Granted that we have a working concept of occurrence at a
time (although Chisholm has not of course provided us with such)
,
the
analysis of the concept of a proposition (D.I.IO) seems perfectly ade-
quate. Some philosophers are reluctant to grant that contingent
propositions concerning the future have a truth-value; to satisfy them
the definiens of D.I.IO need only be modified so that _t' is stipulated
as being not earlier than jt. However, 1 am not convinced that contin-
gent propositions concerning the future have no truth-value, and I am
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prepared to accept D.I.IO as it stands. I am prepared, furthermore,
to accept D. I. 11,3^ but D.I.12 and D.I.12.a are problematic. Chisholm
claims that there are some properties which are not such that they may
be rooted outside times at which they are had; indeed, that there are
such properties is crucial to his analysis of the concept of an
event. 1 gave, as tentative examples of such properties, the follow-
ing:
_belng red (an example given by Chisholm himself) and being such
_that it moves. (In my preamble to D.1.14 I also gave the examples of
being self-identical and being pink—but again, for the reasons that
follow, these examples must be regarded as tentative.) But note that
being red
,
for example, is necessarily equivalent to ( i. e.
,
is neces-
sarily coextensive with) the property being red-and-such-that-it-did-
move or being red-and-such- that-it-did-not-move
,
and this property may
be rooted outside times at which it is had. In similar fashion, ob-
viously, every property may be shown to be a property that is such
that it may be rooted outside times at which it is had. Hence there
are no properties which are not such that they may be rooted outside
times at which they are had, and Chisholm's analysis of the concept of
an event is in trouble. Therefore, from Chisholm's point of view, it
would seem best to replace "is equivalent to" by "entails" in the
definiens of D.I.12 (where "entails" is understood as defined in
D.I.13). This of course would necessitate a corresponding change in
D.I.12. a, but clause (iii) (c) of D.1.14 would be salvaged (at least
with respect to its consistency with earlier definitions). In the
same spirit, an identity-criterion for properties stronger than
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necessary equivalence, such as mutual entallment
,
would seem in
order
.
Even with clause (iii) (c) understood to be amended in accord-
ance with the immediately foregoing remarks, D.1.14 (Chisholm's analy-
sis of the concept of an event) is still defective. First of all, it
seems to me simply to be an error to require that all events occur.
Surely an event may just happen never to occur, just as it may happen
always to occur. (In neither case will it be a proposition, for in
neither case will it be impossible for the event sometimes to occur
and sometimes not to occur.) Chisholm seems concerned to rule out
such states of affairs as [there are pink unicorns] as events, but 1
am not sure why he is so concerned. If he were to modify clause (i)
of D.1.14 to read "it is physically possible both that £ occur and
that £ fail to occur," such a state of affairs as [there are pink
unicorns] would perhaps be ruled out as an event. But I see no use
in resorting to such a tactic; for there may yet be states of affairs
which are such that it is physically possible both that they occur
and that they fall to occur and which always occur or never occur.
As an example of an event which happens never to occur, consider the
case of Jones, who happened to be born blind, whose blindness was such
that it was physically possible that corrective surgery enable him to
see, who happened never to undergo such surgery, and who consequently
died blind. Here we have at least two states of affairs, [Jones sees]
and [Jones undergoes surgery so that he may see] , which would appear
to be bona fide events but which happened never to occur. On the
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basis of these considerations I would simply strike clause (1) of
D.1.14 and hence deny the truth of that passage appended to it and
cited above, namely:
If we may assume that all individual things have spatio-temporal location, tlien we may deduce that every event issuch that It occurs at some place and some time.
Clause (li) of D.1.14 seems to me to be unassailable, and I am per-
fectly willing to go along with part (a) of clause (iii). (Note that,
given part (a) of clause (iii), a state of affairs such as [there are
no pink unicorns] is n^t an event, even if clause (i) is struck; for
It can occur in a universe where there are no individual things. This
point holds similarly for all such purely "negative" states of af-
fairs.) I am perfectly willing also to go along with part (b) of
clause (iii). (Part (b) of clause (ill) seems not to square with
clause (i), but since I take it that clause (i) should be struck
anyhow, this is no great matter.) Part (c) of clause (iii), however,
even when reinterpreted in light of the remarks of the immediately
foregoing paragraph, is defective. Kim gives the following counter-
T 36example. Consider the property dying . Surely it is necessarily
true that if someone dies at _t then he was alive at some time t'
prior to jt. Hence dying is a property that is (and thus may be)
rooted outside times at which it is had. And so, for example,
[Socrates dies] is not an event, according to D.1.14. But [Socrates
dies] ^ an event, and hence D.1.14 is defective.
Kim also attempts a counterexample "in the opposite direc—
„37
t ion
.
Chisholm wishes to rule out such states of affairs as [the
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assassin of Caesar is self-identical] and [the assassin of Caesar is
such that he will walk] as events. Yet both, Kim claims, entail the
property killing Caesar
,
which is (we may agree, given an amended
version of D.I.12) not such that it may be rooted outside times at
which it is had. Thus both states of affairs are events, according
to D.1.14. But they are in fact events (or, at least, so
Chisholm would claim), and hence D.1.14 is again seen to be defective
(or, at least, defective from Chisholm's own point of view). But
here I think kim is once again a victim of his own misapprehension
of Chisholm s use of tense. If tense is taken seriously, then neither
[the assassin of Caesar is self-identical] nor [the assassin of Caesar
is such that he will v/alk] entails the property killing Caesar
,
that
is, the property killing Caesar now .
What, finally, of D.I.15 and D.I.16? Other than that each
inherits the problems regarding tense of D.I.7, there is the following
problem with D.I.15 (and which, again, is inherited by D.I.16).
Chisholm seems to think that, roughly, an event occurs once at every
time and place at which it has been in some sense "completed." If
this is Chisholm's insight, it is one with which I am in agreement.
However, D.I.15, by requiring that no two of the periods of time in
question be continuous, seems to commit Chisholm to the view that
cessation is the mark of completion. While this does seem to be the
case with certain types of events (such as the event [rain falls].
which occurs once at every time and place at which it ceases to oc-
cur)
,
it is not the case with certain other types of events. Consider,
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nstance, the event (Jones walks around the block]. Such an event
may occur several times ij^succe^ Jones may walk around the block
once and then continue to walk around the block. D.1.15 (and hence
D.I.16 also) appears to be inadequate to this fact. Chisholm is
aware of this sort of objection, and his response amounts to this:
[Jones walks around the block), in this context, is "better described"
as [Jones completes his walking around the block), and this latter
event occurs once at every time and place at whicl, It ceases to oc-
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„cur. But this response is unsatisfactory. First of all, it is
false that [Jones walks around the block] is better described, in any
context, as [Jones completes his walking around the block]. For this
latter event, it seems to me, is the same event as [Jones walks around
the block once], and this is certainly distinct from the event [Jones
walks around the block]. Secondly, while it may be true that [Jones
walks around the block] occurs once at every time and place at which
[Jones walks around the block once] occurs, and that this latter event
itself occurs once at every time and place at which it ceases to oc-
cur, pointing this out is hardly helpful to us in our attempt to come
to understand the expression "Jones walked once around the block."
With regard to D.1.16, note that there is an apparent quanti-
fication over numbers in the definiens, and yet Chisholm has not in-
troduced the concept of a number prior to this definition. But per-
haps this omission is not too grave.
In the next chapter 1 shall propose a theory of events which
does not succumb to the criticisms just levelled at Chisholm's theory
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of events and which (I hope) does not tall pncy to any new criticises
I think the criticisms raised In this section are serious but not
devastating and that a Chlsholmian theory of events (where events are
taken to be eternal, non-concrete” objects) may be defended. I shall
propose such a theory, retaining. Indeed, many of Chisholm's Insights.
NOTES
Roderick M. Chisholm, Person and Object (La Sallepen Court Publishing Company, 1976). Henceforth I shallthis book as "P&O."
, Illinoi
refer to
s
:
It would seem that Chisholm follov/s current convention andregards properties as monadic relations.
^P&O
, p. 22.
I shall forbear making detailed references to P&O in the
rest of this chapter.
It may be noted that in D.I.2 the words "to bring about" are
strictly superfluous. Also, I include D.I.2 in the present exposition
since the concept of a person is implicit in many of the definitions
that follow. (See, for instance, the use of "someone" in D.I.3
whoever" in D.I.4, and so on.)
it IS interesting to note that, of these three concepts, only
that of a property is left unanalyzed by Chisholm. One might try
analyzing the concept of a property by appealing to the notion of con-
ception and saying;
^ is a property =df. it is possible that someone conceive F.
But this would simply defer the obscurity of the concept of a prope7-
ty to that of conception, without anything being gained thereby. For
the concept of conception is not to be used for any (other) purpose
in what follows.
Chisholm almost always uses gerundial nominallzations to
designate states of affairs or to form complex variables ranging over
states of affairs. For instance. Instead of my "[Socrates walks]" he
would write "Socrates walking"; and instead of "[^ walks]" he would
write walking." This practice runs into trouble, I think, when
designations of states of affairs are embedded within designations,
or designations within variables, or variables within variables. In
what follows I shall adopt the practice of using square brackets to
designate states of affairs or to form complex variables ranging over
states of affairs. For Instance, an example of a designation of a
state of affairs is "[Socrates walks]." An example of the forming of
a complex variable ranging over states of affairs is "[^ walks]."
(This is of course a variable because it is formed by means of the use
of another variable—"^"—which in this case ranges over persons.)
An example of a designation embedded within a variable is " [^ accepts
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properties underlining when designating
or Lpression One n
<^""“nguish their designation from their use
11 j i
complxcation with contingent properties as T
them """"For iL^’ things may necessarily fail to have.or nstance, no non-concrete object can be white Alsothere IS a distinction to be made between necessary properties and
tlerwhich‘’th-"‘'^‘'‘'’
•>n‘^“nen impossible properties and proper-s which things essentially lack. (See note 11 below.) But I
cuL irin the
““ Chisholm himself does not dls-uss It i present context.
9
^1 .1 .
^^^isholm in fact uses the locution "at (place) p" ratherlan
^
(place) ' but I prefer the latter because it contrastsmore clearly with the locution "at (time) t."
an
® definition (number D3.7) given by Chisholm inearlier unpublished version of P&O.
the f
“chisholm does not attempt to give an explicit definition ofterm essential rn this context, but he seems to have the fol-lowing in mind
:
^
F is essential to x =df. x is necessarily such that it has
12
P&O
,
p. 128.
13
Presumably
,
it is claimed that particular events could not
recur because, first, it is assumed that, if events were particular,
they would occur when and only when they existed and, secondly, noth-ing may pass out of and then back into existence. As for the first
point: 1 am not clear why one should make such an assumption, although
it is true that it seems to be one that is implicit in most of the
par ticularist theories of events that have been proposed. As for the
second point: I am not sure what to make of the contention that noth-
ing can pass out of and then back into existence. Chisholm apparently
subscribes to it, however, and I shall not dispute the matter here.
14
31,
Donald Davidson, "Events as Particulars," Nous
,
4 (1970), p,
I shall have more to say on the concept of undertaking in
Chapter 111.
16
,Of course, this is not to say that Chisholm's use of "=df."
is deliberately ambiguous.
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later work, both spoken and written fbnt- .o
llsi.ed), Chlshota is careful to say that he does take tense serious-
issue becomes even more important when Chisholm seeks—as he has recently done, but as he does not do in PiO-to analyzethe concept of a time in terms of the concept of a“ilate of afLirsIn such an enterprise, it is crucial that tense always be taken seri-ously. (I am grateful to Tom Ryckman for pointing out to me, both inconversation and In his paper "Kim on Chisholm's Reduction of Events
taut
Affairs" (unpublished), just how Impor-n Chisholm s use of tense is in P&O.)
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,Jaegwon Kim, States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions,"
I shall refer to this article as
^‘^SAEP, P- 2.
^^SAEP, P- 2.
^^SAEP, P- 2.
^^SAEP, P. 10.
2A,
A vague phrase
,
present purposes.
Ut course the question arises, on this view of Chisholm's
enterprise, whether [Jones walks now] is an event or a proposition.
Again, there is independent evidence (seminar at the University of
Massachusetts in Amherst—spring semester, 1978) that Chisholm regards
it as an event; for he believes it may occur at one time and yet not
at another. One consequence of this position is that, if it now hap-
pens to be time
_t
. ,
[Jones walks now] and [Jones walks at tj^] are dis-
tinct states of affairs (the former being an event and the latter a
proposition). But are they distinct? This is a difficult issue and
is one I attempt to avoid in Chapter II by not taking tense seriously.
26^.
ut course, I am now considering the case where p. is dis-
tinct from £ in D.I.4.
27
SAEP, p. 5.
28
,,.Kim makes this point in SAEP, pp . 10-12, in particular
criticizing Chisholm's analysis of the concept of negation (D.I.5).
But once again, as I shall point out shortly, it seems that Kim's
comments are misguided; for it seems that Chisholm takes tense
seriously in P&O.
39
29
and «
30„
,
1 /-n / 7 Q
aeminar at the University of Massachusetts
wrUlngl."°"''"‘*““'' ‘'/‘'nt.-, later tmpublished
Universit!“ofMa°^^T changes, from thexversity ot Massachusetts seminar, 1/31/78.
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SAEP, p. 12.
33.
writing P&O
Chisholm has nevertheless undertaken since
34.,
cent of
Chisholm once again appeals to the unanalyzed con-p exemplification at (or throughout) a time in D.I.ll andw
. 1 . iz
. a
.
. .
writing P&O Chisholm has proposed (University ofMassachusetts seminar, 3/14/78) that properties are identical justin case they are necessarily equivalent, i.e.
,
just in case, neces-ariiy
,
whatever exemplifies one exemplifies the other. This is a£T^ facie Implausible position, as the foregoing remarks serve toin icate, but Chisholm's defense of it is characteristically spirited
and challenging.
^^SAEP, pp. 13-14.
^^SAEP, pp. 14-15.
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See p. 218, n. 24.
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In P&O Chisholm uses the term "abstract" where I have used
the term "non-concrete," but in EP, p. 22, he claims that events are
n^ abstract entities. For he claims there that an abstract object
is one which is not only non—concrete but is also one which may be
exemplified by another object. Obviously states of affairs are not
of this sort. In the rest of this work, however, I shall use the
term abstract to mean what Chisholm means by "non—concrete.
"
CHAPTER II
A CHISHOLMIAN THEORY OF EVENTS
mien presenting his theory of events in Person and Obi er^
Chisholm makes frequent reference to the concepts of time and place,
and yet it is a notable feature of his ontology that he neither ana-
lyzes these concepts in terms of more primitive concepts nor makes
room for times and places in that group of entities (consisting of
states of affairs, properties and relations, and individual things)
which form the foundation of his theory of being. He says that he
will allow himself'^ to speak of times and places, and yet he neither
eliminates them by analysis nor commits himself to their existence.
This is clearly an untenable position. I sympathize with Chisholm
in his desire not to commit himself to the existence of times and
places; but, since I am not in a position to present a theory of being
in which these entitles do not Irreducibly figure, I shall here as-
sume that they exist. A similar point pertains to the concept of a
set. Perhaps, as Chisholm says (but does not demonstrate), the con-
cept of a set may be analyzed in terms of the concept of a property
and other concepts; but again, since I am not in a position to present
any such analysis, I shall here assume also that sets constitute a
distinct type of entity.
As a result of these and other considerations I shall make
use, in the theory of events that follows, of the following unanalyzed
40
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concepts: the concepts of a thing, a property and a relation,^ a set,
existence, existence-in, acceptance, consideration, occurrence,
metaphysical necessity, physical necessity, exempl if ication-at
,
mem-
bership, and being-earlier-than. I shall also appeal to the "logical”
concepts of negation and material implication, in terms of which the
concepts of conjunction and disjunction may be conventionally ana-
lyzed. This list of unanalyzed concepts differs from Chisholm's in
certain ways, of some of which it is important to take note here.
First, the ontology that underlies Chisholm's theory of events,
as noted in Chapter 1, is trlpodal; that which underlies mine is
hexapodal. That is, 1 take it that not only are there such things as
states of affairs, properties (and relations), and individual things,
but there are also times, places, and sets; and 1 do not assume that
any of these types of things is reducible to any other. 1 shall at-
tempt to analyze the concepts of a state of affairs, an individual
thing, a time, and a place; but, following Chisholm, I shall not
attempt to analyze the concept of a property (or a relation)
,
and I
shall also not attempt to analyze the concept of a set.^ Secondly, I
distinguish two types of existence, namely, existence simpllciter and
exlstence-ln; the latter is a relation that holds between individual
things and places.^ Everything which exists in a place, exists sim-
pllciter
;
but this is not true vice versa . Thirdly, I take exemplifi-
cation fundamentally to be a triadic relation that holds between
things, properties, and times and not, as Chisholm has it, to be a
dyadic relation that holds between things and properties. This slight
42
change, as will be seen, allows us to dispense with complications
concerning tense. Fourthly, 1 shall often talk of necessity slmplici-
ter, when I do, it will always be of metaphysical necessity that I am
talking. Whenever that type of necessity with which 1 am concerned
is physical necessity, I shall explicitly acknowledge this fact.
I shall not take tense seriously. 1 hope thereby to avoid
certain complications without sacrificing accuracy.^ I am able to
do this, I believe, first by assuming that there are such things as
times and, secondly, by appealing to the concept of exemplif ication-
at rather than to the concept of exemplification simpliciter
. Thus,
for instance, phrases of the form occurs” and ”S accepts £" are
not to be thought of as meaning the same, respectively, as phrases of
the form £ occurs now” and accepts £ now.” The former phrase-
forms, rather, have no implications whatsoever regarding time of oc-
currence and acceptance.
The theory of events whose exposition follows owes much both
to that theory of Chisholm's which was discussed in the last chapter
and also to some of Chisholm's later work. However, I shall here
forgo making detailed points of comparison between the theory and
Chisholm's work.
Locutions involving the specification of times may be handled
by appealing to the concept of exemplif ication-at . That is, we may
say first of all:
D- II • 1
• £ occurs at _t =df. £ exemplifies occurrence at
and then we may go on to say:
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D.11.2: exists at ^ -df. [x exists] occurs at t;
D.II.3:
_S accepts £ at _t =df. accepts £] occurs at t;
and so on for the concepts of consideration at (a time), existing in
(a place) at (a time), and being a member at (a time). And we may
also say:
D.11.4: X exemplifies F =df
. there is a time t such that x
exemplifies F at t. ~
Ibe concepts of a state of affairs, an individual thing, a set
a time, and a place may be analyzed as follows:
D.II.5: £ is a state of affairs =df. it is (metaphysically)
possible that there be someone^ who considers £.
^
D. 11.6: is an individual thing =df. there is a thing £ (a place,in fact) such that x exists in £.
D. 11. 7:
_t is a time =df. it is possible that there be some
property which is exemplified at t.^
D. II. 8: £ is a place =df. it is possible that there be some
individual thing that exists in £.
It should of course be noted that, while I present D.II.5 through
D.II.8 as definitions, none of these definitions warrants the asser-
tion that some or all of the entitles concerned have been somehow
eliminated from the basic ontology presupposed here. This ontology
remains hexapodal.
Certain assumptions have been implicitly made in the fore-
going, such as: whatever accepts or considers something is a person;
whatever is accepted or considered is a state of affairs; whatever
exists in a place is an individual thing; whatever is existed in is a
place; and so on. Other important assumptions are not implicit in the
foregoing, and 1 shall make them explicitly here:
44
A.II.l: Necessarily, for any thing x, x exists.
A. II. 2: Necessarily, for any thing x, if x is a state of affairsa property or a relation, a tine, or a place, then, nece^-sarily, x exists. ’
A. II. 3: Necessarily, for any thing x, if x is a set and there isa thing
^ such that is a member of x, then there are
,
. .
.
,
which are members of x and
which are such that x exists if and only if they“exist.
A. II. 4: Necessarily, for any thing x. if x is an individual thingthen It IS not necessary that x exist.
A. II. 5: Necessarily, for any thing x, if x occurs, then x is a
state of affairs. ~
A. II. 6: Necessarily, for any thing x, if x necessarily occurs,
then, necessarily, x necessarily occurs.
A. II. 7: Necessarily, for any thing x, if x necessarily occurs,
then it is physically necessary that x occur.
A. II. 8: Necessarily, for any thing x, if it is physically neces-
sary that X occur, then, for any time t, x occurs at t.
A. II. 9: Necessarily, for any property or relation F, there are
states of affairs £ and £ such that, for any time t, £
occurs at £ if and only if ^ is exemplified at t and £
occurs at _t if and only if F is not exemplified at t.
A. II. 10: Necessarily, for any state of affairs £, there is a state
of affairs £ such that, for any time t, £ occurs at t if
and only if £ does not occur at t.
A. II. 11: Necessarily, for any distinct states of affairs £ and £,
there is a state of affairs £ such that, for any time t,
£ occurs at £ if and only if both £ and £ occur at t.
I shall also assume that the relation of being-earlier-than is both
transitive and asymmetrical.
Some remarks concerning some of these assumptions would be in
order. First, it will turn out (see D.II.17 below) that A. II . 6 , A. II. 7,
A. II. 8 and A. II. 10 jointly imply that whatever (metaphysically) neces-
sarily occurs or fails to occur is a proposition . Secondly, we may
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say that £ and £ in A.II.IO contradict one another. A similar assump-
tion concerning contradictory properties or relations (where "exempli-
fies" replaces "occurs") may also be drawn up. Thirdly, we may say
that r in A.Il.ll is a conjunction of £ and £. Again, a similar as-
sumption concerning conjunctive properties or relations may be drawn
up. In the same spirit, too, assumptions concerning disjunctive and
conditional states of affairs and disjunctive and conditional proper-
ties or relations may be drawn up, but I shall forgo that task here.
With regard to the matter of one state of affairs being the
negation of another, we may, I think, follow Chisholm's latest analy-
sis fairly closely. That is, we may say:
D. II. 9:
D.II.IO:
D.II.ll
D. 11.12:
£ involves ^ -df. Necessarily, for any time
_t, whoever
considers at ^ also considers at t.
p properly involves =df. £ involves £ and £ does notinvolve £.
p explicitly denies £ =df. £ contradicts £ and also
properly involves only £ and what £ involves.
£ is the negation of £ =df.^^either £ explicitly denies
£ or £ explicitly denies £.
Note that, given D.II.12, the relation of being-the-negation-of is
symmetrical. Examples of mutual negations are: [Socrates walks] and
[Socrates does not walk]; [two and two are four] and [two and two are
not four]; and so on. The matter of one property (or relation) being
the negation of another may be similarly treated.
By analyzing the concept of the entailment of one state of af-
fairs by another in a Chisholmian fashion, we may characterize the
concept of the conjunction of states of affairs. An analysis of the
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concept of the entailment of one property or relation by another pro-
vides similarly for the characterization of the concept of ^ con-
junction of properties or relations. I propose first of all:
£ strictly implies ^ =df. Necessarily, for any time tif £ occurs at then £ occurs at t.
We may then say, with respect to states of affairs:
p. II
. 14
: £ entails £ =df.
(i) £ strictly Implies £; and
(ii) necessarily, for any time £, whoever accepts that poccurs at
_t accepts that £ occurs at t.H
And with respect to properties or relations we may say:
P^ . II . 15 . p entails G =df. for any thing x and any time t, [x ex-
emplifies p at t] entails [jc exemplifies G at t].
~
We may then say:
PiJPcJp: £ is the conjunction of £ and £ =df.
(i) £ entails £;
(ii) £ entails £;
(iii) £ does not entail £;
(iv) £ does not entail £;
(v) for any state of affairs £, if £ entails s, then
there is a state of affairs u such that
(a) £ entails u, and
(b) either £ entails £ or £ entails £; and
(vi) for any state of affairs s, if £ entails both £
and £, then £ entails r.l^
An example of such conjunction is: [[John is tall] and [Mary is
short]] is the conjunction of [John is tall] and [Mary is short].
Similar examples may be concocted. (Whenever a state of affairs r
is the conjunction of states of affairs £ and £, an acceptable and
more revealing name for £ other than 'V' is '' [£ and £].") In like
manner the matters of one property of relation being the conjunction
of other properties or relations, one state of affairs being the dis-
junction of other states of affairs, and so on, may be treated.
47
The concepts of entailment analyzed
also allow us to give identity-criteria for
in D.II.14 and D.II.15
states of affairs and
properties (or relations). These are
A. II. 12: Necessarily, for any state of affair
affairs £ is identical with £ if£ and £ entails £.
s £ and any state of
and only if £ entails
A. II. 13: Necessarily, for any property or relation F and any prop-ty or relation G, F is identical with G if and only if
^ entails ^ and ^ entails F.
And while on the subject, we may give identity-criteria for
of our basic ontological types. These are:
the rest
A. II. 14:
A. 11.15:
A. 11.16:
A. 11.17:
Necessarily, for any individual thing x and any indivi-dual thing £, X IS identical with £ if and only if
necessarily, for any place £, x exists in £ if and ’onlyIt £ exists in £.-*-'
Necessarily, for any set A and any set A is identical
with B if and only if, necessarily, for any thing x, x
IS a member of A if and only if x is a member of bT
“
Necessarily, for any time
_t and any time t'
,
t is
identical with
_t' if and only if, necessarily7 for any
thing X, X exists at
_t if and only if x exists at t'.
Necessarily
,
for any place £ and any place £'
, £ isidentical with £* if and only if, necessarily, for any
thing 2£, X exists in £ if and only if x exists in £* .
With this groundwork out of the way, we may now focus our at
tention more sharply on the particular problems that concern us here
—
how to characterize events and how to count them. What are we to say
about events? I share Chisholm's intuition that events are not propo
sitions. Accordingly, we require a definition of the term "proposi-
tion, and I propose that we accept the following:
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M - R is a proposition =df.
(i) £ is a state of affairs; and
(ii) it is impossible that there be a tlmo ^ ^
i; such that £ occurs at t and do^s^f Ir
I also share Chisholm’s intuition that such
-’contrived" states of
affairs as [Jones is such that Smith walks], [[John is tall] or
[Mary is short]], [John has walked a week ago], and so forth, ought
not to be ranked as events. Providing a definition adequate to the
ruling out of all such contrived states of affairs but adequate also
to the ruling in of all events properly so called is, however, a
fairly formidable task. Some preliminary definitions are required.
I think the thing to notice about events-what distinguishes
them from other sorts of states of affairs— is that they "directly
concern," in some sense, "straightforward" properties of individual
things. For instance, [Socrates walks] "directly concerns" the
"straightforward" property walking
,
whereas [Socrates is such that
Plato walks] does not "directly concern" any such "straightforward-
property. It seems to me that the way to capture these two notions
of "direct concern" and "straightforwardness" is as follows. First
of all we need an analysis of the concept of a simple property, a
property which is neither negative, nor conjunctive, nor disjunctive,
nor conditional. Unfortunately, we therefore require all of the
following:
F involves G =df. for any time £, [F is exemplified at
_t] involves [G is exemplified at t].
^ properly involves ^ =df
. £ involves G and G does notinvolve F. ~
D. 11.19:
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D. 11.20:
D. 11.21:
D.II.22:
D. 11.23:
F Is negative
-df. there Is a property G such that-(i) F properly involves G; and
“
(ii) necessarily, for any time
_t, F is exemplified at tif and only if g is not exemplified at
_t.
~
(i) F properly involves both G and H; and(ii) necessarily, for any time t, F is exemplified at t
an on y if both ^ and Ii are exemplified at t.
distinct properties Gand such that: —
(i) F properly involves both G and H; and
necessarily, for any time
_t,
^ is exemplified at t1 an only if either
^ or is exemplified at t.
F IS conditional =df. there are distinct properties G
and such that: —
(i) F properly involves both G and H; and(ii) necessarily, for any time
_t, F is exemplified at tif and only if either ~
(a) G is exemplified at t only if H is exemplified
at or
(b) is exemplified at ^ only if G is exemplified
at t.
“
We may then say:
F is simple =df. F is neither negative, nor conjunctive,
nor disjunctive, nor conditional.
Simplicity is not the only mark of "straightforward" proper-
ties, however. Such properties must also not be such that it is pos-
sible that everything may exemplify them. That is, they must not be
unlversalizable, where:
P- ’ If >25 : F is unlversalizable =df. it is possible that, for some
time
_t
,
everything that exists at jt has ^ at
Moreover, such properties must not be had ( i . e. , exemplified) essen-
tially by whatever has them, where:
is essential =df
. necessarily, for any thing x and any
time if x exists at ^ and has F^ at then there is no
time
_t' such that x exists at t' and does not have F at t'.
50
Finally,
"straightforward" properties r„„st not have certain
types of implication regarding past or futnre exemplifications. In
order to clarify
„,,at types of Implications are acceptable in this
respect and what types are not, we require first of all the following
F is a reflection of G =df.
(i) F is distinct from G; and
(xi) necessarily, for any thing x and any time t if xexemplifies F at t, then there is a time t^’dif^tinct from t such that x exemplifies G at~t'.
And we may say r
j:f^icti:: ^ ^ 1
Now, we cannot simply claim that all "straightforward" properties are
not reflective, for there are a few special properties, such as those
of dziaa. ffafsl'ing a book, and so forth, that are intuitively
"straightforward" and are also reflective. What can be said about
these special properties? It seems to me that any such property is
exemplified by a thing, x, if and only if it is necessarily the case
that there was a time at which x did not exemplify it. And so I pro-
pose
:
: .
_
IS emergent =df. necessarily, for any thing x and any
time
_t, if X exemplifies F at then there is a time t'
earlier than jt such that x does not exemplify F at t'.~
I think that we now have all the equipment we need to charac-
terize the concept of a "straightforward" property. Such a property
IS simple, nonuniversalizable, nonessential, and either nonreflective
or emergent. VJhat of an event's "directly concerning" such a proper-
ty? I believe the following analysis of the concept of an event ade-
quately captures this notion:
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£ is an event =df. n is .
(i) £ is not a prop^ition; and
^
=
(ii) there is a property F such that
(a) necessarily, for any state of affairs q, n en-tails £ if and only if ^ entails [there is something which is F],
LLu -
(b) necessarily, for any thing x and any time t if
^^exemplifies F at t, then £ is an Ldivldth
(c) for any time
_t, it is possible that nothing ex-emplifies F at
_t, and ^
(d) there is a property G such that
(ot) entails G,
( 3 ) G is simple,
(Y) ^ is not universalizable
,
( 5 ) ^ is not essential, and
(^) either G is not refleeiit/o/^i- a*-
—
uL t ii cciveor it is emergent.
Let us run D.I1.30 through a few test cases. Gonsider, first,
the case where £ is [two and two are four]. Is this an event? No,
xt IS a proposition, and thus ruled out by clause (i) of D.II.30.
What, then, of the case where £ is [Jones is such that Smith walks]?
I believe there is no candidate for the property G in this case. (In
particular any otherwise likely-looking candidate will fail either
clause (il) (d) (y)—as does being such that Smith walks—or clause
(ii) (d) (6)—as do being Jones and being an individual thing .) Hence
£, in this case, is not an event. So too with the case where £ is
[Jones is such that he has walked]. (Any otherwise likely-looking
candidate for G in this case will fail either clause (ii) (d) (6)—as
do ^eing Jones and being an individual thing— or clause (il)(d)(e)
—
as does being such that he has walked
.
)
Some states of affairs, nevertheless, are events, according to
D.II.30. Consider the state of affairs [Socrates dies]. One property
which satisfies what is required of F^ in this case is being such that
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Now, F entails (beln. suol. H.„e w„
diiaa, which Is simple, nonunlversallzable, nonessentlal
,
and emer-
gent; thus what is required of G Is satisfied. Hence [Socrates dies]
is an event.
Or consider the state of affairs [Smith washes his car]. One
candidate for F In this case Is belnR such that he is Smith
“SMHS_hi^i[ar. One candidate for G Is (being such that he Isl wash-
ing his car ; for this property Is entailed by F and is simple, nonuni-
versallzable, nonessential, and nonref lective. Hence [Smith washes
his car] is an event.
But D.II.30 also rules out certain states of affairs as events
that some may consider to be events and rules in certain states of af-
fairs as events that some may consider not to be events. For instance,
the requirement that G be nonessential rules out [Jones is Jones] as an
event, and this seems right;^^ but it also appears to rule out [there
are horses] as an event. Is the latter an event? I am not sure that
It IS. But if it is, D.1I.30 could, 1 think, be modified so that it
rules [there are horses] in while still ruling [Jones is Jones] out.
But 1 shall not undertake such modification here.^^ D . II
. 30 also rules
in as events such conjunctive states of affairs as [[Smith washes his
car] and [two and two are four]]. I am not sure that this is not an
event, but, if it is not, D.II.30 could, I think, be modified so as to
rule it out. Once again, however, I shall not undertake such modifica-
tion here. Or finally, it might be objected that D.II.30 takes no
account of the phenomenon of change or transition, and that this is
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essential to a state of affairs' being an event. For instance, it
may be protested that, according to D.II.30, (Socrates sits] is an
event, but that since, to put it very loosely, nothing (much) happens
when Socrates is sitting, [Socrates sits] should aot be said to be an
event. I have some sympathy with the intuition underlying this pro-
testation. It is generally recognized that, in some prominent sense
of "event," all events Involve change. Some Insist that this is the
only proper use of the teimj^® others allow for a broader use.^^ I
side with the latter, and D.I1.30 is testimony to this. However, I
think the concept of an event which essentially Involves change is an
Important one, and 1 believe that an analysis of this concept could be
given in terms of D.II.30. But I shall not undertake this analysis
here.^°
Assuming that what has just been said succeeds in capturing
the identifying characteristics of an event, we may now turn our at-
tention to the second main question that concerns us here, and that
has to do with the counting of events. How are we to explicate the
concept of recurrence? What is it for an event to occur once, twice,
or any number of times? In this connection, I think Chisholm's con-
cept of concretlzation can prove useful. Let us say first of all, the
following
:
D. II . 31 : entails
^ =df. Necessarily, for any person S and any
times
_t and
_t ' :
~
(i) if £ occurs at _t, then is exemplified at t; and
(ii) if
^ accepts [£ occurs at at , then ^ accepts
is exemplified at t] at t'.
Let us also say:
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^ is a proper subset of A =df.
(1) every member of B a member of A- andUi) some member of A is not a member of B.
n these definitions, we may move on to
of concretization
. I propose:
an analysis of the concept
a concretizes at t =df.
(i) A is a set;
(ii) occurs at t;
(ill) for every property F, If £ entails F and It is notpossible that something other than an individualhing exemplify then some member of A has F at
_t; and — —
(iv) there is no proper subset B of A such that for
every property F which p entails and which ’it is notpossible for something other than an individual
thing to exemplify, some member of B has F at t.^l
A fringe benefit of the foregoing analysis of the concept of
concretization is that we are now in a position to analyze the concept
of a state of affairs’ taking place. Again, sticking closely to
Chisholm's proposal, I suggest the following:
D. 11
. 34
: £ takes place at p in p. .
A such that: ^ P„
-df. there is a set
(i) A concretizes p at t; and
(ii) for every place p, if £ is identical with p , or
•
,
or p is identical with p^ , then some member
of A exists in p at t.
^
It follows from the foregoing definitions that every event is such
that, if ever and whenever it occurs, it takes place in some place or
places. In connection with this it is appropriate to discuss the
question of whether or not it is possible for a state of affairs of
the form [p and not p] ever to occur. The easy answer is of course
that it will not. For, given A. II. 10 and D.II.9 through D. 11.12
above, it follows that such a state of affairs cannot possibly occur;
that is, p cannot occur while not-p occurs. But the question then
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arises: Wliat about a state of affairs such as |[snow falls] and [snow
does not fall]]? Is It not possible for it to snow In Boston while
it is not snowing in Los Angeles? Must we then conclude that [snow
does not fall] is not Che negation of, and Indeed does not even con-
tradict, [snow falls]? I think we can and should avoid concluding
this. Note that [snow does not fall] is not an event, since it could
occur in a universe where there are no individual things. [Snow does
not fall] cannot then (by D.II.34) take place in any place or places;
in particular, it cannot take place in Los Angeles, and hence the
plausibility of the contention that [[snow falls] and [snow does not
fall]] can occur is undermined. Certainly [[snow falls in Boston]
and [snow does not fall in Los Angeles]] can occur; but this is not
of the form [p^ and not-p] .
It will be recalled that the major criticism made in Chapter I
against Chisholm's account of recurrence was that he maintained that
cessation is the mark of completion. It was pointed out in that chap-
ter that, although this holds true in some cases, it does not hold
true in all cases. There are, in other words, certain events that
can occur more than once in succession. Examples of such events are
[Jones walks around the block], [Smith swims a lap], and so forth.
Now, it seems to me that every event which can happen more than once
in succession involves a "measure" of some sort; the measure may be a
block, a lap, a mile, or whatever. Moreover, measures may be divided;
one can walk halfway around the block, swim half a lap, run half a
mile, and so forth. That is, the occurrence of a measure-event
56
entails the occurrence of otlier events which .nay be called fractions
of It. And it seems to me that the distinguishing mark concerning the
completion of measure-events is that such events are completed when
and only when all their fractions have occurred. However, fractions
are such chat they occur in succession. In view of all this. I pro-
pose the following:
D.I1.35:
D.II.36
^ is just prior to _t' =df
.
(i) is earlier than
_t'
; and
(ii) there is no time
_t* such that
_t is earlier than t*
and
_t- is earlier than t'. ~
t
— n
-1
£ occurs just prior to r =df.
and also times
_t'
,
. .
(i) £ occurs at _tj
,
and
. .
(ii) £ occurs at _t
'
j , and .
(ill) none of the
_t^ is identical with any~o?’the t'^; andUv; _t^^ IS just prior to
_t'^. ^
^
there are times
’ such that:
and at t ;
,
and at t
And then we may say:
D.I1.37;
D.I1.38:
£ is a fractioii of £ -df. £ and £ are events such that:(i) for any time
_t, [£ occurs at _t] entails, for some
time £ earlier than or identical with t, [q occurs
at £' ]
;
and “
(ii) there is an event £ such that
(a) for any time
_t, [£ occurs at £] entails, for some
time
_t' earlier than or identical with t, [r
occurs at £' ] , and
~
(b) if £ occurs, then either £ occurs just prior to
£ or £ occurs just prior to £.
£ is a measure-event =df.
that
:
(i) £ is a fraction of £; and
(ii) £ is a fraction of £.
there are events £ and £ such
An example of a measure-event is, as already said, [Smith swims a
lap]. Examples of fractions of this event are [Smith swims half a
9 olap], [Smith swims a third of a lap], and so on.
The two types of completion may now be accounted for in one
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formula
;
D- 11.39: A completes £ at t =df. A is t „
a time such tliacTelther “
j, an event, and t
(i)(a) £ is not a measure-event, and(b) tliere is a time t' such that
(oi)
^ is just prior to t',
(3) A concretizes £ at I, ’and
(y) A does not concretize £ at t ' • or(,ii;(a) £ is a measure-event, and
~ '
(b) for any event a, if ^ is a fraction of „,then there is a time such that
a)
I’
is earlier than or identical with t, and(.3) A concretizes £ at t'. ~
We may then say:
D. 11.40: £ occurs exactly £ times at t =df.
sets which complete £ at t.
there are exactly n
Furthermore:
D. 11.41: £ occurs exactly £ times at t in £ ,there are exactly £ sets A
~
any set A, if A is identical with An ,~oris identical with Aj^
,
then
(i) A completes £ at £, and
(ii) for any place £, if £ is identical with £n
,
or
.
. or £ is identical with v, then’some
member of A exists in £ at ^
^
such; Y;that. for
or A
t.
More generally, we may also say:
D. 11.42 A completes £ exactly £ times =df. there are exactly
£ times _tj^, . .
.
,
_t^ such that A completes £ at t-, ,
.
.
.
,
and A completes £ at t .
And finally:
R occurs exactly £ times =df . there are k sets A-.
,
• •
.
,
Aj^ such that:
(i) for any set A, if A is identical with A^
,
or
• .
.
,
A is identical with Aj^, then there is a
number m such that A completes £ exactly m times;
and ~
(ff) H is the sum of all such numbers.
According to the theory of events just outlined, events are,
in the vernacular of the current literature, "finely-grained” abstract
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The contention that events are finely-grained la contro-
versial, as is the contention that they are abstract, 1 think that
there are definite advantages to he gained fro. asserting the truth
of both these contentions, but this is a .atter that I shall leave
aside here.« There have, of course, been rival theories proposed
In the literature. Some philosophers contend that events are
coarsely-grained, concrete entitles. ^6 gome contend that they are
finely-grained, concrete entitles. None, so far as I know, con-
tends that they are coarsely-grained, abstract entitles. Some, of
course, contend that there are no such things as events at all.^S
But these are all alternatives that I shall not Investigate here.
There is one point, however, concerning the finely-grained
nature of events that should be taken into account here.” j „ould
Imagine that. If „e have any preanalytic intuitions at all concerning
the individuation of events, we would favor a theory according to
which events are coarsely-grained rather than finely-grained. And
perhaps It does appear, at first glance, that a theory where events
are finely-grained multiplies tlie number of events unacceptably. For
instance, suppose Jones slanders Smith viciously and with venom. How
many events occur here? According to the theory, several events oc-
cur, among which are [someone is slandered], [Jones slanders Smith],
[Jones slanders Smith viciously], [Jones slanders Smith with venom],
[Jones slanders Smith viciously and with venom], and so forth. (These
are all distinct events, given A. II. 12 above.) Some may object that
only one event is involved here. I disagree, however, and I know of
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no argument „Mch successfully cefuues
,.,y coute.uiou, Buf, u „,ay be
urged, surely it Is obvious that, when Jones slanders Smith (whether
It be viciously and with venom or not) Just one slandering eecurs;
and yet the present theory has it otherwise. But, in fact, the pre-
sent theory does ^ have it otherwise; and, although 1 contend that
several events occur when Jones slanders Smith, 1 agree that only one
slandering occurs (at that time and place). After all, what is a
slandering? It is reasonable to say that a slandering is an occur-
rence of the event [someone is slandered]. And, according to D.I1.41,
this event occurs exactly once at the time and place at which Jones
slanders Smith. It seems to me that the principle implicit in this
response may be extended to all similar cases (j^, a murder is an
occurrence of the event [someone is murdered], a theft is an occur-
rence of the event [something is stolen], and so on), and hence it
seems to me that the theory of events presented here is not counter-
intuitive after all, at least in the respect just discussed.
With this my presentation of the theory of events that I shall
presuppose in that theory of human action to be given in Chapter IV
IS complete. I shall now turn to a consideration of Chisholm's
latest published theory of human action. This theory will serve as an
introduction to the treatment of actions as abstract entities.
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CHAPTER III
CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION
l- Exposition of Ch itlin's Theory of Human Acrinn
In the past Chisholm has proposed several different theories
of human action. Just as he has proposed several different theories of
events. In this chapter 1 shall pursue a course similar to that which
I took in Chapter I. In the first section 1 shall concern myself with
an exposition of Chisholm's latest published theory of human action as
it appears in Chapter II, sections 4 through 9 of Person and Obiecr .^^
This account of action has been criticized in part by Alan Donagan.^
Chisholm has replied to this criticism,^ and I shall also concern my-
self with portions of his reply. m the second section of this chap-
ter I shall turn to a criticism of Chisholm's theory thus expounded.
So far in this dissertation I have used the term "theory"
rather uncritically, but it is time to ask what sort of thing we
should take a theory to be and what sort of information we should
reasonably expect a theory to provide. A theory is an account, but
what sort of an account? I think that the most critical requirement
that an account must meet in order to qualify as a theory is that it
be systematic. Certain assumptions should be explicitly made and by
means of these certain information derived. The information may come
in the form of definitions or in the form of theorems. Moreover,
there should be a general coherence, a general unity of purpose
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ifost in tllP Tr'r'riiiT-tf- T-P T*-If xt IS reasonably to be said to be a theory.
Any great degree of dissipation will disqoallfy it as snch.
Whereas the accounts of events presented in the preceding two
chapters may, I think, reasonably be called theories of events (ac-
cording to the rough criteria just mentioned), it is open to question
whether Chisholm's account of human action, as it appears in Person
qualifies as a theory of human action. For his discussion
of such action seems to suffer, not from logical, but from structural
incoherence. Despite Che presence of assumptions, definitions and
theorems, there seems at first to be no general unity of purpose in
his discussion. For Instance, a particularly glaring omlsslon-a
conspicuous lacuna in an otherwise painstaking piece of work—is
Chisholm's failure to say what he takes an action to be. One would
have thought an analysis of the concept of an action essential to any
^ fi^ theory of action (although, it is true, Chisholm is far from
being alone among so-called action-theorists in omitting to provide
such an analysis). However, Chisholm does seek to remedy this defect
in his reply to Donagan. Moreover, despite outv/ard appearances,
there is perhaps a fair degree of structural coherence in Chisholm's
account after all. For, by means of his account, he seeks to give
answers to some fairly basic questions concerning human action, among
which are the following. What is it deliberately to omit undertaking
something? What is it to do one thing by doing another? What is it
to undertake something for the purpose of bringing about something?
What is it to bring about something for the purpose of bringing about
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somethiiiP? Wliaf iq t ^t IS It to act intentionally? What is it to act
^^SiCcllXv? Tlipcip 'ir*o o 1 1 •a e all questions that lie at the foundation of
action-theory. In view of the fact that. In his reply to Donagan,
Chisholm also seeks to answer the question of what an action is, It
would seem less than charitable to refuse to call his account of
human action a theory. But let the reader be forewarned that the
account of human action whose exposition follows is stark, unremitting
in Its complexity, and its structural coherence is elusive.
Chisholm tells us"^ that he will base his theory of action,
that is, of human action, on the undefined locution "S undertakes at
t to contribute causally to the occurrence of (Henceforth,
whenever I say "action- I shall mean human action.) More often than
not, when appealing to the concept expressed by this locution, he sup-
presses all mention of the time of undertaking. Chisholm also pro-
vides us with four other locutions which he uses to express the same
concept. These are: "S endeavors at
_t to contribute causally to the
occurrence of
_S acts with the intention of contributing causally
to the occurrence of "s acts with the intention of bringing about
£, and ^ undertakes £. " The last version of course assures us that
the concept being invoked is not a new one; Chisholm has already ap-
pealed to It in his theory of events (see definition D.I.2). However,
there is a problem regarding Chisholm’s use of tense here. It seems
that, when he suppresses mention of times, he is taking tense serious-
ly. For instance, it seems that he takes "S undertakes £" to mean
the same as ^ now undertakes £." But often he does mention times
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explicitly, and when he does so it see.s that he does ^ ,ahe tense
setlonsly. Pot instance,
'.S nndettahes
^ at t" ptesn^ahly should not
be taken to .ean the sa^e as "S now undertakes £ at t"; for the latter
is a phrase which has no clear sense, at least when t is distinct fro™
now (as Chishol™ surely allows for).^ But whereas this Inconsistent
treatn,ent of tense raised problems in our evaluation of Chisholm’s
theory of events, no such problems arise, I believe, with respect to
eory of action. As will soon be seen, concern with the mention
of times may almost always be profitably dispensed with in evaluating
Chisholm's theory of action.
Chisholm initially makes seven assumptions concerning the con-
cept of undertaking. These are:
AiIILlI- [1 undertakes £] does not imply [S desires £]
.
[S undertakes £] does not imply [£ occurs].
[_S undertakes £] does imply [£ exists].
[^undertakes £ and £ entails £ and S believes [£ en-
tails £] and ^ is rational] does not imply [^ undertakes
[^undertakes £ and ^ believes [by bringing about p hewill bring about [£ and £] ] and ^ is rational] doesimply [^ undertakes [£ and £] ] .
^
[^ undertakes £] does not imply [S considers [S under-
takes £] ] . —
undertakes £] does imply [it is directly within S's
power to know [^ undertakes £] ]
.
~
Chisholm calls A. III. 4 the principle of the nondivisiveness of inten-
tion and A. III. 5 the principle of the diffusiveness of intention. The
it is directly within s power" which is employed in
A. III.
2
A. III.
3
A. III.
4
A. III. 5:
A. III. 6:
A. III.
7
locution
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A.III.7 is defined elsewhere by Chlsholn.; I shall not consider it in
detail here.
There is one other concept that Chisholm introduces unanalyzed
into his theory of action-that of causal contribution. Chisholm in
fact uses the term "causal contribution" and its cognates in two
quite distinct ways, although he is often not that careful in dis-
tinguishing these. The first way is to use it to designate a relation
that holds between events and events. It is v^hen used in this way
that the term expresses an unanalyzed concept, often called the con-
cept of event-causation. The second way is to use it to designate a
relation that holds between persons and events. When used in this way
the term expresses a concept that is often called the concept of
agent-causation. Chisholm analyzes this concept in D.III.4 below.
All that Chisholm does by way of Initial characterization of the con-
cept of event-causal contribution is to say the following. First,
and roughly, an event r may be said to be a sufficient causal condi-
tion of another event
^ just in case it is physically necessary that,
if £ occurs, then £ occurs.^ Secondly, an event £ contributes causal-
ly to another event £ only if £ is part of an event r that occurs and
IS a sufficient causal condition of £. As an example of such causal
contribution Chisholm cites the familiar case of the presence of oxy-
gen in a room contributing causally to a fire.
Because the logic of intentional action that Chisholm pro-
poses is complex, I shall make use of abbreviative symbolism when
discussing it. Chisholm himself does not use such symbolism in Person
,w. l.y „,.
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In his paper, Donagan complains that Chisholm's theory of
action, as propounded in Person and Objec
actions
; that is, according to Donagan,
count commits one to the view that there
t, "unacceptably multiplies
acceptance of Chisholm's ac
are many more actions than
It is in fact reasonable to believe there are. Donagan asks us to
consider a case where a person seeks to step over a puddle, misjudges
Ills stride, and steps into the puddle, thereby getting his feet wet.
In this connection, Donagan says:
oj''aftalrr'aj"? ^ analysis, an action is a stateairs, t least three distinct actions can be distineuished
o?der?rst“‘' ‘"’’f - l®‘’8thenlng his stride (in
strlL i„f (2) S lengthening hiside nsufficiently to clear the puddle; (3) ^ stepping intole puddle; and (4) ^ getting his foot wet. Here, since (1)oes not entail (2), although (2) entails (1), (1) and (2) are
f
states of affairs. And since in none of the pairs
orme y the set (2), (3) and (4) does either member entail
e other, (2), (3) and (4) are each distinct from the others.
In this passage Donagan correctly ascribes, by implication at least,
to Chisholm the view that mutual entailment is a criterion of identity
for states of affairs. Donagan is therefore quite right in saying
that, according to Chisholm, all of (1) through (4) are distinct
states of affairs. Indeed, all of (1) through (4) are distinct events
,
according to Chisholm. Now, the charge that events are unacceptably
multiplied according to the criterion of identity based on mutual
entailment is one that was addressed and dismissed in the last chap-
ter. But what is puzzling about Donagan 's passage is that it imputes
a view to Chisholm that Chisholm never espouses in Person and Object.
For, to repeat, in that book Chisholm never says what he takes an
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action to bo. Howovor in i o v-^ ie e , m his reply to Donagan, Chisholm obliges us
In this regard with the foUowiag characterization:
We could say
. .
. that a person's action on a given occaSion IS that conjunctive state of affSTJ which conslstrh)of the person's undertaking whatever it was that he did ua-
that'^hl a
along with (b) the various thingst is undertaking brought about-the events or states ofaffairs which are such that the agent's undertaking con-
oraffaLs?13^
“ocurrence of those events or states
By this Chisholm seems to mean the following:
Damn: Zp
-df. (aq)(3rp
. .
. (3rp(Uq & c[Uq], r, i
. . . s
^ C[Uq]
,
r & i(3r) (C[Uq]
,
r
P = [|Uq] & r, &
r 1).l^ 1
This definition is certainly problematic, but I shall postpone all
criticism of Chisholm's theory of action until the next section of
this chapter.
Ihe next concept to be analyzed is that of deliberately omit-
ting to undertake something £ (or, simply, of deliberately omitting £,
as Chisholm sometimes, and perhaps misleadingly, puts it). Chisholm
proposes
:
—
• I II . 2
; ^ deliberately omits undertaking £ at t =df.
(i) ^ considers undertaking £ at _t; and
(ii)
^ does not undertake £ at t.
We may symbolize this as follows:
Op =df. G[Up] & -Up.
Chisholm next moves on to an analysis of the concept of agent-
causal contribution, for whose advocacy he is well-known. He attempts
to analyze this concept in two stages. First he proposes:
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S does something at
^ which contributes causallv t
(li H
""
t
^ elthe?
^
i) undertakes q at tl rnn^r^K..*-
(il) S deliberately^nltl
q at t and n
affairs which is [S delibe7ately^omits
aJ
that is: Sp =df. (aq)(C[Uq],p v (Oq & p = [Oq])).
He then proposes:
-DrlllcA: S contributes causally at ^ to £ >df. either:
( 1
)
l^does something at t that contributes causally to
(fi) there is a ^ such that
(a) S undertakes
^ at t, and
(b) undertakes is £; or(iii) there is an jc^ such that
(a)
I
does something at t that contributes causallyto £, and ^
(b) [S does something that contributes causally to
that is: Ap =df. Sp v (aq)(Uq & [Uq] = p) v (3r) (Sr & [Sr] = p)
.
(Chisholm sometimes uses the phrase "S brings about £- instead of "S
contributes causally to £.”) D.III.4 is a formidable definition.
Clause (1) would appear relatively straightforward, but to get a
grasp on the rationale that underlies clauses (ii) and (iii) we should
consider four principles which Chisholm calls "theorems of agency."
They follow, he says, from his ontology of events and his analysis of
the concept of agent-causal contribution. The theorems are:
T. III. 1:
T.III.2:
T. III. 3:
If
^ contributes causally to £, then £ occurs.
where "—3 " symbolizes strict implication:
Ap -9 Tp
. )
If ^ does something that contributes causally to £, then
^ contributes causally to does something that con-
tributes causally to £]
.
( f -e. , Sp —a A[Spj.)
If ^ contributes causally to £, then there exists a £
such that
^ undertakes £.
( f
.
Ap
—
i
(3q)Uq.)
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If
^ undertakes p, then S ^nn^riK .
[S undertakes
.
~ ntributes causally to
( I-e.
,
Up —i A[Up].)
T.m.l is a theorem, since ll is confined by all classes of
0-III.4. It is confirmed by clause ( 1 ) of that definition by virtue
Of the fact that it is confirmed by D.III.3; and it is confirmed by
D.III.3 by virtue of the fact that (j, contributes causally to im-
plies that i occurs. That it is confirmed by clauses (ii) and (lii)
is easily seen. As for T.III 2 thic i j-s follows directly from clause
) of D.I1I.4. However, it seems to me that T.III
.
3
is not a
theorem. For if s contributes causally to j, simply by virtue of the
fact that £ is [S deliberately omits r J , then there is no £ that S
undertakes. But I do not consider this a vital chink in Chisholm's
armor, and I shall not pursue the matter. Finally, T.III. 4 follows
directly from clause (ii) of D.III.4.
Chisholm also notes that the following are not theorems of
agency
:
If
^ undertakes then p occurs ( i . e
.
, Up •—i Tp);
If S contributes causally to p, then S undertakes p
( i-e.
,
Ap —3 Up); ~ ^
If
^ undertakes p, then S_ undertakes [S undertakes p](i-e-
> Up —J U[Up]). “ ^
The two most important theorems are T.III. 2 and T.III. 4. it
is because Chisholm wants to be able to affirm these that he includes
clauses (lil) and (ii), respectively, in D.III.4. And Chisholm
wants to be able to affirm these for the following reason. The con-
cept of agent-causal contribution is invoked in part to salvage the
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concept of the agent's moral responsibility for his actions even when
those actions are not caused by any events. But the concept of agent-
causal contribution would not be adequate to this task were it not
stipulated that an agent’s contributing causally to an event is it-
self something to which the agent contributes causally. I shall ex-
pand on this in the next section.
Given the following definition:
j) is a necessary causal condition of q =df n . a
logicair"’ physically necessar;,ically necessary that, if q occurc:
£ occurs at t or prior to t, ^ -t’
Chisholm says that he wishes also to assume the following:
Ariliwl: If a state of affairs £ occurs and S contributes causally
causaurtr^f
condition of £, then S contributes
He makes this assumption because it enables him to say that an agent
may contribute causally to subsequent free (1^. un-event-caused)
actions both of other agents and of himself.
Chisholm also makes the following observation. The lower-
case schematic letters in the definitions, assumptions and theorems
so far formulated in this chapter are to be replaced by expressions
designating actions
. He gives as examples: "His raising his arm,"
"His stealing the money," and "His breaking his promise." But he
also makes the following remark:
would assume, however, that what is intended by most such
action expressions could be paraphrased (doubtless sometimes
cum ersomely) into our undertaking”
. . . vocabulary without
u ing terms that themselves designate actions.
Chisholm next moves on to a consideration of an expression
75
which he calls "fundamental to the theory
concerns the notorious
"by"-relacion, and
lowing
:
of agency." The expression
Chisiiolm suggests the fol-
^contributes causally at
^ to p; and(ii) that event which is [S contributes causally at t to£] also contributes causally to
^ °
that is: Rp,q Ap & C[Ap],q.
Chisholm explicitly rejects the following definition:
Rp,q =df. Ap & Cp,q
and for good reason. He correctly remarks that, for example, when we
y ( we ever do say) that by contributing causally to his hand's
being extended out of the car window the driver contributed causally
to his signalling, we do not imply that the driver’s hand's being ex-
tended out the car window contributed causally to his signalling.
But Chisholm does contend that when we say this we do imply that the
driver’s contributing causally to his hand's being extended out the
car window contributed causally to his signalling. This statement is
of course, controversial. It is worth remarking here, though, that
despite Chisholm's assertion that the "by"-relation is fundamental to
the theory of agency, he does not appeal to it in what follows.
So far none of the concepts analyzed in this chapter goes any
way towards providing an analysis of the concept of intentional action
In order to provide such an analysis, Chisholm begins with the follow-
ing definition:
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^^^lLLL_7: ^ undertakes p and does <=;n n
about a =df. \ uudertakL
(11) 1[S undertakes j,] contributes causall^'LV^
that is: Pp,q =df. U[p & [C[Up],q]].
Chlshol. so™eti„.es rephrases the deflniendu™ as "S undertakes
^ as a
means to (bringing about) a," and he assumes;
Uq!) - andertakes £.
He also notes that (S undertakes £ for the purpose of bringing about
£l implies neither that £ occurs nor that £ occurs. To underscore
the attractiveness of D.III.7, Chisholm contrasts it with a simpler,
but erroneous definition, to wit:
Pp,q =df. U[p 6 [Cp,q]].
This definition Is defective, Chisholm says, simply because, for some
£ and £, one may undertake £ for the purpose of bringing about £ and
yet £ may precede £. (For Instance, let £ be [the cabin at the foot
of the hill is destroyed) and £ be [the boulder rolls straight down
the hill].) Chisholm explicitly rejects the possibility that £ both
succeed and contribute causally to
^ and hence, by this light,
D. III. 7. a is to be rejected. This problem does not arise with
D.III.7, however; indeed, Chisholm believes that D.III.7 successfully
accounts for such otherwise anomalous cases in addition to the more
straightforward cases.
Chisholm contends that the locution contributes causally to
£ for the purpose of bringing about £" is "readily reducible" to the
terms he has already presented, and in a footnote he proposes the
following definition:
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^ contributes causally to n t-u^
about n -Hf ^ purpose of bringing
^ d . there is an £ such that: ^
P^^rpose of bringing about
ILJ^ [fS undertakes r] contributes causally to ^] ] ;
(ii) undertakes £] contributes causally to £;
that is: Qp,q =df. (ar)(Pr, [r & [C[Ur],q]] & C[Ur],p).
This definition, he believes, provides a correct analysis of such
statements as "Smith blew up the palace for the purpose of
about the death of tlie king." In this connection Chisholm
following theorem:
bringing
notes the
1| contributes causally to £ for the purpose of bringing
about implies that £ occurs but not that q occurs.
Qp»q —3 Tp but Qp,q Tq.)
At this point Chisholm feels that he is in a position to deal
with the following objection to his theory. The objection is that
his theory requires that whenever a person contributes causally to an
event, he contributes causally to his contributing causally to that
event ( 1. e.
,
the theory requires the truth of "Ap —
3
A[Ap]"); but
this is true, so the objection runs, only on those special occasions
when a person causes himself to do something, such as when he leaves
a reminder on the table in order to bring it about that he will do a
certain thing the next day. Chisholm's reply is that the objection
confuses
^ s contributing causally to his contributing causally to £
with ^ s doing something for the purpose of contributing causally to
his contributing causally to £ ( i.e. , it confuses "A[Ap]" with
(3ci)Qq,[Ap] ). He acknowledges that from the fact that S contributes
causally to £ it does not follow that ^ does something for the purpose
of contributing causally to his contributing causally to £. But this
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point has no bearing on the troth of "Ap ^ A(Ap]."
Continuing with his discussion of .eans and ends. Chishol.
oeehs to analyze the concept of an end in itself. But this is peri-
P-al to our present concern, and 1 shall not discuss his treatment
issue here. I qIi^iiall move on. ratlier. to Chisholm's attempt
Po distinguish between undertaking something as a preliminary step
towards a certain goal and making an attempt (i^. taking a final
ds) that goal. He notes that a person who makes an attempt
to kill someone will (usually) have already undertaken several pre-
liminary steps towards that goal, such as buying a gun. loading it.
ng It. and so on. He also notes, however, that one may undertake
something as a preliminary step towards a goal which one does not
plan personally to attain; for instance, one may undertake preliminary
steps towards bringing about the death of a politician with a view to
someone else's making the attempt on his life. Por this reason, and
first and only time, the question of which agent does what
becomes important. Chisholm proposes:
I
£ as a preliminary step towards bringing about£ df. S undertakes £ and does so for the purpose ofringing it about that someone bring about £;
that is: sJp,q =df. sPp, [(3s')s'Aqj.
Note that it is consistent with this definition that "s" and "s'"
designate the same agent. A final step is one that is not preliminary.
Hence
:
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^ makes an attempt to bring about £ =df.(i)
^ undertakes £; and
“^'^'’‘’8 ^ preliminary step
that is; Kp =df. Up &
~(aq)Jq,p.
Chisholm makes six observations concerning the concept of
making an attempt when analyzed as in D. 111. 10. First, making an at-
tempt to bring about a state of affairs does not imply failure to
bring about that state of affairs. Secondly, undertaking a prelimin-
ary step towards bringing about a state of affairs £ itself consti-
tutes making an attempt to bring about, not £, but another state of
affairs £ which is a means to £. (That is, [Jr,p] implies [[~Kp] &
[(aq)(Kq & Pq,p)]].) Thirdly, attempts (so defined) may be either
"half-hearted” or confident. Fourthly, making an attempt at a time t
to bring about £ does not rule out the possibility of making an at-
tempt at a later time
_t' to bring about the negation of £. For in-
stance, a person may make an attempt to assassinate someone (by
planting a bomb, for example), then come to regret his action and
attempt to "undo” what he has done before it is too late. Fifthly,
making an attempt to bring about a state of affairs is compatible with
undertaking a preliminary step towards that same state of affairs. As
Chisholm says, the would-be assassin may fire a pistol with one hand
while reaching for more ammunition with the other. Finally, there is
a distinction between, for example, the d£ dicto statement "The as-
sailant made an attempt to bring about the death of the king" and the
he re statement "The king was such that the assailant made an attempt
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to bring about his " r\U death. One might be justified in nff.- •
_
affirming the
a ter while denying the former.
The analysis of the concepi of making an aften,pf allows Chis-
holm to attempt an analysis of the concept of intentional action. It
might at first seem that the following would suffice:
LiTl. ^brings about £ Intentionally =dfU; _S undertakes £; and
(11) [S undertakes £] contributes causally to £;
that Is: Ip
.<jf. Up ^ C(UpJ,p,
But the (iefiniens of
successful, and not o
D.ni.ll manages to capture only the concept of
f intentional, action; for the success may well
be unintentional. Chisholm gives
unintentional action. The first
vertent success":
two examples of such successful but
is a case of what he calls "inad-
^ent orkUui/r-""fr“® home with the in-
over and killca^ —
£pute, he accidentally runs
be none otL“\har^L=“«e"’dervi^^:i^!?f^'"^" ^
The second Is a case of what Chisholm calls "happy failure":
ilceLa^rforihe everything he believesnecess ry f the complete execution of his plan and
at hirvlctir'^r*"^ failure. In shiotliig
the i^rsfo^tM then, Inescape, the intended victim is killed byan unexpected stroke of lightning. 18 ^
Chisholm believes that what is wrong with D. III. 11 is that it fails
to account for the fact that an agent acts intentionally provided
that he brings about something in the wav he intended
. He believes
that what this amounts to is a requirement that the agent be, not just
successful to some degree, but completely successful in his endeavor
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to bring about the Intended state of affairs. And so to tua , cap ure the
concept of a genuinely intentional action Chlsholc , i m proposes the fol-
lowing definition:
ll.a:
^ is completely successful nr, k- j
bring abLt £
“ has endeavor at
J: to
(") hiih-
-diL\e\^^?*rihr
-p:- Ofringing about £ contributes causally to £;
that Is: Ip =df. Kp 4 (q)(Pq,p cq,p).
Chisholm notes that D. 111.11. a ™ay appear too rigid for the following
reason. Suppose that, according to one plan of action (e^, that of
death by shooting), the assassin succeeded in achieving everything he
undertook for the purpose of bringing about the death of his victim,
but that he also acted upon an alternative plan (e^, that of death
by bombing) as a precaution in case of failure to execute the primary
plan of action. Suppose this secondary plan Itself failed. Then not
—
rythlna that the assassin undertook for the purpose of bringing
death of his victim was successfully accomplished. Chisholm
acknowledges the truth of this point, but he notes that its sting is
diminished if one recognizes the fact that everything that the assas-
Sin undertook for the purpose of bringing about the death of his
victim by shooting was indeed accomplished.
As an addendum to his theory of action Chisholm presents two
final definitions. In the first the concept of a basic action is
analyzed. He proposes:
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^ brings about as a basic act at t =df.
(-L) [S undertakes p] contributes causally at t to n*
and — Hy
(ii) there is no p such that ^ undertakes a at t forthe purpose of bringing about p;
~
that is: Bp =df. C[Up],p ^ ~(3q)Pq,p.
In connection witL D.III.12 Chisholm notes that the following is
a theorem: Up B[Up]. The second concept to be analyzed Is that
of direct action, that of the bringing about of a state of
affairs without the benefit of causal intermediaries. Chisholm sug-
gests
:
D. III. 13:
that is:
^ brings about p directly at t =df.
(!) ^ contributes causally at p to p; and(ii) there is no p such that
(a) p contributes causally at p to p; and(b) p contributes causally to p;
Dp =df. Ap &
~(aq)(Aq & Cq,p).
In connection with D. III. 13, Chisholm claims the truth of the follow-
ing:
A. III. 10 ; Up —i D[Up].
This completes my exposition of Chisholm's latest published
theory of action. Before moving on to a criticism of it, let us
briefly take stock of what it is that Chisholm has given us; for my
exposition of his theory, in accordance with his own presentation of
it, has been rather austere. Chisholm has sought to tell us the
following: (1) what an action is (D.III.l); (2) what a deliberate om-
mission to undertake is (D.III.2); (3) what agent-causal contribution
is (D.III.4); (4) what doing one thing by doing another is (D.III.6);
(5) what undertaking one thing for the purpose of bringing about
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another is (C.m.7); (6) s„oui one i„i„g io. iUe pur-
pose of bringing about another is (D.III.8); (7) what making an at-
tempt is (D.III.IO); (8) what acting intentionally is (D. Ill, ll.a)
;
(9) what acting basically is (D. III. 12); and (10) what acting directly
is (D. III. 13). He has also provided us with several subsidiary defi-
nitions together with various assumptions and theorems. All of the
questions touched on have both an intrinsic interest and a direct
bearing on other pressing problems in philosophy, particularly In
moral philosophy. It is Important, therefore, to attempt to assess
how successful Chisholm has been in his treatment of these issues.
2^ Criticism of Chisholm's Theory of Human Ar.finn
I find it very difficult to evaluate Chisholm's theory of ac-
tion, partly because it is very rich and his presentation of it pithy,
but mostly because 1 have trouble dealing with the unanalyzed concept
of undertaking. Now, it is always a difficult matter to question the
comprehensibility of those concepts which serve as the basis of a
philosophical theory, for the philosopher who advances the theory is
always at liberty to say, "Well,
^ understand them." Nevertheless,
in the present case, 1 feel 1 must raise some doubts concerning both
.^on^prehensiblllty of the concept of undertaking and also its
to serve as part of the basis of a theory of action.
In attempting to come to grips with the concept of undertaking
it is worth consulting some papers written by Chisholm prior to his
completing Chapter 11 of Person and Object . In those earlier papers
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Where he discusees the topic of actlon^O chlshol™ does not take the
concept of undertaking as primitive. Instead he appeals to a locution
which may be symbolized as "Mp.q" and read as "S makes £ happen in
the endeavor to make
<i happen." (The concept has been expressed in
various ways by Chisholm in his various papers, but this reading will
do. 1) Concerning this undefined locution, Chisholm says that it
"expresses the concept of agency, for it refers to the person as
cause"
; and using it as his primitive locution, Chisholm offers the
following definition:
D- III. 14 : Up =df. (aq)Mq,p.
This earlier work of Chisholm's is very revealing. I suspect
P£.^_son and Object Chisholm does away with the locution "S
makes £ happen in the endeavor to make £ happen" simply because he
feels that he has found a way to do without it; that is, he feels that
he has found a way in which to base his theory solely on the concept
of undertaking and the other concepts already introduced, and hence he
dispenses with the introduction of the earlier locution whose only use
would be to allow for the analysis, in turn, of the concept of under-
taking. But the earlier locution is revealing in its obvious invoca-
tion of the concept of agent-causal contribution. Now, formally, in
his earlier works Chisholm analyzes the concept of agent-causal con-
tribution in terms of his undefined locution thus:
D. III. 4.
a
: Ap =df. (aq)Mp,q.
But it is obvious that one cannot understand, or be expected to under-
stand, the locution without first understanding the concept of agent-
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causal contribution. Similarly, any understanding of the concept of
undertaking relies on an understanding of the concept of agent-causal
contribution, and indeed this is manifest even in Person and Ohi eci
when Chisholm proposes that ”S undertakes £- be understood to mean
the same as "S undertakes (at t) to contribute causally to the occur-
rence of For this reason I find the analysis of the concept of
agent-causal contribution (given in D.III.4) bothersome. D.III.4 has
certain formal problems which will be duly noted below, but by far
Its most puzzling aspect is that it should be presented as a defini-
tion at all, since it is peculiarly unenlightening. In this it per-
haps resembles D.I.3 (in which the concept of a state of affairs is
analyzed). But its anomalous nature is aggravated by the fact that
Chisholm clearly intends it to be informative; for he presents it for
the express purpose of rebutting the contention that there is an
unbridgeable gap" between "event-causation" and "agent-causation,
I do not see how it begins to bridge this gap.
.,23
But the somewhat covert inclusion of the concept of agent-
causal contribution in the concept of undertaking does not in and
of itself constitute good grounds for criticism of either concept.
Nevertheless, I do question the propriety of drawing up a theory of
action in which the concept of agent-causal contribution figures ir-
reducibly (conceptually, if not formally). I have two main criti-
cisms in this regard. The first is that, with the concept of agent-
causal contribution presupposed, it appears impossible to give an
informative account of what it is to do something, and yet such an
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account su.ely aesl.a.le in e,.n pneseni eoniexi. u is snnpnis-
—ded in the last sec-
tion) that to act is to undertake a state of re •affairs; one would
perhaps expect him to say rather that to act is t ,e IS o make something
happen, i^. being something about. 1^, ,, eontribnte causally
to a state of affairs. Either way. however, whichever thesis Is
asserted, the account does not afford much enlightenment as to what
involved in acting. For the concept of undertaking is taken as
primitive by Chisholm, and, as has just been shown n aj u n , an understanding
of It seems to rely on an understanding of the concept of agent-
sal contribution. And so. unless one understands either of these
concepts, it seems that one is In no position to understand Chisholm's
thesis that to act Is to undertake a state of affairs. This point
applies also^
dldly admits that one is hardly likely to understand the concept of
agenpausal contribution unless one already understands what acting
Is. 2'' But surely this is a situation to be avoided, if at all pos-
sible, when presenting a theory of action.
My second criticism concerning Chisholm's implicit invocation
of the concept of agent-causal contribution right at the outset of the
presentation of his theory is that his reliance on this concept con-
stitutes a misapplication of the very insight which led him to intro-
duce the concept in the first place. It seems that Chisholm first
latched on to the concept of agent-causal contribution when seeking a
solution to the well-known problem that the ascription of moral
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o^ W.th the sepposlttoe that aetet^lnlst. is ttee a„a with the sup-
PosUioa that inaete™i„ia„ is ttae, aah .et it see.s te he the ease
U.at^ either Uete™i„is„ is true or indeterminism is troe.^S
-olm's solution, very roughly, is that a person may be morally
-sponsible lor his aetions beeause he contributes causally to them.
^en first presenting this solution, Chisholm likened the agent to a
prime mover unmoverl"^^ r,r^A tand characterized agent-causal contribution
thus
:
nothiig?-or''L''Le--cr ^^^tain events to happen, and
happen. 27
auses us to cause those events to
Chisholm would now declare this to be a little Inaccurate. As was
pointed out in the first section of this chapter, he would not now
say chat nothing or no one" causes a person to contribute causally
certain events, but rather that the person himself contributes
causally to his own causal contributions. This is required, according
to Chisholm, because the problem of the ascription of moral responsi-
bility being consistent with the truth of indeterminism would arise
once again if there were no cause at all (1^, neither an event-
cause nor an agent-cause) of a person's contributing causally to an
event. Hence, a necessary condition of a person's being morally
responsible for an event is that he contribute causally both to it
and to his causal contributions.
It IS not clear whether or not, when he first introduced the
concept of agent-causal contribution, Chisholm thought that an agent's
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con.r.bu.ing causally lo an evenl „as „ol only
„ecessacy also
sufficient foe his being
.oeally eesponsible foe u. „ He did
then he „ould have had the soef of ceifeeion he „as looking foe! a
crxteelon by which one .ighf distinguish those events foe which one
xs moeally eesponslble feo. those foe which one is not. Be that as
it ™ay. Chlshol. ceetainly does itot now believe that an agent's con-
tributing causally to an event is sufficient foe his being morally
responsible for it. For he now contends, as we have seen, that,
ihHHiXSr one acts, one contributes causally to an event; and yet
(reasonably enough) he does not accept that, whenevee one acts, one
incurs
..oral eesponslblllty foe an event. Indeed, in Person and Oh-
ject he Implicitly accepts the view that an agent S is moeally ee-
sponslble foe an event j> only If j, is within S's power, and that £ is
Within S's powee only if there is a
^ which S is free to undertake.
Moreover, he says that it is not the case that everything one under-
takes one is free to undertake. ^8 But, this being the case, there has
clearly been a shift in emphasis over the years in Chisholm's use of
the concept of agent-causal contribution. Originally invoked to
handle the thorny problem of how it can be that one sometimes is and
sometimes is not morally responsible for one's actions (and other
events), the concept of agent-causal contribution is now used by
Chisholm to characterize all action, whether or not moral responsibil-
ity Is Incurred as a result of the action. Not only does this neces-
sxtate a new account of how it is that one can be morally responsible
for some but not all of one's actions, it also serves to complicate
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Chisholm's account of action it-.in general without any concomitant gains.
It seems to me tliat there i genuine benefit to be derived from ap-
plying the concept of aeeni rra -rP g t-causal contribution to an analysis of free
action (see Chapter VI below '»• k <- i .u app ying it to an analysis of all
action, free and unfree, seems to me to serve no purpose. When used
thus it has no explanatory power, and it robs one of a useful tool in
the attempt to distinguish free from unfree action, a distinction
upon which an adequate account of how moral responsibility is possible
would appear contingent.
Insofar, then, as the concept of undertaking is conceptually.
If not formally, reliant on the concept of agent-causal contribution.
It seems to me that the very basis upon which Chisholm founds his
theory of action is unfortunate, for the reasons just outlined. More-
over, I also have trouble simply understam^ the concept of under-
taking, even when it is analyzed in terms of 'making j, happen in the
endeavor to make
^ happen." Part of this is of course due to the
fact that I believe the concept of agent-causal contribution has no
place in the analysis of the concept of action in general. But I am
also unsure how to construe the intentional aspect of the locution
which is conveyed by the phrase "in the endeavor." Clearly, the
concept expressed by the locution Is an Intentional one, both because
Chisholm explicitly says chat It is (and the locution is, after all,
an invention of his) and also because, in an earlier paper, Chisholm
expresses the same concept by means of a locution in which "in intend-
ing replaces in the endeavor. Nevertheless, Chisholm says that
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is no
.'aci oi „iii..
^
pen in the endeavor to .ake
^ happen/'^O
volxtionai light that I am intuitively moved to try to Interpret
^he locution "S undertakes £" and the use to which Chisholm puts it.
Be that as it may, when it comes to the comparing of intuitions lit-
tle constructive can be said, and so 1 shall now pass on to a blow-
by-blow criticism of Chisholm’s theory of action as expounded in the
preceding section, with the concept of undertaking tucked safely away
and immune to all further questioning.
Of course, the refusal to engage in further discussion of the
concept of undertaking constitutes a sort of pretense on my part.
For, If this concept is suspect, then so are all the definitions and
theorems that Chisholm has given us in his theory of action, since
the concept of undertaking plays a role in all of these. Neverthe-
less, it is worth suppressing suspicions concerning this concept in
order to unearth any further merits or demerits of these definitions
and theorems. Indeed, this is the course that I shall pursue in
general throughout this section: if the analysis of a concept has been
found to be suspect, all suspicions concerning it will be suppressed
when moving on to a consideration of the next concept. The point of
this method of pretense is, of course, to try as far as possible to
distill all that is insightful as well as all that is misleading from
Chisholm s theory of action— in short, to separate the wheat from the
chaf f
.
I start, then, with assumptions A.III.l through A. III. 7. The
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first three assumptions seem to me innocuous, even given my lack of a
clear understanding of the concept of undertaking. A. III. 4 and
A. III. 5 are, I think, controversial, but I would not know on what to
base a judgment as to their truth or falsity. A. III. 6 would seem to
be true. As for A. III. 7, I shall leave this aside entirely, since I
do not wish at this point to discuss the concept of being directly
''^ithin one’s power.
Wliat of the concept of event-causal contribution? 1 think the
concept is familiar enough, although some comment should be made con-
cerning Chisholm's brief characterization of it. Chisholm says that
if an event £ contributes causally to an event £, then there occurs
an event r_ of which £ is a part and which is such that it is physical-
ly necessary that, if it occurs, then £ occurs. Now, Chisholm is
32not alone in asserting this, but it is questionable whether he is
right to assert it, and indeed he appears to make some remarks that
are inconsistent with this assertion. At one point Chisholm claims
that an event £ may contribute causally to an event £, even if there
occurs no sufficient causal condition of £, provided that £ con-
tributes causally to an event £ which is a necessary causal condition
of £. He has in mind the following sort of case. It might be that
£, [Smith buys some balls], contributes causally to a necessary causal
condition £, [there are balls available], of £, [Jones hits a back-
hand]; and yet, if £ occurs freely, there occurs no sufficient causal
condition of £. Nevertheless, Chisholm says, in such a case £ does
contribute causally to £. I am inclined to deny this contention (but
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perhaps I a„ 3ln.ply Pherehy appealing to a concept slightly diifenent
from that to which Chisholm appeals). I would rather say that j,
"provides an opportunity" for ^’s occurrence in such a case (and I
all not attempt here to analyze the concept of the provision of
opportunity) rather than that £ contributes causally to
Even if I am right in this, however, I ^ believe that there
is still reason to doubt that it is necessarily the case that, if
^
contributes causally to then there occurs an event r which is a
sufficient causal condition of
^ and_ofjd^ ^ is a part . It is the
matter of £*s being a part of a sufficient causal condition of £,
rather than the matter of there occurring a sufficient causal condi-
tion of £, that I find troublesome. Perhaps the issue rests on the
proper analysis of the relevant concept of a part. But if, as seems
to be suggested by certain remarks that he makes, Chisholm considers
£ to be a part of £ just in case £ is a conjunctive event of which £
IS a conjunct, then, given his own characterization of the conjunction
of states of affairs (see A. 1. 5 in Chapter I)~according to which a
conjunctive state of affairs occurs when and only when all its con-
juncts occur— the contention that, whenever an event £ contributes
causally to an event £, there occurs an event £ which is causally suf-
ficient for £ and of which £ is a part, is certainly false. For con-
sider the following case. Suppose £ is [Smith throws a baseball] and
£ is [a window breaks], and suppose that £ contributed causally to £.
But suppose also that Jones was standing next to the window in ques-
tion and that he had it in his power to intercept the ball in its
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flight towards the window, but that he si„.ply chose uot to do so.
Now. let us say that occurred at t^ and
^ occurred at
^3. and that
Jones's interception, had It taken place, would have occurred at t
Then, even though £ contributed causally to it is not the case
^
that there occurred an r. of which was a part, and which therefore
(given the above characterization of the concept of a part) occurred
at t^. such that it was physically necessary that, if r occurred.
then i would occur. For Jones could have intercepted the ball at
.
In which case the window would not have broken at
^3. This implies'’
(and Chisholm accepts the implication) that it was physically pos-
sible, even given r's occurrence at t Tw u i .
— that Jones should intercept
the ball at t^ and hence that the window should not break at t Yet.
to repeat, since Jones did not intercept the ball. Smith's throwing
the ball ^ contribute causally to the window's breaking. However,
despite the fact that Chisholm's brief characterization of the con-
cept of event-causal contribution seems to be wanting for the rea-
sons Just given. It Is. as I have said, a familiar enough concept and
I shall not question the propriety of Chisholm's employment of It.
Let us now turn to a consideration of D.III.l, in which
Chxsholm analyzes the concept of an action. First, a rough distinc-
tion should be made, one which Chisholm appears not to make. It
should be noted that the term "action" is ambiguous in English—a fact
which has seldom been appreciated by action-theorists. In English we
use the word "action" to designate that which is done or brought
about, but we also use it to designate the process of doing or bring-
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Ing about somethlug. I shall call that which is brought about a
deed, and that which Is the bringing about of a deed a doing
. An
example of a doing is my raising my hand; what is brought about in
this case, i^, the deed, is my hand's rising. Now, bearing this
rough distinction between doings and deeds in mind, we should ask
what concept it is, the concept of a doing or the concept of a deed,
that Chisholm tries to analyze by means of D.lII.l. i think it is
almost certainly the former. Be that as it may, D.IlI.l is seriously
defective, for the reason that Chisholm himself gives when he pro-
poses A. 1.5; a conjunctive state of affairs occurs when and only when
all Its conjuncts occur. Now suppose that, for some effect r of
[1 undertakes
, £ does not occur when undertakes £] occurs; then,
according to A. 1.5, there occurs no conjunctive state of affairs
[ [^ undertakes c[] and ^] . It would seem, then, that according to
D.lII.l, if an action occurs at all, it occurs only while an under-
taking occurs. But this is surely a consequence unanticipated and
unintended by Chisholm.
If we overlook this problem with D.lII.l, another strange fea-
ture of it emerges, and that is that it is clearly supposed by Chis-
holm to be the case that one's actions ( i . e
.
,
doings) last indefinite-
ly. For there are indefinitely many events to which an undertaking
may contribute causally. But surely our common understanding of the
concept of a doing, rough as it may be, is such that we regard a
doing as an event which, when it occurs, has both a definite beginning
and a definite end. For instance, if I raise my hand and then let it
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drop, then my raising my hand has surely ceased r,.•:>ui.t;a.y to occur. But Chis-
holm, apparently, would disagree Now t a ...Si . , I do not wish to deny that it
is possible that certain actions (i^, doings) should continue to
occur perhaps long after the agent himself has departed from this
world
-on this point see Section 5 of the next chapter. But I do deny
that one must wait until it has been established that an undertaking
has ceased to have causal consequences (can this ever be established?)
before it may properly be said that an action (i^, a doing) has
ceased to occur—a claim which Chisholm apparently wishes to make.
Moving on to D.III.2, we find that this definition is also
defective. First, note that the definiens appeals to the concept of
consideration at a time rather than to the concept of consideration
s impliciter
. Once again, Chisholm's inconsistent treatment of tense
IS in evidence; but, as mentioned above, this point seems not to be
that important in the present context. Secondly, and more important-
ly, note that there is an explicit time-reference in the definiens as
Chisholm presents it which is only implicit in its abbreviated trans-
lation. To make this reference explicit the translation should read:
top =df. tG[Up] & ~tUp. But it seems to me a mistake to stipulate
that the time of consideration be identical with the time of omission.
Surely the failure to undertake £, if it is to count as the deliber-
ate omission to undertake £, should be subsequent to any consideration
of £. For undertaking, or the omission to undertake, if deliberate,
must await the outcome of deliberation; it cannot occur at a time when
the deliberation is still ongoing and Incomplete. To account for
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er
this, tha definition might be modified to read: tOp =df. (dt')(f < t
^ fCIUpJ) .
-tup. But. If rendered thus, It would clearly be defec-
tive; the deflniens could be true and the definlendum false. Consld
a case where S considers undertaking j, at t
' , is earlier than t,
and S falls to undertake £ at t because he Is dead at t; in such a
case we would surely not accuse S of deliberately omitting to under-
take £ at _t.
If Chisholm were to Insist on sticking with D.III.2 in Its
original form, another problem becomes apparent. Suppose £ is
[Smith runs on Tuesday) and suppose that at t (which Is earlier than
Tuesday) Smith considers undertaking £ but does not yet undertake It,
even though he In fact does later undertake to run on Tuesday and,
when Tuesday arrives, does run. Certainly Smith does not deliber-
ately omit to undertake £ on Tuesday, and It seems very odd to ac-
cuse him of doing so at £. But according to D.II1.2, such an accusa-
tlon is warranted.
It seems to me that Chisholm fails to take due note of an
expression which he himself employs: a deliberate ommission is an
omission which is committed
. But surely consideration of the under-
taking of a state of affairs is not sufficient to transform a mere
failure to undertake it into the commission of an omission to under-
take it. I suggest that what Chisholm should have said is:
D.III.2.
a
: Op =df. U[~p],
(where ~p signifies the negation of £) . Here the commission of an
omission is clearly seen, since there is something that S undertakes.
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(Possibly the
.osl appropriate deflnlens Is one of the
uf'IUpJ]; (at'Hf < t i t'Gp)
. tut~p]; (at'Ht' < t & t'cfupj) s
or one of several other alternatives. Perhaps also, to elim-
inate the possibility of an Irrational person's nndertahin, both
^ and
the negation of the deflnlens should read: U(~p| &
-Up, or some
variation on this. But I shall not enter into these matters here.)
There are two basic parts to D.III. 3
,
the definition of "S
does something at t which contributes causally to these are tL
two disjuncts in the definiens. With regard to the first disjunct
["[S undertakes
^ at t] contributes causally to £”) I shall only
point out that it reads as if a proposition, and not an event, con-
tributes causally to a state of affairs, and this is clearly contrary
to Chisholm's Intention. (Presumably, Chisholm wants to say some-
thing like undertakes contributes causally at ^ to al-
though there are problems with this also in that (1) Chisholm has not
provided any analysis of the concept of event-causal contribution at
a time, and (2) relativizlng event-causal contribution to just one
time IS in fact inadequate. With regard to the second disjunct,
( _S deliberately omits £ at _t and £ is that state of affairs which
is [S deliberately omits £]"), I must say that I find in it no role
for event-causal contribution. For, on Chisholm's analysis of the
concept of deliberate omission, the disjunct "Oq & p = [Oq]," when
expanded, reads "G[UqJ & ~Uq & p = [C[Uq] & [-Uq]]"; and on my defi-
nition it reads, when expanded, "U[-q] & p = [U[~q]]." In neither
case is there any mention of event-causal contribution; and yet the
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defi„ie„Cu„, reads:
-S does seething at ^ which conttlbutes
to
I suspect that Chlsholt, includes the second disjunct in the
deflniens of D.III.3 staply because he wants to be able to say that
[ p] implies [A(Op]J. For he makes the following contention (although
this was not mentioned In the preceding section): when "Sp" is de-
fined as in D.III.3, it follows from D.III.4 that S contributes
causally to his own deliberate omissions and their results. There
are two claims here: first, that [Op] implies [A[Op]J, and, second,
that, for anyn, [C[Op],q] topUes (Aq). To take the first claim
first: Chisholm's definitions do not in fact Justify his saying this.
It is true that, according to D.III.3, (Op) Implies [S[Op]J and that,
according to D.III.4, [S[OpJ] implies [A[S[Op]]J; nevertheless, these
definitions do not permit the Inference of [A[Op]) from [Op]. How-
ever, If "Op" were defined as I suggest In D. III. 2. a, then It would
be the case that [Op] implies [A[OpJ]. For, according to that defl-
nltion. Op means the same as "U[~p]'' and, according to D.III.4,
[U[~pJ] implies [A[U[~p]]].
With regard to the second claim (that [C[Op],q] implies
[Aq]), again this does not follow formally from any of the assump-
tions or definitions so far provided. The claim would seem to rely
on the general principle that [[Ap] & [Cp,q]j Implies [Aq]. Chisholm
in fact endorses this principle in an earlier publication,^^ although
he does not explicitly do so in Person and Object
.
(However, it is
obviously operative in D. Ill, 13.) Nevertheless, even this principle
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(which is certainly not a theorem of the system) does not sanction the
inference Chisholm makes. We may accept the principle that [Cp,q]
implies [Tp], and hence we may accept that [C[Op],q] implies [Op].
Therefore, [C[Op],q] implies [[Op] & [C [Op ] , q ] ]
.
^9 [A[Op]]
ollowed from [Op], then we would be able to say that [[Op] & [C[Op],
q]] implies [[A[Op]] & [C[Op],q]] and thus implies, according to the
general principle provided at the beginning of this paragraph, [Aq].
But we have just seen that [A[Op]] does not follow from [Op] ac-
cording to any assumptions and definitions with which Chisholm has
provided us.
I have already made mention of the anomalous nature of
D.II1.4, but there are other problems with it also. D. 111.4 fails to
fulfill one of its primary objectives, namely, the sanctioning of the
principle that from [Ap] one may derive [A[Ap]]. Chisholm clearly
subscribes to this principle (witness his reply to the objection
raised immediately following the presentation of T.III.5) and he
clearly does so, as 1 have mentioned, in order to salvage the notion
of moral responsibility. And yet D.1II.4 does nothing toward sanc-
tioning this principle. Now Chisholm obviously believes that agent-
causal contribution is transitive, although this does not follow
from D.III.4. But let us suppose that the transitivity of this re-
lation were a theorem of the system. Then it is indeed true, given
such transitivity and also clause (i) of D. 111.4 (whereby [Sp]
implies [Ap]) and, in addition, clause (ill) of D.III.4 (whereby [Sp]
implies [A[Sp]]), that [Sp] implies [A[Ap]]. But since [Ap] does not
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imply [Sp], this is still of no help, it is also trupF -LL J.S e, given clause
(11) of D.III.4, that [Up] implies [A[Up]]; but again, since [Up]
does not imply [Ap], ,bis too is of no help. It seems to me that
Chisholm should have stuck closer to the program of his earlier
publications in which he presents the analysis of the concept of
agent-causal contribution as in D.III.4. a above and in which he adds
as an assumption that [Mp,q] implies [M[Mp
,q] ,q] . This, combined
with the assumption (Chisholm does not claim it to be a theorem in
earlier publications, as he does in Person and Object with T.III.l)
that [Mp,q] implies that £ occurs, automatically yields the strict
equivalence of [Mp,q] and [M[Mp,q],q]. This would, I think, have
yielded at least some of the results that Chisholm seeks in Person
_and Object in a far less complex and unsatisfactory manner.
I have no quarrel with Chisholm's rejection of "Up Tp,"
Ap a Up, and "Up- J U[Up]" as theorems. His comments seem to
be quite correct in this regard. Nor do I find D.III.5 objectionable,
A. III. 8, however, I do question. It seems to me that in this assump-
tion Chisholm confuses the concepts of agent-causal contribution and
agent-provision of opportunity just as he elsewhere confuses (as was
mentioned above) the concepts of event-causal contribution and event-
provision of opportunity. But once again, I shall not attempt here
to give a fuller account of the concept of the provision of oppor-
tunity (although I shall do so later—see D.VI.17).
Chisholm s remark, that the lower-case schematic letters in
the assumptions, definitions and theorems so far formulated are to be
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replaced by expressions designating actions, is puzzling. I suspect
that he makes this claim at least partly in response to a comment
made by Annette Baler, on an earlier paper of his, to the effect that
he has failed to note chat the proper objects of one's Intentions are
limited to one's actions. Baler's contention, however, is, I think,
false, and Chisholm's capitulation ill-advised.^^ Ue have already
noted that Chisholm seems to use the term "action" to designate
doings; at least, he seems to use the term in this way in D.IlI.l.
Moreover, the examples that he gives when discussing the present point
( His raising his arm," "His stealing the money," and "His breaking
his promise") do indeed appear to be phrases that designate doings.
But Chisholm is surely wrong if he is to be understood to say that the
schematic letters that he has been employing are to be replaced in
every instance by expressions that designate doings. For, according
to his own analysis, a doing is a conjunctive state of affairs of
which an undertaking is of necessity a conjunct. Now, if Chisholm
were to claim (and 1 see no reason why he would not be prepared to do
so) that, necessarily, if ^ undertakes and p is a conjunct of p,
then ^ undertakes p; and if he insists that, necessarily, if S under-
takes p, then p is a doing; then he is committed to the view that [Up]
implies [(gq) U[Uq]]. Now, he has already denied the claim that [Up]
implies [U[Up]], and 1 do not. think that he would find the nev/ly-
noted implication of his views any more palatable than this claim.
Moreover, Chisholm's analysis of the concept of an action would seem
to be self-defeating if the range of the "p" in D.IIl.l were to be
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understood to be linii tpH t-pm ed to actions. I think that what Chisholm
should have said in this context Is that the lowet-case schematic
letters so far used are to be replaced by expressions designating
dSSds or, more accurately, either deeds or would-be deeds. But an
adequate understanding of this point must await the more detailed
discussion in the next chapter concerning the distinction between
doings and deeds.
It is difficult to evaluate D.ln.6. First, a minor point: as
before with D.III.3, clause (ii) of the deflnlens of D.III.6 seems to
require (despite Chisholm's use of the term "event") that a proposi-
tion contribute causally to an event, and this again Is clearly con-
trary to Chisholm's intention. Secondly, another minor point: the
"also" in clause (11) of the deflnlens seems to imply that not only is
[C[Ap],q] true if [Rp,q] is, but that [C[Ap),p] is true whenever [Ap]
IS. But this is false, even according to Chisholm, and hence is not
to be Inferred from his use of "also." (It would seem best in fact
simply to strike "also" altogether from the deflnlens.) Thirdly, and
more importantly, it is unclear why Chisholm thinks that D.I1I.6 con-
cerns a relation "fundamental to the theory of agency"; for the de-
finiendum bears no great resemblance to any normal statement concern-
ing that by
-relation with which most action-theorists appear to con-
themselves (if they concern themselves with it at all). The
lation that is usually discussed by such philosophers is expressible
in a phrase of the form "By ing, S s," where verbs expressing
doings replace the blanks. But Chisholm appeals instead to the
cern
re
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concept of agent-causal contribution, rather than to the concept of
oing or acting, and it has already been remarked that in earlier
publications he says that to do or to act is to undertake a state of
affairs; nowhere does he say that to do or to act is to contribute
i-H-Uz to a state of affairs. But let ns for the moment suppose
that in Persojz^ni^^y^ Chisholm in fact does tacitly accept the
that to do or to act is to contribute causally to a state of
affairs; how does D.I1I.6 fare nn ^h-!o o • .t o this supposition? This is difficult
to determine. Note that, in order for (Rp„) to imply not Just [Ap]
but also (Aq] (as is clearly desirable), the principle that [(Ap) i
lC[Ap],qJ] implies [Aq] must be true.^'^ But this is not a theorem of
the system. Moreover, if, as I have argued above, Chisholm's use of
the concept of agent-causal contribution is objectionable, it is not
easy to assess the truth of D.III.6. Should we assert that, whenever
an agent does something
^ by doing something £, then his doing £
causes cj to occur? Any adequate answer to this question would have
to rely on an acceptable analysis of the concept of doing something.
But Chisholm has not provided such an analysis.
Turning now to D.III.7, we may note once again that Chisholm's
analysis appears wanting. This is a difficult matter, but if we are
to understand the definiendum in what seems to be the intuitive way,
then the deflniens is inadequate. Consider the case where is [some-
one undertakes £] and ^ wants to occur (perhaps for purposes of
demonstration); and suppose that
^ himself undertakes £ for the pur-
pose of bringing about £. It certainly seems that in such a case S
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does not undertake to brinoo about that his undertaking £ should
£ause £ to occur; and so there seemc: ums to be no justification for as-
sertlng that In such a case [U[p i [C[UpJ,q],] le true, even though
[Pp.ql Itself is true. Perhaps, however, for his own purposes, Chis-
hol. can .ake do with D.I1I.7 as a merely stlpulatlve definition. If
this is so, he would have been better advised to state explicitly that
this was his intention.
A. 111. 9 seems to be innocuous; it serves simply to fill out
Chisholm's characterization (given by means of A.III.l through
A.III.7) of the concept of undertaking. Also, it seems to me correct
that [Pp,q] implies neither that £ occurs nor that £ occurs. Final-
ly, Chisholm's rejection of D. III. 7. a would also seem correct.
D.III.8, the definition of contributes causally to £ for
the purpose of bringing about £," is very complex, and I am not sure
why It should be so. It seems to me that from Chisholm's point of
view the following would suffice:
jX Ill.S.a: Qp,q =df. (ar)(Pr,q & C[Ur],p).
But T.III.5 seems to me correct.
I have already commented on Chisholm's reply to the objection
which Immediately follows T.III.5 and how it seems to me that the
truth of Ap i A[Ap]" does not follow formally from any of the as-
sumptions, definitions or theorems that he provides. Nevertheless,
he is right in distinguishing this principle from the principle "Ap
^ (a9 )Qq , [Ap ] , " and he is right to reject the latter. I think, too,
that he is right in ascribing a confusion of these two principles to
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the objector.
Chisholm’s analysis in D.III.9 of the concept of intending a
state of affairs as a preliminary step towards another state of af-
fairs reflects his belief that an event (in this case an Instance of
agent-causal contribution, may be the (event-)ef f ect of another event
even when it (the former event) is freely brought about. As recorded
above, 1 am inclined to think that a distinction should be made in
such a case between the concept of causal contribution and that of the
provision of opportunity. But. again, I shall not attempt here to
characterize the latter concept. As for D.III.IO, it seems that this
definition is better suited to an analysis of the concept of undertak-
ing an attempt rather than an analysis of the concept of making an
attempt. In any case, keeping in mind D. III. 8. a above, I think the
following would suit Chisholm's purpose better than D.III.IO does:
(aq)(as')(at')(stQq,p &
~(ar)(stQq,[r i
Of course, embedded in this definition is Chisholm's notion of agent-
causal contribution, according to which it is possible for a person
to contribute causally to the free causal contributions of himself and
Others
.
What of the six "observations" that follow D.III.IO? The
first (that making an attempt to bring about £ does not imply failure
to bring about £> seems to me correct. The second (that [Jr,p] im-
plies [[~Kp] 6i [(aq)(Kq & Pq,p)]]) does not follow formally from
Chisholm s definitions D.III.9 and D.III.IO, and I am not sure why
he should V\/ant to assert it. The third (that attempts may be "half-
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hearted" or confident) seems innocuous. Tl,e fourth (that making an
attempt at to bring about £ does not imply not making an attempt at
a later time t' to bring about the negation of j,) seems right. The
fifth (that making an attempt at t to bring about £ is compatible with
undertaking a preliminary step at
J: towards j,) seems to me to be
right, and yet it is ruled out by Chisholm's own definitions. For it
is stipulated in D.III.IO that if S makes an attempt at t to bring
about £ then S undertakes no preliminary steps at t towards £. Hence,
Chisholm s holding both to the assumption expressed by the fifth ob-
servation and to D.III.IO is inconsistent. Such Inconsistency would
not arise were he to suscribe to D.III.IO. a instead of D.III.IO.
Finally, the sixth observation concerning the distinction between ^
re and ^ dlcto statements about making attempts seems quite correct
to me.
We can now turn to a consideration of Chisholm's attempt to
analyze the concept of intentional action. I think that Chisholm is
right to reject the simplistic definition D. III. 11, since it includes
inadvertent successes and happy failures in the class of intentional
actions; but the remedy he adopts, which is that of stipulating that
everything the agent undertakes in preparation for his action should
be successfully achieved, is not the correct remedy. Two cases in
particular suggest that D.III.ll.a is defective. First, consider the
case where the would-be assassin aims to shoot his intended victim
right between the eyes, but his hand slips and he shoots his victim
straight through the heart instead, thereby killing him Instantly.
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Surely It IS counterintuitive to say his action
unintentional, andyet not everything he undertook to do was successfullv a .t i y accomplished.
ut, as long as we agree to one point I thinl. m •r, i ink this seeming counter-
example can in fact be ruled out Thn •. e point is this: whenever one
undertakes and makes an attempt to kill a person by shooting him right
between the eyes, one also undertakes and al ,L so makes an attempt to
kill him by shooting him. (There Is a „i general principle operating
here that 1 shall not attempt to formulate.) if rhls is true, then we
n^ay say that the assassin intentionally killed the victim by shooting
hi. but did not intentionally kill the victim by shooting him straight
through the heart. The second main objection to D.IIl.n.a has been
voiced by Michael Corrado. who thinks the second conjnnct of that
definition is inadequate. He says:
This objection is, I think, more telling than the first and in fact
points up a major defect in Chisholm's analysis of the concept of in
tentional action. Corrado's example is not fully explicit, but per
haps the following will serve to flesh it out sufficiently. Suppose
the two things I undertake for the purpose of signalling are, first,
my arm s rising and, second, my arm's being extended. Suppose also
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each of chese events occnts. hot only fontnXtonsl,. (,ot example™ ettahfn, at„.s tfsfn, an. on.ettahfn, a„.s hefns ex-
’
::r -- a ff^— Of „hfch f hoth tafse
„„ a™ an. exten. ft.,
.efthet.,
s tfsfng not at^'s being exten.e. win then have been inten-
tionally brought about (which In itself serves as ad counterexample to
•in.ll.a. Since, in this example, nothing is un.ertaben for the sahe
o f.ese two things) an. therefore, it see.s reasonable to say,
.y
signalling will also not have been Intentional. On at least one
count, therefore, Chlshol.'s analysis of the concept of intentional
action is wanting.
D. III. 12 IS a little odd. The concept of a basic act or
basic action has been analyse, in a variety of ways by philosophers
since it was first Introduced by Arthur Danto sixteen years ago,^^
but it is usually agreed that a basic action is one which is performed
without being perfor„,ed by perforning some other action. Since
Chisholm has already offered an account of the "by"-relatlon by means
of D.III.6, one would have thought that he would offer not D.III.12
but rather the following:
^111.12.
a
: Bp =df. Ap &
~(aq)Rq,p.
For some reason, however, Chisholm thinks that, whenever one performs
basic action, one brings about an event which one undertakes
directly, which one undertakes without undertaking some other
its sake. He is, of course, at liberty to stipulate that
this is how he proposes to use the term "basic action," but the dis-
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parity between his use of the term and the more normal use of the term
should be noted. Another point concerning D. III. 12 is the following.
Chisholm has not ruled out the possibility that one undertake a state
of affairs for its own sake. Indeed, it would not have been surpris-
ing had he explicitly assumed that, for any state of affairs £, [Up]
implies [Pp,p]. To be on the safe side, then, Chisholm might have
done better (from his point of view) to say the following:
D I^I.12.b : Bp
-df. C[Up],p &
-(3q)(p?^q & Pq,p).
Finally, D. III
. 13 seems unobjectionable, as does the assump-
tion (A. III. 10) which follows it. Note, however, the different uses
of the term "brings about" in D. III. 12 and D. III. 13. In D. III. 12
isholm appears to use this term as if it were synonymous with "suc-
cessfully undertakes," and in D. III. 13 he appears to use it as if it
were synonymous with "contributes causally to." It seems, then, that
even at the conclusion of the presentation of his theory of action,
Chisholm is undecided as to just how to interpret that key locution
brings about £."
In conclusion, how is Chisholm's theory of action to be rated?
It may fairly be said that this theory constitutes a valiant effort to
come to an understanding of certain concepts that loom large in many
areas of philosophy. Indeed, by means of his theory Chisholm seeks
to resolve some intriguing puzzles, the resolution of which would ap-
pear requisite for an adequate philosophical account of human ac—
47
tion. But I shall not discuss these puzzles or Chisholm's treatment
of them here; for it has been seen that many of Chisholm's proposed
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analyses of the concepts with which he is concerned are defective.
Moreover, his discnssion is so laconic that it is often difficult to
appreciate the reasons for certain of his remarks, although, as I
suggested above, there is perhaps a stronger structure to these re-
marks than at first appears. In the next chapter I shall attempt to
draw up a theory of human action of my own. I shall strive to retain
certain of Chisholm's insights, but the theory will be quite different
from his in many respects (although it will, of course, be predicated
on the Chisliolmlan premise that actions, being events, are abstract
entities). I hope that the finished product will be such that (1) it
avoids replicating the defective features of Chisholm's account, (2)
It avoids Introducing fresh defects of its own, (3) it provides satis
factory resolutions of the prominent problems of action-theory, and
(4) its Internal structure will readily be seen to be coherent.
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chapter I V
A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION
—
Problems to be Rpsn ived
The history of philosophy is rife with accounts of hu.an ac-
tion. so.e of greater
.erit than others. Pe„ are as detailed as
Chisholm's. None that I know of both matches Chisholm's for detail
and treats events as abstract entitles. ^ Rather than consider other
philosophers' accounts of human action, therefore. I propose to turn
in this chapter to an account of human action of my own. Given the
rough criteria presented at the outset of the last chapter, it will.
I think, prove reasonable to call the acrn^n^ n-dxx Liie cou t ot human action that
follows a theory.^
Any adequate theory of action must provide acceptable resolu
tlons of certain prominent problems in so-called action-theory. I
have in mind sixteen problems in particular, and the main purpose of
the theory that 1 shall propose (and, indeed, the underlying motiva-
tion for all the twists and turns that the theory will take, some of
which will inevitably appear baffling at first) is the resolution of
these problems. The problems may profitably be divided into various
groups, and the manner in which I shall designate them will reflect
this fact.
The first group of problems concerns the concept of action,
and the first problem (la) may be posed by means of the following
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Illustration. Suppose a friend of n.l„e constructs a giant marionette
in my likeness. He then has me stand next to the marionette, which
g s lifelessly by my side but whose movements he is ready to con-
trol from above. The marionette and I then enact this little scenario,
I raise my arm; the marionette raises his. I sit down; so does the
marionette. I stand up; the marionette follows suit. In fact, for
the next five minutes, whatever action I perform the marionette dupli-
cates. Why is it. then, that we are Inclined to say that, whereas I
have been acting (or performing actions, or doing things) for five
minutes, the marionette, strictly speaking, has not? What distln-
guishes my movements from his?
Another related problem (lb) is this. Let us suppose (indeed,
let us hope) that, while performing this pantomime, I have been
breathing regularly. Is this breathing an action of mine? If it is,
it is surely of a sort different from the sort of actions involved in
my raising my arm, my sitting down, my standing up, and so on. But
where exactly does the difference lie?
The second group of problems concerns the individuation of
actions. First (2a), consider this case. Late one evening Jones re-
turns home. He opens the front door and flips the light-switch. The
light goes on. The room is illuminated. Moreover, a burglar is
alerted to the fact that Jones is home.^ How many actions did Jones
perform after he opened his front door? Some say one; others say at
least four. Is Jones's flipping the switch the same action as his
turning on the light? Is this in turn the same action as his
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illuminating the toom? And is this, finally, the sa„,e action as his
alerting the burglar? How are we to adjudicate this matter?
A related problem (2b) concerns what may be called the divisi-
bility of actions. Suppose Jones Is a new army recruit. The
sergeant-major calls the troops to attention and orders all those who
have just joined up to take one step forward. Jones does so. But,
in taking one step forward, Jones also takes half a step forward, a
quarter of a step forward, an eighth of a step forward, and so on
ad infinitum
. Has he then performed an infinite number of actions?
In similar fashion there is a problem (2c) concerning what
may be called the accuraulablllty of actions. Suppose Jones is out for
a walk In the park. During the walk he does many things; he takes
many strides; he swings his arms; he whistles a tune; he contemplates
the absurdity of existence. But he takes just one walk. Is the en-
tire walk, then, a single action of his?
Another problem (2d) concerning the individuation of actions
has to do with the distinction between actions and their consequences.
What is this distinction? The problem may be put in a particularly
striking manner by means of this puzzle. Jones, bent on revenge,
shoots Smith. Smith clings to life but succumbs some hours after the
shooting takes place. Jones, then, has killed Smith. Is Smith's
death a part of Jones's action or a consequence of it? If a conse-
quence, then, following Hume, it is logically possible that Jones
kill Smith and Smith yet live. But this is not logically possible.
Therefore Smith's death is part of Jones's action. But how can it be
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part of Jones's action when what Jones did took place hoars before
Smith died?
Finally, there is a problem (2e) concerning the distinction
between actions and circumstances. Suppose Jones is partial to noc-
turnal snacks in weird places. He makes some toast and then butters
It. Not only that, he butters it in the bathroom. Moreover, he
butters It in the bathroom with the knife. Indeed, he butters It In
the bathroom with a knife at midnight.'* We may safely assume that
the buttering Is an action. But are the manner (with a knife), the
place (in the bathroom) and the time (at midnight) parts or circum-
stances of Jones's action? To what criterion may we appeal in order
to settle this issue?
The third group of problems concerns the concept of inten-
tional action. There are two problems in particular that should be
raised here. The first (3a) is simply this. What is the correct
analysis of the concept of intentional action? An acceptable analysis
of this concept is desirable for many reasons, but in attempting to
give it we must beware falling into the trap (exposed in the last
chapter) of thinking that to act intentionally is simply to act in
such a way that one satisfies certain intentions that one has. We
should also bear in mind what Chisholm says concerning "inadvertent
successes" and "happy failures."
The second problem (3b) may be posed by means of this per-
plexing puzzle. Hamlet killed and, indeed, intentionally killed the
man behind the arras, and the man behind the arras was in fact
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Polonlus. So Hamlet killed Polonius. But Hamlet did not Intenelonal-
12 kill Polonius. Surely, however, just one killing occurred at the
time and place at which Hamlet killed Polonius. How can this killing
have been both intentional and not intentional?
The fourth group of problems concerns the ”by"-relation
.
There are three mam problems in this group. The first (4a) is
simply that of accounting for the fact that some actions are such that
we perform them by performing others, and other actions appear to be
such that we "just perform" them. For instance, if we consider again
the case of Jones's returning home and alerting the burglar, we find
that Jones alerted the burglar by illuminating the room, he illumin-
ated the room by turning on the light, he turned on the light by
flipping the switch, and (let us suppose) he flipped the switch by
raising his hand. But it seems probable that he did not raise his
hand by doing anything else. In particular, it seems that he did not
raise his hand by flexing his muscles, that he did not flex his
muscles by causing certain neurons in them to fire, and that he did
not cause certain neurons in his muscles to fire by sending any
physiological "messages" from his brain. He "just raised" his hand,
and this fact needs to be accounted for.
Another problem (4b) is closely related to the first. Where-
as, in the case just mentioned, Jones apparently did not raise his
hand by causing certain neurons to fire, it seems that such a "by"-
relation can exist at times between a hand—raising and a neuron-
firing. Suppose Jones wants to cause his neurons to fire and, in
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to do so, raises his hand. It seems legitimate to say that, in
such a case, Jones causes his neurons to fire 1^; raising his hand (or,
equivalently, that Jones raises his hand, thereby causing his neurons
to fire). This fact must also be accounted for.
third problem (4c) in this group concerns accounting for
instances of the "by"-relation when it holds between events which do
not occur simultaneously. In the first problem (4a), there is an
element of simultaneity involved in all of Jones’s actions (if, in-
deed, he did more than one thing), but such simultaneity is not neces-
sary for the ”by"-relation to hold. Consider the case where Jones
drives around the corner first by signalling, then by braking, then
by changing gear, then by turning the steering-wheel, and then by
accelerating out of the corner. An adequate treatment of the "by"-
relation must also be able to account for such a case.
The fifth group of problems concerns the concept of omission.
There are two basic problems in this group. The first (5a) has to do
with the distinction between omitting to do something and merely not
doing it. For instance, at the moment there are very many things
that I am not doing. (I am not eating, I am not drinking, I am not
walking on Fifth Avenue, I am not sunbathing in the Bahamas, I am not
propounding a disproof of Goldbach's conjecture, and so on.) Are any
of these failures to act omissions of mine? Which ones? What is
their distinguishing characteristic?
The second problem (5b) results from the first. It appears
plausible to say that the distinction between my omitting to do
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soniething and my merely not doing It has something to do with my In-
tentions at the time I do not do whatever It Is that I fail to do.
Nevertheless, there Is a distinction to be made between my omitting
to do something and my Intentionally omitting to do something. Wl,at
IS this distinction? How Is It to be rendered consistent with the
distinction sought in answer to problem 5a?
The sixth and final group of problems concerns the concepts of
decision and choice. In the present context these problems are per-
haps not so pressing as those just mentioned; but the fact that their
resolution will prove to follow fairly easily from the theory of ac-
tion shortly to be presented both warrants their inclusion here and
adds to the attractiveness of the theory. This theory, as will soon
be seen, relies heavily on the concepts of intending and willing, but
in so doing allows for an account of the phenomena of decision and
choice. The main problems in this area are again two in number.
First (6a), what is the distinction between willing, deciding, and
choosing? Second (6b), what is the distinction between a "short-range"
decision (or choice) and a "long-range" decision (or choice)? Is
there, for Instance, any essential distinction to be determined be-
tween Smith's deciding to stand up now (and consequently
,
not just
subsequently, doing so) and his idly deciding to watch a show on tele-
vision later (and, perhaps, doing nothing as a consequence of this
decision)
?
There are, of course, more problems that might be posed here.
But sixteen suffice. Moreover, the sixteen that have been posed
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appear to to be those „.ost deserving of attention. Before any
direct atte.pt is undertaken to resolve these problems, however, two
quire treatment. First, some new, unanalyzed concepts must
be introduced; and then a brief, rough sketch should be given of the
theory of action that is to follow so that this theory may be more
easily understood and appreciated when it is presented in detail.
2. New Concepts
The concepts introduced in Chapter II, both analyzed and un-
analyzed, will figure in the theory that is to follow. But, on their
own, they are not sufficient for the presentation of this theory.
Three new, unanalyzed concepts must be introduced.
The first of these new concepts is that of causal contribution,
a concept with which most of us are thoroughly familiar. We already
saw in the last chapter the extensive use that Chisholm makes of this
concept, and my use of it will be no less extensive. But my use and
understanding of the concept differ somewhat from Chisholm's. First
of all, I assume that the relata of causal contribution are and can
only be events; as I use the term "causal contribution," a person
cannot contribute causally to an event. Secondly, I relativize the
concept of causal contribution to times. Thirdly, I claim, in con-
trast with some (though also in accordance with some) of Chisholm's
statements, that, whenever an event £ contributes causally to another
event there occurs an event which is causally sufficient for ^
But all of this should be made more precise
.
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A. IV. 2;
A. IV. 3:
I think it is safe t„ ,„ake the following assumptions concetn-
ing the concept of causal contribution:
Necessarily, if
^ contributes causally relative to t
— 3.» then both and p are events.
and^t^^to^a’ h ^
contributes causally relative to t
- then p occurs at p and p occurs at t
'
and^t^^^o^a’ causally relative to t
— CL> len p is earlier than or identical with t'.
Each of these assumptions should be self-explanatory and each. I
think, is uncontroverslal-except perhaps for A.IV.3, insofar as it
does not rule out the possibility that a cause be cotemporaneous with
some of its effects and Insofar as it does rule out the possibility
cause succeed some of its effects. Nevertheless, A.IV.3 is in
my opinion correct. That a cause may be cotemporaneous with some of
Its effects is, I believe, amply Illustrated by the following ex-
amples:^ when a locomotive pulls a caboose, the motion of the former
contributes causally to the motion of the latter, even though they
move simultaneously; so too when a hand moves a pencil, when a gust
of wind causes a leaf to flutter, and so on. Of course, there are
innumerable examples also of a cause preceding some of its effects,
as when my pressing the brake-pedal contributes causally to the car's
stopping, when a child's eating contributes causally to its having
tooth-decay, and so on. And perhaps there are cases of causal con-
tribution where it is difficult to determine whether or not a cause
precedes its effects. But there are and can be, I believe, no in-
stances of a cause succeeding some of its effects, and A.IV.3 re-
flects this fact.
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A distinction should be draun between the relation of causal
contribution and that of being-the-cause-of
. Whatever is^ cause
o£ an event contributes causally to that event, though not necessarily
:ii£a„ Ae I use the ter™ "causal contribution." a match’s being
struck ™ay contribute causally to its lighting, but so may the pres-
ence of oxygen, the dryness of the match, and so on. Presumably only
one of these (probably the match's being struck) ranks as cause
of the match's lighting. It is Che relation of causal contribution,
not the relation of being-the-cause-of, with which I shall be con-
cerned in what follows. How to characterize the latter relation is
a matter that I shall not pursue here.
One more significant assumption should be made concerning the
concept of causal contribution, but in order to present it we need
first of all the following definition:
D.IV.l: £ is a sufficient causal condition relative to t and t'
of c[ =df. and
^ are events such that:
~ ~
(i) £ occurs at t;
(ii)
^ is earlier than or identical with t'; and
(iii) it is physically necessary, but not
necessary, that, if £ occurs at t.
at t
metaphysically
then £ occurs
(An alternative rendering of the definiendum is: £ is causally suf-
ficient relative to £ and _t' for £. ) We may now say
Necessarily, if £ contributes causally relative to t
and £ to £, then there are an event £ and a time t*
such that:
~ ~
(i) ^ is earlier than or identical with £*; and
^ii) £ is a sufficient causal condition relative to
£* and £' of £.
This assumption expresses my opposition, mentioned above, to Chis-
holm s part-time characterization of the concept of causal contribu-
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tlon, where he allows for the possibility of an event's contributing
causally to the free action of a person. As I said In the last
chapter, and as I shall discuss more fully In the final chapter, 1
think it best to distinguish here between the concepts of causal
contribution and of the provision of opportunity. Once this dlstinc-
tion is made, A. IV. 4 may be safely asserted.
The reason for relativizing causal contribution to times is
that thereby a particularly troubing problem is obviated. This is a
problem which in fact besets Chisholm's own non-time-relativized use
of the concept of causal contribution, although I did not discuss
this point in the last chapter. The problem may be posed by means
of the following illustration.^ Suppose Smith is ill on two occa-
sions,
_t^ and
_t
2 »
and suppose Brown is re-elected on two occasions,
_t^ and Suppose also that Smith's illness at
_t^ contributes
causally to Brown's re-election at
> but that there are no other
causal connections between these events. In such a case the statement
[Smith is ill] contributes causally to [Brovm is re-
elected]
requires disambiguation. On Chisholm's account of causal contribution
this may not be rendered as
(2) [Smith is ill at
_t,] contributes causally to [Brown is
re-elected at ^2 ^’
for this statement takes propositions, rather than events, as the
relata of causal contribution. Chisholm explicitly denies the pos-
sibility of propositions* being the relata of causal contribution, as
do I by means of A.IV.l. Moreover, neither
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( 3 )
nor
[Smith is ill] contributes causally at t to [Brownis re-elected]
^
[Smith is ill] contributes causally at t„ to [Brownis re-elected] 3
succeeds in capturing the required disambiguation. For the former
does not account for the fact that it is Brown's re-election at 13
that is at issue, and the latter does not account for the fact that
It IS Smith's illness at
_t^ that is at issue. It is only by rela-
tivizing causal contribution to the times of occurrence of each
relatum that this problem may be obviated.
The second concept to be introduced here is that of intending.
Once again, this is a concept with which most of us are thoroughly
familiar. Examples of intending abound in everyday life, such as
when Brown intends to go to the supermarket, when Smith intends that
Jones should be happy, and so on. It should be noted that, as I use
the term intend (and my use of it is, I believe, in accordance with
a common use ot it), it may but need not be the case that the object
of Intention is an action. For instance. Brown may intend to go to
the supermarket, in which case the object of his intention is an
action of his. But Smith may Intend that Jones should be happy, in
which case the object of his intention is an event ([Jones is happy])
which is not an action. (As I shall put it in much of what follows,
if Smith intends that Jones should be happy, then Smith intends [Jones
is happy].) To be sure, if Smith is rational, it may be that, for his
intention to be sincere, he must attempt to see to it that Jones is
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happy. But that is a separate issue and is one that I shall discuss
in a little more detail in Section 10 below. Moreover, it is not
even the case that the objects of intention are of necessity re-
stricted to events, let alone actions. For Instance, I may intend
that Smith's car should be waiting in front of the bank at 3 p.m.,
January 4, 1980, and here the object of my intention is the proposi-
tion [Smith's car is waiting in front of the bank at 3 p.m., January
4, 1980].
Despite its familiarity, however, the concept of intending is
difficult to characterize in any positive way. It is far easier to
say what is not true of the concept than to say what is true of it.
But some of the non-implications that may be attributed to it are of
significance and should be recorded here. Accordingly, we should note
that rione of the following statements is true:
(5)
( 6 )
(7)
( 8 )
Necessarily, if
^ intends £ at t , then,
^ considers £ at t ' . H
~
for some time
Necessarily, if S considers £ at t, then, for some time
_t
, ^ intends £ at _t ’ .
Necessarily, if ^ intends £ at _t, then, for some time
Jt
, ^ accepts £ at jt '
.
Necessarily, if
^ accepts £ at _t, then, for some time
,
S intends at t'.
(9)
( 10 )
Necessarily, if ^ intends £ at _t, then, for some time
^ ^ desires £ at _t ' .
Necessarily, if ^ desires £ at _t, then, for some time
intends £ at t'.
Necessarily, if ^ intends £ at £, then, for some time
^ , £ occurs at t *
.
( 11 )
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( 12 )
(13)
(14)
Necessarily, if S intends £ at tpossible that £ occur.
then it is pliysically
Necessarily, if
^ intends £ at t
,
physically possible that £ occuT!
then it is meta-
Necessarily, if S
^ accepts [it
at t ' .
intends £ at £, then, for some time
IS physically possible that £ occur
(15) Necessarily, if S
^ accepts [it
occur] at t '
.
intends £ at £, then, for some time
IS metaphysically possible that £
Other non-implications concerning the concept of intending could of
course be cited, but the foregoing are perhaps the most significant.
Nevertheless, some implications may truthfully be attributed to this
concept
,
of which the following are perhaps the most significant:
A.IV.5: Necessarily, if S Intends £ at t and S is rational,
^ accepts that, for some time
_t' not earlier than t
niay well occur at t’ . —
’
then
£
Necessarily, if S intends £ at t and S is rational, thenIt IS physically possible that £ occur.
But these assumptions are few in number and present, besides, two
obvious problems. The first problem is that they both invoke the con
cept of rationality, an obscure concept that I shall not seek to
clarify here. The second problem is that in A. IV. 5 the locution "may
well IS employed. How are we to interpret this? Again, I shall not
venture a response here, although I think the locution has some intui
tive appeal.
It would be advantageous to be able to determine the truth-
value of such statements as the following:
(^^) Necessarily, if ^ intends £ at t, then S accepts [^intends £ at _t] at t;
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(17) Necessarily. If s intends £ at t and p entails „ and
I lnt:i;d1
^ S is^atlonal.^h^n
and suchlike. However, although I a.„ Inclined to accept the former
statement and to reject the latter. I am not prepared to state posi-
tively that the former is true and the latter false.
^
me that the best thing to do here Is to back off and to acknowledge
the fact that the concept of Intending, despite Its familiarity. Is
not crystal-clear. We should not force the Issue, for there will al-
ways be statements of the sort we have been considering and of whose
truth-value we are uncertain. For Instance, consider the following:
(18) If S accepts [It is metaphysically neces-sary that £ occur] at _t and S is rational, then Sintends £ at t. —
Is this true or false? I do not know, and It seems to me best to be
honest about the matter and to admit one's ignorance. After all.
there is. 1 think, no philosophical theory, concerning any topic,
which can boast complete clarity on behalf of all those unanalyzed
concepts employed in its foundation. In the present case, the con-
cept of intending is, I believe, unusually well-suited for the role it
is to play in the theory that is to follow; for it is a common concept
and is readily, even if a little roughly, understood
.
The third and final concept to be introduced here is that of
willing. It is unfortunate to have to introduce a third concept
here. It will be recalled that Chisholm calls upon only two extra
concepts, those of causal contribution and undertaking, in the pre-
sentation of his theory of action. But his use of the concept of
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undertaking was shown to be inappropriate, and so a replacement for
that concept must be found. I believe that neither the concept of
intending nor the concept of willing will suffice on its own as a
replacement for the concept of undertaking, but that they, together
with the other concepts already discussed, are indeed jointly suffi-
cient for a satisfactory account of action. This sacrifice of con-
ceptual simplicity, as compared to Chisholm's approach, is, I think,
unavoidable.
The concept of willing is not so common as that of intending.
Moreover, my use of this concept may differ a little from that use to
which one is perhaps at first intuitively moved to put it. A good
way to try to understand the concept of willing and ray use of it is
to ally it with the more common concept of decision. But we must be
careful how we go about this. I shall discuss the concept of decision
in more detail later (see Section 9 below)
,
but at this point we
should take note of three main facts. First, there is a distinction
to be drawn between two categories of decision-making, the practical
and the theoretical. If I decide to turn in early, I make a prac-
tical decision. If I decide that capital punishment is unjustifiable,
I make a theoretical decision. It is with practical, and not with
theoretical, decision-making that the concept of willing is to be
allied. Secondly, just as not every object of a practical decision
is an action, so too not every object of a willing or volition is an
action. For instance. Smith may decide that Jones should be seen by a
doctor, and he may vjill that his arm should rise, and neither [Jones
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is seen by a doctor] nor [Smith's i •arm rises] is an action of Smith's.
(Actually, there is a sense in which 'f q • i *, if Smith s volition is success-
ful, the event [Smith's arm risesl h ^^isesj ^ an action of Smith's. But this
point will be discussed more fully m Section where the distinc-
tion between the concepts of a doing and a deed is discussed.)
Thirdly, although every Instance of willing is an instance of prac-
tical decision-making, the reverse is not true. It is only when I
intend that my decision should be causally effective in bringing about
that state of affairs that I have decided should occur, that my deci-
sion Is a volition. (This point has to do with the distinction be-
tween "short-range" and "long-range" decisions mentioned In problem
6b above
.
)
I do not presume that there is any necessary restriction on
the type of state of affairs which may be the object of a volition;
but there is certainly such a restriction operative under normal cir-
cumstances, where the agent has a reasonable understanding and expec-
tation of what it is he can and cannot do. (Of course, the terms
do and can are in need of definition—and such definition will
be supplied in this chapter and in Chapter VI, respectively—but
perhaps their use here is nevertheless helpful.) Under normal cir-
cumstances, objects of volition are restricted to those events which
the agent believes he can bring about. (Under normal circumstances,
then, what an agent wills is a guide to or a measure of the confi-
dence he has in his own ability.) Furthermore, as I use the term
volition, objects of volition are restricted, under normal circum-
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stances, to those events which the agent believes he can bring about
without having to bring about any other events. Examples are: Smith
wills that his arm should rise (_i.e.
,
Smith wills [Smith's arm
rises]); Jones wills that his right knee should bend ( i.e. , Jones
wills [Jones's right knee bends]); Brown wills that his eyes should
move U-e.
,
Brown wills [Brown's eyes move]); and so on.
There is a sense of "will" which may be analyzed in terms of
that sense of "will" that 1 am using unanalyzed here, and which is
perhaps a slightly more Intuitive sense of that term than the restric
tive sense that I employ here. There are some things that we will
just for their own sake; but very often we will things not just for
their own sake but also in order that other events may come about.
For instance, Jones may will that his arm should rise so that Smith
will recognize him and walk over to his side of the street. Now,
there is a sense of "will"—a sense which is perhaps slightly more
intuitive than the restrictive sense that I employ, but a sense which
is in fact simply an extension of the restrictive sense that I em-
ploy in which Jones in this case not only wills [Jones's arm rises],
but also wills [Smith recognizes Jones], and even wills [Smith walks
over to Jones s side of the street]. Let us call this willing in the
broad" sense. We may then say:
^ broadly wills £ at t =df. either
(i) wills £ at or
(il) there is an event £ such that ^ v^7ills £ at t for
the purpose of £.
It would be helpful if a definition of the locution "S wills £ at t
for the purpose of £" were provided here, but unfortunately 1 am not
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In a position to provldo such a definition. For this definition
would require an account of the concept of the provision of oppor-
tunity, and I am not yet in a position to give such an account.
Nevertheless, there is a limited use of the notion of willing for a
purpose which may be accounted for here, and indeed accounting for It
here will prove useful later on. I propose:
^ wills £ at _t in order that £ may occur =df.(i) ^ wills £ at _t; and
(ii)
^ intends at £ that, for some time
_t
' ,
[s wills p]should contribute causally relative to t~and t'
to £. — —
It Should be stressed that this is a purely stipulative definition.
The definiens is not intended to account for every type of willing for
a purpose, but only for one type of such willing. We may also say,
in light of D.IV.3, the following:
D^T5£4: £ directly wills £ at £ =df. £ wills £ at £.
p . IV .
5
. £ indirectly wills £ at £ =df. there is an event £distinct from £ such that £ wills £ at £ in order that
£ may occur.
Some additional remarks may be made in order to characterize
the concept of willing further. As with the concept of intending,
there are many non-implications that may be attributed to the concept
of willing, foremost among which are analogues to statements (6)
through (15) above where "wills” replaces "intends." But there are
also some significant implications that should be emphasized in this
context, and these are:
A. IV.
7
: Necessarily, if £ wills £ at £, then £ intends £ at £.
A. IV.
8
: Necessarily, if £ wills £ at £, then £ considers £ at £.
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Necessarily, if s wills j, at t, then S intends at tthat, for some time ^ very close to t, (S wills pTshould contribute causally relative to ^ Ind t' to
The locution "very close to" is unfortunately vague, but it is diffi-
cult to see how it can be improved upon. It is, moreover, accurate.
(If I will my arm's rising, I mean for this to happen now.) A. IV.
9
serves to distinguish willing from certain other types of practical
decision-making. If Smith now decides that Jones should be seen by a
doctor, it is unlikely that he means for this to happen now and it is
even more unlikely that he regards his decision as causally effective
in bringing this about.
D.IV.3 and A. IV. 9 yield the following theorem:
Necessarily,
^ wills £ at _t if and only if ^ wills ££ in order that £ may occur.
The following is also a theorem (yielded by D.IV.3 and A. IV. 7):
T^_IV^: Necessarily, if S wills £ at _t in order that £ may
occur, then £ Intends £ at _t.
But neither of the following is a theorem, although I think it is
proper to assume their truth:
A. IV. 10:
A. IV. 11:
Necessarily, if £ wills £ at _t in order that £ may
occur, then £ intends £ at jt.
Necessarily, if £ wills £ at _t in order that £ may
occur, then £ intends at £ that, for some time t' ,
[£ wills £ in order that £ may occur] should contribute
causally relative to £ and £' to £.
Analogues to A. IV. 5 and A. IV. 6 (where "wills” replaces "intends") may
also, I think, be properly asserted, but at this stage it is best to
move from a characterization of the new concepts to a brief, rough
characterization of the theory of action that is to be based on these
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concepts
.
3. Sketch of the Theory
Like many others, I take it that a person acts only if he
brings about an event in some way. Unlike some, I believe that an
analysis of this way of bringing about an event can be and ought to be
gxven. In fact, I shall distinguish six main types of bringing about
an event, and part of the problem will be in deciding which types
constitute acting and which not.
It will come as no surprise that the analysis that I shall pre-
sent of that type of bringing about an event which constitutes genuine
acting IS a volitional one. Specifically, I contend that whenever one
acts, one wills an event £ and one's willing ^ causes some event £
(either identical with or distinct from £> to occur. The distinction
between the various types of bringing about an event will rest on a
distinction between the various restrictions to be placed on what type
of event £ may be. Formulating these restrictions proves to be a
complicated matter, but there is no skirting it.
Once the main types of bringing about an event have been
treated and the concept of acting analyzed, the next task is to at-
tempt to Individuate actions. Here the ambiguity of the term "action"
must be acknowledged. This is a matter that I raised in the last
chapter, where I briefly distinguished the concept of a doing from
that of a deed, and it is a m^itter that I shall discuss more fully
below. Once the distinction has been made, the task of providing a
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criterion for the individuation of actions Is fairly easily handled.
Ihe result is an account of actions as being finely-grained entitles,
«hlch is of course In keeping with the foregoing account of events;
for every action is an event. “ This criterion of individuation n,ay
appear at first to multiply in an unacceptable „ay the number of ac-
tions that may properly be said to take place, but „e shall see that
this is not in fact so.
There will be seen to be several ways of intentionally bring-
ing about an event, corresponding to the several ways distinguished
earlier of bringing about an event. My treatment of intentional ac-
tion will concern itself with accounting for these various modes of
intentionally bringing about an event, and in the course of my inves-
tigation I shall take into consideration certain attempts made re-
cently by other philosophers to provide such an account. For the
topic of intentional action is not only important but has also been
in recent years the focus of considerable attention.
The various ways of bringing about an event give rise to an
even larger number of ways of bringing about one event by bringing
about another. 1 shall concentrate on only some of these ways, how-
ever, for there is no need to account explicitly for all of them.
My discussion of this issue will also Include a treatment of what has
come to be known as basic action; for this latter issue is an impor-
tant and topical one and its treatment is directly dependent on an
acceptable account of the ”by"-relation.
The matters of analyzing the concept of omission and analyzing
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the concepts of decision and choice are obviously important, al-
though neither has received much attention in recent years. Of
course, the use of these concepts has always been and continues to be
widespread-all the more reason to attempt to provide analyses of
them.
During the course of the presentation of the theory that is to
follow attempts will of course be made to give, at each stage, ac-
ceptable resolutions of the problems posed earlier. But the theory
IS intended not simply to provide acceptable analyses of the key con-
cepts of action-theory and thereby to resolve the problems that have
been posed; it is intended also to present these analyses and to re-
solve these problems in such a way that the concepts concerned may be
put to profitable use in areas of philosophy other than hardcore
action-theory. (I have in mind ethics in particular.) But the ques-
tion of v/hether or not the theory succeeds in realizing this inten-
tion is one that I must leave entirely to one side.
4. Bringing About an Event
Actions come in many shapes and sizes. Smith may perform an
action by (a) raising his hand, bending his knee, extending his arm,
signalling, saluting, kicking himself, cursing, concentrating on a
problem, reaching a conclusion; or he may perform an action by (b)
shooting Jones, killing Jones, frightening Jones, pleasing Jones,
even by scaring himself; or he may perform an action by (c) crossing
the road, hitting a forehand, singing a song, playing a piano solo.
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cooking n dinner, multiplying 928 by 254, giving n speech, or saying
a prayer. Of course. Smith may perform an action by doing all sorts
of other things as well, but this list should give a good idea of the
variety of things that he may do. The reason for grouping these
examples into three separate groups will be discussed later.
I said in the last section that all action is volitional.
H.A. Prichard says that acting consists simply in willing something.
That is, in the vernacular of the present enterprise, his contention
is
:
^ acts at _t =df. there is an event £ such that S wills
(Perhaps "broadly wills," as defined in D.IV.2, should replace "wills"
in the definiens of D.1V.6, but this is a minor point that need not be
pursued here.) But this is surely counterintuitive. What if a person
wxlls an event but liis willing has no effect? Surely we are inclined
to say that in such a case the person has failed to act. For in-
stance, suppose Jones has been in a serious car accident and, as a
consequence, is paralyzed from the neck down. He retains conscious-
ness in his hospital bed, lifts his head, and sees that no one is
with him. Noticing a button marked "Nurse," and ignorant of his con-
dition, he attempts to lift his arm and to summon the nurse by press-
ing the button. Nothing overtly physical happens, of course. But
suppose also that nothing at all happens as a result of Jones's voli-
tion that his arm should rise. Surely we are inclined to say that
Jones has failed to act, despite his attempt, and that this is so
precisely because there is nothing that he has brought about.
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u seems, then, that a person acts only if he brings abont
some event and that he brings about an event only if a volition of his
has some effect. This contention is of course not proved merely by
virtue of the foregoing ease; nevertheless, 1 am at this point pre-
pared to assert it and to make it more precise by means of the fol-
lowing two statements:
A. IV. 12
A. IV. 13:
Necessarily, s brings about £ relative to t and t' onlyir there is an event
^ such that:
~
(i)
^ wills £ at _t; and
(11) [S wills q] contributes causally relative to t and
_t to £. —
Necessarily, S acts relative to t and t' only if thereIS an event £ such that ^ brings about £ relative to tand t
.
—
(Note that the times to which the bringing about and the acting are
relative in these assumptions are the times to which the causal con-
tribution at issue is relative.) The question that now confronts us
Is whether or not all we need do to capture the concept of action
IS to elevate these two assumptions to the status of definitions by
deleting "Necessarily" and replacing "only if" with "=df." in each
case
.
In order to answer this question we must digress for a moment
and take note of the ambiguity of the term "action." I made brief
mention of this ambiguity in the last chapter when discussing Chis-
holm's characterization of the concept of an action in D.III.l. I
said there that we must distinguish between the concept of a doing and
the concept of a deed and that the term "action" is commonly used to
express both concepts. Now, I propose to use the term "doing" to
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designate that type of bringing about of an event which constitutes a
genuine instance of acting and to use the tern, "deed" to designate
that which Is brought about when the bringing about constitutes a
genuine Instance of acting. The fact that the term "action" Is ambi-
guous has seldom been appreciated by action-theorists
. In fact.
Prichard goes so far as explicitly to deny that there Is any such
ambiguity, but I think that he is plainly wrong to do so. (In
fact. In English many terms are ambiguous in this way. This sort of
ambiguity Infects, for instance, the terms "lntentlon"-which may
designate the process or the object of Intention—"hope ," "fear,"
belief," and so on.) We may Introduce here a piece of suggestive
terminology and say that to every doing there Is a deed "Internal" to
. 24
It. That is, in general: an agent S brings about an event £ in such
a way that the bringing about is an instance of genuine acting on s
part If and only if ^'s bringing about £ is a doing of ^'s and £ is
the deed internal to this doing. Examples of this relation of intern-
ality abound. For instance, if Smith raises his arm then he brings
about his arm s rising; and so, the deed [Smith's arm rises] is in-
ternal to the doing [Smith raises his arm]. Similarly, [Smith's
knee bends] is internal to [Smith bends his knee], and so on. Four
points in particular should be noted here. First, a doing entails
that deed Internal to it. Secondly, it is not being contended that an
event which is a deed on one occasion is a deed whenever it occurs;
it is a deed only when it is brought about by a person—otherwise it
is an event which is not a deed. On the other hand, a doing is always
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a doing. Thirdly, a corollary (perhaps not yet an obvlons one) of
this treatment of action Is that "Smith raises his arm" and "Smith
brings about [Smith's arm rises]" express the same event; so too with
"Smith bends his knee" and "Smith brings about [Smith's knee bends]";
and so on. 25 Fourthly, It happens that in English there is often a
phrase available to express a doing when none Is available to express
that deed internal to the doing. Donald Davidson, for instance,
worries about finding phrases to express those deeds internal to the
doings expressed by "He walked to the corner," "He carved the roast,"
and "He fell down." He says:
My problem isn't that I can't imagine that there is some
buftbarr”®"' “ke happen,ut th t I see no way automatically to produce the right
ascription from the original sentence. No doubt each timea man walks to the corner there is some way he makes his body
way he makes his body move every time he walks to the corner. 26
I sympathize with Davidson's worries, but it should be noted that
his final remark is irrelevant. True, there is no one way in which
a person's body moves every time he walks to the corner, but there is
also no one way in which a person's arm moves every time he raises his
arm. This point, then, has no bearing on the availability or un-
availability of appropriate phrases in English to express deeds in-
ternal to doings. The main point to be made here is, of course, that
the availability or unavailability of such phrases is a purely con-
tingent linguistic fact which itself has no bearing on the ontological
structure of a doing. A doing, a piece or episode of acting, such as
the carving of a roast, is in fact the bringing about of an event in a
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certain way, even if there is no phrase available in English to ex-
press that event.
I shall give a precise analysis of the concepts of a doing
and a deed In the next section once a precise analysis of the con-
cept of acting has been given, but perhaps the distinction between
these concepts may be adequately understood for present purposes from
the foregoing remarks. The point of this brief digression has been
Co put us in a position to evaluate the suggestion that A. IV. 12 and
A. IV. 13 be elevated to the status of definitions. Such elevation
results in the following:
brings about
^ unrestrictedly relative to ^ and t'
-df. there is an event
^ such that:
~ ~
(i)
^ wills ^ at and
(ii) wills contributes causally relative to t
and
_t* to ~
_S acts relative to _t and
_t' =df. there is an event £such that
^ brings about £ unrestrictedly relative to
_t and
_t ' .
There can be no quarrel with D.IV.7, for it is a purely stipulative
definition. (I use the term "unrestrictedly" to differentiate that
type of bringing about analyzed in D.IV.7 from other types discussed
below.) But D.IV.8 constitutes an attempt to capture as precisely as
possible our common concept of what it is to act, and it surely fails.
For it is much too liberal. Suppose that ^ wills some event £ and
that his so willing causes some totally "unrelated" event £ to occur
and no related" event to occur. For Instance, suppose that Jones
wills his arm's rising and that his so willing, by some misfortune,
causes a blood vessel to burst in his brain and that this in turn
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causes hi., So heel ove. (his e™ ue^alnlng at his side) a.td thereupon
expire. Although «e may acknowledge that, In some sense ot "bring
about" (namely, that sense given In D.IV.7), Jones has brought about
his own death, we are surely reluctant to say that he has acted In
this case. We would rather say that In this case, as In the case
regarding D.IV.6, Jones has failed to act, despite his attempt. Or
suppose that Smith wills that his right knee should bend and that his
so willing causes a certain nervous Impulse to emanate from his brain,
but that this Impulse for some reason fades before any muscular
activity Is produced. Once again, although we may acknowledge that.
In some sense of "bring about," Jones has brought about the nervous
impulse, we are surely reluctant to say that he has acted In this
case.
It seems that some connection between a person's volition and
what this volition causes to happen, other than merely that of causal
contribution, is required, if we are properly to say of the person
that he has acted. The most natural move in a first attempt to forge
such a connection is, I think, to make explicit mention of the event
caused by the volition in the description of the volition itself.
This may be done in either of two ways. We might try first of all:
^ brings about £ restrictedly relative to £ and £' =df.(i)
^ wills £ at £; and
“
(ii) v^7ills £] contributes causally relative to t and
_t’ to £.
~
And we might then say that a person acts just in case he brings about
some event restrictedly. But this would not do. D.IV.9 takes only
direct willing into account (see D.IV.4), and an adequate, enlighten-
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ing account of action tmst take Into account the matter of Indirect
willing also. For Instance, let be (Jones's arm rises] and a be the
event internal to [Jones su„m,ons the nurse], and suppose that Jones
Wills £ but that he wills it in order that £ may occur, v^tat if Jones
is successful? That is, what if Jones's willing £ in order that a may
occur contributes causally to £? Surely we should say in such a case
that Jones's summoning the nurse is a doing and that a is (therefore)
a deed of his. But analyzing the concept of action purely in terms
of D.IV.9 would leave us none tile wiser in such a case.^®
If we Introduce the concept of indirect willing into our ac-
count, which is the second way to attempt to accommodate the insight
that explicit mention should be made of the event caused by the voli-
tion in the description of the volition itself, we get the following:
^ accomplishes £ relative to £ and £' =df. there is an
event £ such that:
(i) ^ wills c[ at _t in order that £ may occur; and(ii) [S wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and £' to £.
And then we might say that a person acts just in case he accomplishes
some event. But this would not do either; this account of acting is
too restrictive. Sometimes people act unintentionally, and when they
do it may well be that no event (other than that which is directly
willed) is accomplished thereby; nevertheless, they act. For in-
stance, suppose Smith wills that his hand should move in order that
the event internal to his signalling Jones may occur, but suppose that
he fails to signal Jones and that all he succeeds in doing (other than
to move his hand) is to knock over Brown's Ming vase. [Jones knocks
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over Brown's Ming vase] Is a doing of Jones's, bat the account of
action just proposed does not allow for this.
There are innumerable paths that one could follow at this
point in order to improve on what has so far been proposed in the
attempt to say what acting is. But at this stage I shall content my-
self with describing just one of these-the path I believe preferable
to all others. Just why this path is taken and not some other path is
a matter that 1 shall not discuss further; my handling of this issue
must be judged according to the comprehensiveness, explanatory power,
and intuitive appeal of the theory to which it gives rise.
First 1 require a technical concept. Let us say that an event
£ constitutes an event ^ just in case whatever causes £ also causes £.
Or more precisely:
D. IV. 11
: £ constitutes £ at t =df.
(i) £ occurs at £;
(ii) £ occurs at _t;
(ill) there are an event £ and a time _t' such that r
contributes causally relative to t' and t to p*
and
~ ~
(iv) for any event £ and any time £' , if £ contributes
causally relative to £' and £ to £, then £ con-
tributes causally relative to £' and t to £.
This definition is supposed to accommodate, at least in part, the fol-
lowing sort of Intuition. l>Hien Jones insults Smith by calling him
names, there is a tendency to say that his calling Smith names "just
is' his insulting Smith in this case. Or when Jones apologizes to
Smith by sending him flowers, there is a tendency to say that his
sending Smith flowers "just is" his apologizing to him. Now, as is
to be expected and as will be seen below, I advocate a criterion for
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the individuation of doines armr-rin *- i • i iu-Lng cco ding to which doings are finely-
grained; and so It is false, on „ie„, that Jones's calling Smith
names is Idem^ „ith his insulting Smith or that his sending Smith
flowers is identical with his apologizing to him. Nevertheless, it is
true that on these occasions his calling Smith names constitutes his
insulting Smith and that his sending flowers constitu^^^T^logiz-
ing to Smith, and so we have here at least a partial account of the
just is intuition. Not only is D.IV.ll useful in this regard (more
will be said in this respect when the "by"-relation is discussed In
Section 7 below), but also I believe that it is this relation of con-
stitution that will allow us to provide the link that we are looking
for, that IS, that noncausal link between the volition and what the
volition causes to happen which obtains whenever a person acts. But,
first of all, let us note two theorems:
— Necessarily, if £ occurs at _t and there are an event £ anda time
_t such that £ contributes causally relative to t'
and
_t to £, then £ constitutes £ at t.
~
—
• Necessarily, if £ constitutes £ at £ and £ constitutes r
at
_t, then £ constitutes r at t.
~
Let us then say:
D. IV. 12
: £ brings about £ directly relative to £ and £' =df. there
are events £ and £ such that:
(i) £ wills £ at £ in order that £ may occur;
(ii) [£ wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and £' to £; and
(iii) £ constitutes £ at £'
.
And let us now consider the following claim:
D. IV. 8. a
: £ acts relative to £ and £* =df. there is an event £ such
that £ brings about £ directly relative to £ and £*
.
D.IV.S.a has a lot going for it. Note that the fact that £ in
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D.IV.12 is both an object and an effect of S's volition rules out the
possibility that a person acts when his volition happens only to cause
some totally "unrelated" event to occur. D.IV.S.a Is therefore an
improvement on D.IV.8. But note too that D.IV.12 allows for the pos-
sibility that £ be distinct from r. D.IV.S.a la therefore also a
significant Improvement on the suggestion that a person acts just in
case he accomplishes some event. Let us see how D.IV.S.a fares In a
few test cases.
The simplest case is where and "r" in D.IV.12 desig-
nate the same event. For instance, suppose Smith directly wills that
his arm should rise and that his arm rises as a result of this voli-
tion. Has he acted? It would seem so. Does D.IV.S.a, via D.IV.12,
confirm this? Yes. Let £ be [Smith's arm rises]. Now, we know that
Smith wills £ and that his so willing contributes causally to £. We
want to be able to say that he has thereby acted; specifically, we
want to be able to say that he has raised his arm. That D.IV.12
says that, in this case. Smith brings about his arm's rising directly
may be seen as follows. We know, given T.IV.l, that, if Smith wills
£, then he wills £ in order that £ may occur. Since Smith does v/ill
£ (at £, say), clause (i) of D.IV.12 is satisfied; that is, there are
an event £ (namely, £) and an event £ (namely, £) such that Smith
wills £ at £ in order that £ may occur. Clause (ii) is also satis-
fied, since we are given that Smith's willing £ at £ contributes
causally relative to £ and some time £' to £. Moreover, given T.IV.3,
clause (ill) is trivially satisfied. Hence, Smith brings about £
lienee, nceording Lo D.IV.H.a,
tllrectly relative to
_t and and
acts.
Of cou..e,
.V,
same event, and this is part of the strengtl, of that definition. in
general, if r is distinct from £ in D.1V. I2, tl.en S acts unsuccess-
fully, and hence unintentionally. (AJ thougl, this will be discussed
in more detail m Section 6 below, we may note now that wlienever one
ntent ionally
,
one acts successfully, thougli not vice versa:
lienee all unsuccessful actions are unintentional, though not vice
versa.) As an Illustration, let £ be the event internal to [Smiti,
knocks over brown's Ming vase).
^ be the event internal to (Smith
moves his hand) is (Smith's liand moves)), and jr be the event
internal to (Smith signals Jones). Now, if Smith wills
^ at t in
order that
_r may occur, if his so willing contributes causally rela-
tive to and
_t' to Cl but not to r, and if
^ happens in fact to con-
stitute £ at _t', then, according to D.IV.12, we may say that Smith
brings about £ directly relative to t and
_t' and, according to
U.IV.S.a, we may say that Smith acts relative to t and
_t ' . And this
seems absolutely right. But let it be noted that D.IV.12, unlike
D.1V.7, is sufficiently restrictive so that not just any effect of a
volition IS ruled in as a deed. For example, let
^ and £ be as be-
fore, but let £ now be the event Internal to (Smith turns a somer-
sault). If it turns out that (Smith wills n in order that r may
occur) contributes causally relative to
_t and to £ (which, obvious-
ly, would be a very strange, yet presumably possible, turn of events),
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probably it does not also contribute causally to and hence clause
(ii) of D.IV.12 IS not satisfied and appropriately, turns out not
to be a deed of Smith's. Or even if Smith's volition does contribute
causally relative to
_t and
_t' to £ in this case, it is highly un-
likely that £ constitutes £ at £' ; and, if this is so, clause (iii)
of D.IV.12 IS not satisfied and £ turns out once again not to be a
deed of Smith's.
One strange aspect of D.IV.12 should be noted. The following
is not a theorem;
(19) Necessarily, if S brings about [£ and £] directly rela-
tive to
_t and
_t
' ,
then
^ brings about £ directly rela-
tive to
_t and
_t' and ^ brings about £ directly relative
to £ and _t ' .
(19) is not a theorem in part because the following is:
T . IV.
5
: Necessarily, if £ brings about £ directly relative to
£ and £' , then, for any state of affairs £, if £ occurs
£ , then £ brings about [£ and £] directly relative
to £ and £' .
At least, T.IV.5 is a theorem if the following assumption is made, and
it is one that I am prepared to accept (it would be hard to adduce
convincing arguments against it)
:
A. IV. 14 : Necessarily, if £ contributes causally relative to t
and £' to £, then, for any state of affairs £, if r
occurs at £'
,
then £ contributes causally relative to
£ and £' to [£ and £]
.
Now if A. IV. 14 is true, then, given D.IV.ll and T.IV.4, the following
must hold:
IV-
6
: Necessarily, if £ constitutes £ at £, then, for any
state of affairs £, if £ occurs at £, then £ constitutes
[£ and £] at £.
And it is from this that we get T.IV.5. Let us consider a particular
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case. Suppose Sn.ltl, brings about [Smith’s knee bends] directly rela-
tive to t and t', and suppose that Carter is President at t ' . It
follows that Smith brines aboIl^ rrc -r-ui io g out [[Smith's knee bends] and [Carter is
President]] directly relative to
^ and t ' . He also brings about
[[ .Snlth's knee bends] and ]two plus two equals four ]] directly relative
1 and ^ , and so on. This undoubtedly sounds odd, but 1 do not
think that It Is truly objectionable. Perhaps these strange conjunc-
tive events could be ruled out as deeds of Smith’s if a n,ore restric-
tive analysis of the concept of constitution were given, and perhaps
thereby (19) could be rendered a theorem, of the system. But any such
tinkering with the system would be very complicated, and I do not
think the results would be worth the sacrifice in simplicity. For let
us note that (19) Is a theorem of the present system, and that we
are not committed to saying that. In virtue of the fact that Smith
brings about [[Smltli's knee bends] and [Carter Is President]] directly
relative to ^ and , Smith brings about [Carter is President] direct-
ly relative to ^ and t'. Moreover, the falsehood of (19) does not
imply th0 falsehood of the following:
Necessarily, if ^ brings about [£ and £] directly rela-
tive to
_t and
_t
' ,
then either ^ brings about £ directly
relative to _t and
_t' or ^ brings about £ directly rela-
tive to £ and _t ' .
Indeed, I believe that (20) is true.^^
So far, then, D.IV.S.a has not been faulted, but I do not
think it remains unfaulted for long. Let us for a moment return to
the case where Smith attempts to signal Jones but succeeds merely in
knocking over Brown's Ming vase, and let us now elaborate on this and
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suppose that Smith thereby bre-ikc;o reaks the vase, causing Brown to Jump up
in horror, dance around In a fit of rage trio f.nu^ , c p, tail over, bump his
head on the nearby andirons, and lose consciousness. There Is a
sense in which Smith brings about not Just that event Internal to bis
knocking over the Ming vase, but also all of the following: [the vase
breaks], [Brown Jumps up in horror], [Browr dances around in a fit of
rage], [Brovm trips), [Brown falls over], [Brown bumps his head on the
nearby andirons], and [Brown loses consciousness]. Now, none of these
events is brought about by Smith directly, but they are all brought
about by him indirectly, where:
S brings about £ indirectly relative to t and t' =df.there are an event £ and a time _t* such that:
(i)
^ brings about £ directly relative to t and t*-
( 11 ) £ contributes causally relative to t* and t'“to
£; and ~ —
(iii)
^ occurs exactly once at t*.^^
The question now arises: Does our acknowledgment that D.IV.13 cap-
tures a legitimate sense of "bring about" necessitate a revision of
D.lV.8.a? I think it does, although this is debatable. For instance.
It might be argued that, although it is true that Smith brings about
(indirectly) all of those events mentioned, there is no need to say
that they are deeds of his; they are merely consequences of a deed of
his, that is, of the event internal to his knocking over Brown's Ming
vase. Hence, it might be argued, there is also no need to say that
the individual. Indirect bringings about of these events are doings
of his. Moreover, it might be said, we are always able to admit that,
in bringing about the vase's breaking. Brown's jumping up. Brown's
dancing around, etc
.
,
Smith has acted, for the following is a theorem:
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I^V^: If 1 brings about £ Indirectly relative to
7i f
there are an event £ and a time t* suchthat
^ brings about £ directly relative to £ and £0.
But, although the foregoing line of reasoning has its attrac-
tions, 1 think we ought nevertheless to say that Indirect bringings
about are genuine doings and that events indirectly brought about are
genuine deeds. Granted, many events are thereby admitted as doings
and deeds which one is perhaps at first Inclined to rule out as such
(for instance, if 1 now bring about my hand’s rising directly and it
turns out that this contributes causally to an atom’s being displaced
on Mars a million years hence, it is at least questionable whether the
atom’s being displaced should rank as a genuine deed of mine); but if
we do not allow indirect bringings about to be doings and those events
Indirectly brought about to be deeds, many events that appear to be
cases of genuine doings or genuine deeds are ruled out as such. For
instance, I think that Smith's breaking the Ming vase is a genuine
doing of his, and yet it is not a direct bringing about, but only an
indirect bringing about. Let us, for the sake of completeness, as-
sume that Smith knocks over the vase relative to t and t*. It is
hardly likely that the vase breaks at t*; indeed, let us assume that
the vase breaks at
,
some moments after t*. It is then not true
that Smith brings about the vase's breaking directly relative to t
and
_t . For the event that, in this example. Smith wills at t is that
of his hand s rising, and this event occurs at not _t
' ,
and hence
cannot be said to constitute the vase's breaking at . It follows
that the vase's breaking is not a direct deed of Smith's, and that
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Smith's breaking the vase is not a direct doine v8* Yet we are surely
Inclined to say that Smith's breaking the vase is an action.
There is a pattern that „ay be distilled fro™ this case. What
is the breaking of a vase? It is the direct bringing about of some
event which itself causes a vase to break; that is, it is the in-
direct bringing about of a vase's breaking. Similarly, what is the
lurning on of a light? It is the direct bringing about of some event
Which Itself causes a light to go on; that is, it is the Indirect
bringing about of a light's going on. Or again, what is the killing
of a person? It is the direct bringing about (perhaps in some manner
requiring specification) of some event which itself causes (perhaps in
some manner requiring specification) a person's death; that is, it is
the Indirect bringing about (perhaps in some manner requiring speci-
fication) of a person's death. Such examples may be multiplied in-
definitely. Now, it seems intuitively obvious that these indirect
bringings about are genuine doings; hence D.IV.S.a requires modlflca-
tion.
Several points ought to be made here. First, it must of
course be acknowledged that there is a third alternative that could
be investigated here, other than those of ruling in all indirect
bringings about as doings and of ruling out all indirect bringings
about as doings, and that is to rule in some indirect bringings about
as doings while ruling out others. But I know of no plausible cri-
terion that may be employed for this purpose, and so I have bitten
the bullet and concluded that we ought to rule in all indirect
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bringings about as doings. Secondly, ruling in
about as doings does not alter the fact that tho
all indirect bringings
se events indirectly
brought about are consequences of deeds, even if they are now them-
selves to be called deeds. For every indirect deed is a consequence
of a direct deed, and many indirect deeds are themselves consequences
of indirect deeds. Finally, it might be thought that the implications
of admitting indirect bringings about into the class of doings, if
persistently and consistently investigated, would result in the fol-
lowing thesis: all deeds are either events directly brought about or
consequences of events directly brought about. (The concepts of a
doing, a deed and a consequence will be more fully discussed in the
next section.) Even if this were true, note that this thesis is quite
distinct from the following: any event to which a volition contributes
causally is a deed. For this thesis (where the scopes of its quanti-
fiers are read in the most natural manner) has already been dismissed
in our discussion of D.IV.7. Note also that the related thesis, that
all deeds are either events directly brought about or consequences of
events directly brought about but not both, seems to be false. For
when Jones raises his hand and thereby flips the switch, it seems that
he brings about both the event Internal to his raising his hand and
that internal to his flipping the switch directly, indeed that the
former constitutes the latter, and yet also that the former con-
tributes causally to the latter (this being a case of simultaneous
causation). Moreover, the related thesis that all deeds are either
events directly brought about, and not constituted by other events
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directly brought about, or consequences of events directly brought
about, is false. Let us suppose that Jones raises his hand quickly.
Then he brings about both [Jones's hand rises] and [Jones's hand rises
quickly]; the former constitutes the latter, both are direct deeds,
and neither is an indirect deed. But I think that the thesis that all
deeds are either events directly brought about or consequences of
events directly brought about is false anyway, as I shall now explain
Consider this case. Jones is learning how to play tennis.
His instructor says that, in order to hit a forehand, Jones must
first swing his racket backward, then step across on to his left
foot, and then swing his racket forward, making contact with the ball
just in front of his left foot. Suppose that Jones does all this and
that, wonder of wonders, he hits a forehand. Is it not clear that
Jones's hitting the forehand is an action, that is, a doing of his?
If It IS, then D.IV.S.a is again seen to be inadequate. For consider.
Suppose Jones brings about the event Internal to his swinging his
racket backward (£, say) relative to _t^ and that he brings about
the event internal to his stepping across on to his left foot (£, say)
relative to and
_t^, and that he brings about the event internal
to his swinging his racket forward (r, say) relative to t. and t..
—5
Now Jones brings about that event internal to his hitting a forehand
(^, say) relative to and
^ and, most importantly, it is not an
event that he brings about directly. Nor is it an event that he
brings about indirectly. It is, rather, an event composed of events
that he has brought about, some directly, some perhaps indirectly.
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And yet „e have said that it seems that s is a^ e£ done
Is, that Jones's hitting the forehand is a doing of his, or
her words, that in bringing about
^ relative to t and t
s's, that
,
in still
Jones
^
^
^^Intxve to t and t Riix n t\i q *_
-1 -6' D.IV.S.a cannot account for this.
In order to come to grips with this case we must seek to dis-
cern the relation between Jones's bringing about £, and r on the
one hand and his bringing about s on the other. The key word here is
one that has already been used: "composed." His bringing about s is
compos^ of his bringing about his bringing about £, and his
bringing about r. Conversely, his bringing about £, his bringing
about and his bringing about r are all parts of his bringing about
s. How are we to account for these relations of being-composed-of
and being-a-part-of? It is important to note that Jones's bringing
about £, his bringing about and his bringing about £ are neither
individually necessary nor jointly sufficient for his bringing about
It is possible for Jones to hit a forehand without taking a step
across on to his left foot; moreover, Jones may bring about £, £ and
£ on some other occasion and fail to hit a forehand. The proper
account is, I believe, the following. We should note that Jones's
swinging his racket backward at and £2 "jest is" his hitting a
forehand at and
_t
2 >
that his stepping across on to his left foot
—3 -^4 j*Jst is" his hitting a forehand at t_^ and t_^ , and that
his swinging his racket forward at
_t^ and t^ "just is" his hitting a
forehand at _t^ and
_t^. And so 1 believe that, in general, we may
say the following;
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£ is composed relative to t, and t of „
-at . —1
-ni
(i) p and q i , . n ^"
’
’
-3ji sre events; and(11) there is a time t such that
(a) occurs at t-i and i
and . and occurs at t.
consti-
(b) constitutes £ at t, and .
. . andtutes £ at _t, and .
.
. and
there is a time jt such that
(a) ^^occurs at't and
.
.
. and occurs at t
.
(b) constitutes P at £ andtutes p at t
—
m
—
m’
consti-
We may then say:
D.IV.15:
I
brings about £ synthetically relative to t and t' -dfthere are events q i u f - ^
.
-^1’ ‘ > 5.n ®’Jch that:
( ) £ IS composed relative to t and t' of a
£n»
• •
•
,
(il) for any event £, if ^ m Identical with q, or
inf t"°"
later than t^ t* is not later than t",a d t IS not later than t
' ,
and
(b) either
(a)
^ brings about £ directly relative to t*
and
_t"
,
or —
( 3 ) ^ brings about £ indirectly relative to t*
and £". JJ —
Now, if it is true in the foregoing example, as it seems to be, that,
by bringing about s synthetically relative to tj^ and t^, Jones acts
relative to
_t^^ and £^, we must once again modify D.IV.S.a. In fact,
given the foregoing considerations concerning indirect and synthetic
bringings about, I suggest that we say first of all:
D. IV. 16
. £ brings about £ actively relative to t and t' =df
either ~ ~
(i) £ brings about £ directly relative to _t and t’; or(ii)
^ brings about £ indirectly relative to £ an^ t'; or(iii) £ brings about £ synthetically relative to t a^d t'.
We may then say:
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D.IV.S.b:
^ acts relative to
_t and t
such that
^ brings about ^
t ' .
<Jf. there is an event p
actively relative to t and
At this point „e should return to that list of actions pro-
vided at the beginning of this section. The reason for their grouping
into three separate groups should now be obvious. Those actions,
doings In group (a) will normally be such that the deeds In-
ternal to them Will be brought about dir^; those in group (b) will
of necessity be such that those deeds internal to them will be brought
about indirectly
; and those in group (c) will normally be such that
those deeds Internal to them will be brought about synthetically
. I
say "normally" with respect to groups (a) and (c)
,
for there is, I
think, no ng.cessity that those doings in group (a) be direct and that
those in group (c) be synthetic. Suppose, to take an example from
group (a), that Smith has been paralyzed and that he is only begin-
ning to re-learn the use of his leg. In such a case his kicking him-
self may be synthetic. In order to do it, he may have first to draw
his foot backward— this being one direct doing—and then bring his
foot downward into contact with some other part of his anatomy (pre-
sumably his other leg) this being another direct doing. Or suppose,
to take an example from group (c)
,
that Smith is a wizard at mental
arithmetic. In such a case, he may bring about the deed internal to
his multiplying 928 by 254 directly. Most people, of course, must
perform all manner of preliminary calculation before arriving at the
correct answer.
Ihis case concerning mental arithmetic highlights a desirable
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feature of both D.IV.8.a and D.IV.8.b: neither of the. rules out the
possibility that action may be purely mental. I think it is obvious
that action may be purely mental, although this is a point which,
curiously, is often overlooked in the current literature
.
m
this
connection mention should also be made of what may be called "ab-
normal" action. I have in mind in particular both psychokinesis
and telepathy. Suppose that Smith wills an event
^ in order that a
certain lightbulb explode (perhaps
^ just is [the lightbulb explodes]),
and suppose that his so willing contributes causally, by means of
alpha-waves emanating from his brain, to ^ and that ^ constitutes
the llghtbulb's exploding. Then, in this case. Smith brings about
the lightbulb’ s exploding directly (by psychokinesis). Or again, sup-
pose that Smith wills an event
^ in order that the image of the ace
of spades occur to Jones (perhaps £ just is [the image of the ace of
spades occurs to Jones]), and suppose that his so willing contributes
causally, by means of alpha-waves emanating from his brain, to £ and
that £ constitutes the image's occurring to Jones. Then, in this
case. Smith brings about the image's occurring to Jones directly (by
telepathy). Both cases may seem odd, but this oddness, I would con-
tend, is merely a function of the abnormality of the conditions that
are said to obtain. 1 am sure that it is correct to count the light-
bulb s exploding and the image's occurring to Jones as deeds of
Smith's, given the conditions stipulated in each case.
We may now, finally, address ourselves to the task of resolv-
ing the first group of problems, consisting of problems la and lb.
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We have in fact bee
since the statement
n xn a position to resolve the first of these ever
of A. IV. 12 and A. IV. 13. Regarding la, why is it
that I act whereas my marionette double does not? The answer is, of
course, that I act by virtue of actively bringing about certain
events, and that my actively bringing about certain events itself
occurs by virtue of my willing certain events. Now, the marionette
Itself wills nothing and can will nothing. Therefore, it does not
act, even though the deeds that I actively bring about may strongly
resemble the motions of the marionette. Problem lb requires different
treatment. Do I act when I breathe? Yes, but only by virtue of my
raising my arm, my sitting down, my standing up, and so on. The
difference between my breathing and my other actions is this: my
breathing is merely an indirect bringing about of mine, whereas my
other actions are cases of direct bringings about. The breath's en-
tering and leaving my body is the effect of an event directly brought
about, but is not itself directly brought about. Of course, there
are relatively rare occasions on which I willfully hold my breath and
exhale it, and on these occasions my breathing is a direct doing of
mine. In addition, it is of course possible that my breath's enter-
ing and leaving my body on occasion not be a deed of mine at all,
either direct or indirect (or even synthetic). But this is not the
case in the present example.
There is a bonus to be derived here. Wittgenstein asked:
Wiat is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the
35fact that I raise my arm?" The answer, which Wittgenstein himself
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feared forever elusive, may now fairly easily be given. If i aub-
tracf rhe fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise it. the
remainder (in typical cases, at least) is an instance of my willing
that my arm should go up together with my so willing's contributing
causally to its going up.
One last point: the account that has been given in this sec-
tion of what it is to act is not of course designed to account for
every legitimate use of the term "action" and its cognates. In par-
ticular, there are uses of the term "action" according to which an
action is Just an event (witness Newton's law concerning "actions" and
"reactions"); there are also uses of the term according to which an
action, though not just any event, is still such that no volition is
essentially Involved in it (witness habitual actions and reflex ac-
tions); and there are uses of the term "action" according to which
the thing that "acts" is not even a person (witness group and corpor-
ate actions). Now, nothing has been said in this section which be-
gins to give an account of any such "action." But the sort of action
that has been accounted for here is so important, and so significant-
ly different from any of these other sorts of action, that a separate
account of it is fully justified. From now on, however, when I say
that all action is essentially volitional, it should be understood
that It is a particular sort of action—that accounted for in this
section that I have in mind.
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5. The Individuation of Action s
If we assume that D.IV.S.b is correct, then we may expect
doings and deads ic fall Info three
.aln categories: those which are
direct, those which are Indirect, and those which are synthetic. We
may say first of all:
D.IV.17 £ Is a direct doing of S's =df. there Is an event qsuch that £ IS [S brings about £ directly). 36
^
We may also say:
£ Is an indirect doing of S's «df. there is an event qsuch that £ is brings about £ indirectly].
^
And we may say
:
£ is a synthetic doing of S's =df. there Is an event qsuch that £ IS [S brings about £ synthetically].
We may then say:
£^is a doing of ^'s =df. either £ is a direct doing of
S s or £ is an indirect doing of S's or £ is a syntheticdoing of s.
An event cannot be a doing on one occasion and not on another,
For instance, [Smith multiplies 928 by 254] is a doing of Smith's
whenever it occurs; indeed, it is a doing of his even if it never
37
occurs. But when exactly does a doing that occurs occur? This is
a tricky question, but I think the following is accurate. If the
doing is a direct doing, then it occurs at least at the time the voli-
tion involved occurs and at the time the deed involved occurs. That
is, if ^ brings about £ directly relative to _t and _t
' ,
then [S brings
about £ directly] occurs at £ and at _t ' . Whether or not it occurs at
any or all of the times in betvt?een £ and £' (if there are any such
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times) is a „,ooc poi„t-a point whlcl, I do not feel competent to re-
solve, but also a point whose resolution is, I think, not required in
order for the present account of action to be accepted. Similarly, If
the doing at Issue Is an Indirect doing, then it occurs at least at
the time the volition involved occurs and at the time the deed in-
volved occurs, but also at the times to which the causal contribution
involved is relative. That Is, If s brings about £ Indirectly rela-
tive to £ and £' by virtue of bringing about £ directly relative to t
and £* and of £ contributing causally relative to £» and £' to £, then
[S brings about £ indirectly] occurs at £, £* t'. Whether or not
It occurs at any or all of the times in between £ and £' other than
JL* (if there are any such times) is a moot point which 1 do not feel
competent to resolve.
The times at which incdirect doings occur has been of special
interest in recent philosophy. For instance, consider the case of
Smith's killing Jones relative to t and t\ and suppose that he kills
Jones by virtue of pulling the trigger of his gun relative to t and
_t* and of that event internal to this pulling of the trigger con-
tributing causally relative to
_t* and
_t' to Jones's death. Now, the
current account of the times at which indirect doings occur has it
that [Smith kills Jones] occurs at least at _t, _t* and
;
whether or
not it occurs at any or all of the times in between t and t' other
than
_t* is an issue left unresolved. It should be noted in this
respect that the contention that, if ^ brings about jo indirectly rela-
tive to ^ and jt , then brings about indirectly] occurs at each
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t
,
and
.
.
.
,
and
_t •
, becones less plausible as the temporal
lapse between b and ^ incenses. Pc instance, snppeae Cat S^itb
kills Jones by ylttue of bis pnUins the ttf.get of bis gnn telatiye
to see closely related ti^es on April 6 and by virtue of Jones’s
dying tbe following December 17. To say that tbe killing occurs
throughout the months in between sounds odd; but to say that it occurs
at those times to which the pulling of the trigger is relative and at
the time of Jones’s death seems reasonable. At any rate, that is the
position that 1 adopt.
At what time, finally, does a synthetic doing occur? It oc-
curs at least at the time the volition (or volitions) Involved occurs
(or occur) and at the time the deed (or deeds) Involved occurs (or oc-
cur), and also, if any of the deeds Involved are indirect, at the
times to which the causal contribution (or contributions) Involved is
(or are) relative. Whether or not the doing occurs at any or all of
the times in between the time of the first volition and that of the
final deed (if there are any such times), other than at the times of
the intermittent volitions and deeds, is a moot point that I do not
feel competent to resolve.
It should be noted that, according to the present account, it
IS possible for a doing to occur at a time which is indefinitely
later than the time at which the agent involved passes from this world
This may sound odd, but I do not think that it is truly objectionable.
For It IS not possible, according to the present account, for a doing
to occur and yet not occur at some time at which the agent involved
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is alive; aad this is so sl.ply because, first, every doing involves
a volition and, second, a person cannot will an event and not be alive
when he does so. It is, of course, possible (and this is especially
obvious in the case of Indirect action) that a deed should occur and
yet not occur at any time at which the agent (or. Indeed, agents)
Involved is (or are) alive. And so, in sun,, it is certainly possible
for an action, whether "action" Is understood in the sense of "doing"
or "deed," to occur when the agent involved is not alive. But, to
repeat, it is not possible for a doing to occur and yet not occur at
some time at wliich the agent involved is alive.
Although an event cannot be a doing on one occasion and not on
another, it is nevertheless the case that an event may be a deed on
one occasion and not on another; for it is a deed when and only when
it is actively brought about by an agent. Hence the concept of a deed
must, strictly speaking, be relativized to times. This relativlzatlon
gives rise to one small problem, however. How long are we to say
that an event remains a deed? One obvious suggestion is that an
event, once a deed, remains a deed for as long as it occurs without
interruption. For instance, let £ be [Smith's arm rises] and suppose
that Smith brings about £ directly relative to _t and t'. Then £ is a
deed of Smith's at
_t '
.
The suggestion is that £ remains a deed of his
for as long as it occurs without interruption. This is, indeed, a
suggestion that I shall adopt. We should, however, take note here of
a proposed counterexample to this suggestion. Suppose that Smith
raises his arm relative to £ and and that his arm continues to rise
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in a "natural" manner fro„, through t_,; but suppose that a machine
akes over at and that from that moment onward Smith's arm rises
only because of the machine's intervention, until it ceases rising
-En+m' “S say that Smith would have halted the motion of his
arm at
^ if he had been able.) According to the suggestion, [Smitli's
arm rises] is a deed of Smith's from t^ through t^^^, but Is it not
more reasonable to say that It is a deed of his from t^ through t_,
only? I think we should deny this. After all, what is it that dis-
tinguishes the motion of Smith's arm at t from its motion at t ?
—n+1
Is it desired by Smith at t but not af t ? Mmt-D c t Not necessarily; being
desired by its agent is not a necessary condition of an event's being
a deed. Is it intended by Smith at t^ but not at t^^^? Not neces-
sarily; being intended by its agent is not a necessary condition of
an event's being a deed. Perhaps [Smith's arm rises] is in Smith's
control at t^ but not at t^^^? Although this suggestion has some
intuitive appeal, I think that it too should be rejected. After all.
It has not been said that an event must be in the agent's control if
It IS to be a deed, nor do I think that this should be said. Control,
whatever it amounts to, would seem to me to be a condition of free
action in particular, and the present discussion of action is supposed
to take all action into account, free and unfree. And so I am not
persuaded that the purported counterexample is a counterexample. Per-
haps the intuition behind this proposed counterexample is taken care
of if we note that it is perfectly possible that Smith desire or intend
[Smith's arm rises] up until t and that he cease to do so at t ,, or
—n+1
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he be in control of ' tills deed (whatever this amounts to ex-
actly) up until t_^ and that he cease to be so at t
—
n+1'
There is one more problem that must be taken care of before
analysis of the concept of a deed may be proposed. Let £ be
[Smith s arm rises] and suppose that Smith wills £ at _t and that he
thereby succeeds in bringing about £ directly relative to t and t ' .
ppose, too, that Smith s is the only arm that rises at t'. It then
seems reasonable to say that £ constitutes £ at t ’ , where £ is [an
arm rises]. So £ is a deed of Smith's at t ' . But suppose that, from
t' onward, £ never ceases to occur, i^, that at least one arm is
always rising from that time on. (It need not always be the same
arm that rises, of course.) It is surely false that £ remains a
deed of Smith's from £' onward. But perhaps we can account for this
simply by noting that Smith's volition at t does not continue to con-
tribute causally to £ indefinitely. Hence some mention of S's ori-
ginal volition must also figure in the analysis of the concept of a
deed.
In accordance with the foregoing observations I propose the
following (where t is iust prior to t )•
—n
-n+1 ’
D.IV.21:
_t^ =df. there£ is a direct deed of S^'s at t , . .
are events £ and £ and a time ^ such that:
(i) ^ wills £ at _t in order that r may occur;
(li) [S wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and to £ and . . . and
[S wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and £^ to £;(ill) [£ wills £ in order that £ may occur] does not con-
tribute causally relative to £ and t to £; and
(Iv) £ constitutes £ at £^, and . . . T£t1_^ .and at t
—
n
Note that the following is a theorem:
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T^V^: Necessarily, if £ is a direct deed of S' s at t ... .then there is a time
_t such that
^ brings'ibout *
p
'
directly relative to t and
_t^ and ... and S brings
about £ directly relative to t and t .
~
~
-ai
A direct doing, then, occurs throughout the time at which the deed
internal to it occurs, as seems only fitting.
Similar considerations apply to the question of when an in-
direct deed occurs. Bearing them in mind, we may, I think, state the
following
:
IV- 22
: £ is an indirect deed of s at t
,
. .
.
,
t =df.
there are an event £ and times t and t' such that:
(i) ^ brings about £ directly relative to t and t'
;
(ii) £ occurs exactly once at t';
~ ~ ’
(iii) 3. contributes causally relative to t' and t to
£ and . . . and £ contributes causaTly relative to
_t' and
_t^ to £; and
(iv) £ does not contribute causally relative to _t' and
-^+1
Fioally
,
a similar analysis of the concept of a synthetic
deed may also be given, based on D.IV.15 above. This analysis is
very complex, however, and I shall not give it here. Basically, the
idea is that a synthetic deed occurs when and only when at least one
of those deeds of which it is composed occurs. We may then say:
D. IV. 23
: £ is a deed of ^'s at _tj^, . . .
,
=df. either £ is a
direct deed of s at _t ^ , . . .
,
_t^^ or £ is an indirect
deed of S's at t,
,
. .
.
,
t or p is a synthetic deed
of S's at t,, r}
.
.
t
.39-"
Assuming that the concepts of a doing and a deed are rendered
sufficiently precise by means of D.IV.20 and D.IV.23, we may no\<r turn
to the question of the individuation of actions and how problems 2a
through 2e are to be resolved. Since doings and deeds are states of
affairs, indeed, events, it follows from A. II. 12 that they are
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"finely-grained," that la, that a doing (or deed) j, is Identlcal with
a doing (or deed)
^ if and only if p entail c, ny -Li- £ s £ and £ entails £. This
observation helps us deal with problem 2a. It was asked how many ac-
tions Jones performed, after he opened the front door, when he flipped
the light-switch, thereby turning on the light, thereby illuminating
the room, and thereby alerting the burglar. The answer is, as may
now be seen, that at least four doings occurred (namely, [Jones flips
the light switch], [Jones turns on the light], [Jones illuminates the
room], and [Jones alerts the burglar]) and probably many more besides
(such as [Jones flips the light-switch in the hallway], ^. ) ; simi-
larly, at least four deeds occurred (namely, those Internal to the
doings just mentioned) and probably many more besides. There is a
sense, of course, in which [Jones flips the light-switch] "just is"
[Jones turns on the light], and so on, but this is not a question of
these events' being identical but of their being related by the "by"-
relation. This matter will be discussed further in Section 7 below.
It may be objected here (as Donagan objected to Chisholm's
theory of events^°) that actions are "unacceptably multiplied" on a
finely-grained theory of action. For instance, suppose the light-
switch that Jones flips in the foregoing example is located in the
hallway, in his house, in the Bronx, in New York State, etc. On the
present theory, [Jones flips the light-switch], [Jones flips the
light-switch in the hallway]
,
[Jones flips the light-switch in the
hallway in his house], [Jones flips the light-switch in the hallway
in his house in the Bronx]
,
[Jones flips the light-switch in the hall-
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way in his house in the Bronx in New York State], and so on, are all
distinct doings of Jones’s. Does this not contradict the fact that
only one light-switch-flipping occurred? It does not. Here I will
merely invoke, without further discussion, that strategy discussed
and adopted at the end of Chapter II. it is reasonable to say that
a light-switch-flipplng is an occurrence of the event [a light-switch
is flipped], and this event occurs only once at the time and place
Jones flips the light-switch.^^
What of problem 2b? Does Jones perform an infinite number of
actions when he takes one step forward by virtue of his taking half a
step forward, a quarter of a step forward, and so forth? Our intui-
tions are, I think, unclear on this point;^^ but, according to the
present theory, Jones does perform an infinite number of actions.
For instance, let us call that event internal to [Jones takes one
step forward] p^, and let us suppose that Jones brings about p direct-
ly by virtue of his willing p and this volition's causing p to occur.
In order for his half-steps, quarter-steps, and so on, to be actions
of his, p must constitute those events internal to them. Does it?
I think it does. Hence p and all of its fractions are direct deeds
of Jones's and his bringing about p directly is distinct from his
bringing about each of its fractions directly. Is this objectionable?
I think not. I think this thesis would certainly be objectionable if
it Implied that a separate and distinct volition accompanies each
distinct doing and deed, but this is of course not an implication of
the theory.
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As for problem 2c and the issue of the accumulability of ac-
tions, it begins to look as if D.lV.S.a might be preferable to
D.IV.S.b after all. Given D.IV.15, it turns out that Jones brings
about the event internal to his walk synthetically and that therefore,
by D.IV.S.b, D.1V.20 and D.IV.23, his walk is a doing of his and the
event internal to it a deed. Now, perhaps this is not too objec-
tionable. But is it not theoretically possible that direct doings be
accumulated ^ ir^inltum so that a person's entire life (if, as is
perhaps practically impossible, the person is continually active)
turns out to be one big synthetic doing, and hence a doing, of his?
It seems so; and perhaps it would be better if the present theory did
not have this implication. But we are caught in a dilemma here. For
if we rule out one synthetic doing on the grounds that it is just too
big and lasts too long to count as a single doing, how are we still
to rule in as doings those synthetic things, such as [Jones hits a
forehand], [Jones drives around the corner], and [Jones multiplies
928 by 254], which appear to have a legitimate claim on the title
doing. For my part, I can find no acceptable way to rule in the
more compact, short-term synthetic doings and to rule out the larger,
long-term synthetic doings as genuine doings. My decision has been,
as in the case of indirect bringings about, to bite the bullet and call
aJJ. synthetic bringings about doings. Hence I have claimed the truth
of D.IV.S.b (as opposed to D.lV.S.a), D.IV.20, and D.IV.23. The al-
ternative (to claim that only direct and indirect doings and deeds are
genuine doings and deeds), though simpler, seems to me even less
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palatable
.
When It comes to problem 2d and the distinction between ac-
tions and consequences, however, the advantages of the present theory
of action are clear. In one of his papers J.L. Austin says:
[A] single term descriptive of what he [the agent] did maybe made to cover either a smaller or a larger stretch of
clued ’t^e°"
the narrower description being
uL of his or "effects" or fhe
Since Austin wrote this, rt has become somewhat of a commonplace to
say that there is no hard-and-fast distinction between act and conse-
quence, that the distinction Is more linguistic than ontological. For
instance, Eric D'Arcy proposes the thesis that the term which denotes
the act, in the description of a given incident, may often be elided
into the term which denotes the consequence of the act,^^ especially
when the consequence is anticlpatable.'^^ Indeed, he says:
As a rule ... the line between "act" and "consequence" maybe drawn at different points when the elements of a given epl-
sode are being analyzed.
Joel Feinberg calls the phenomenon that Austin points to the "accor-
dion effect,"^^ and Donald Davidson^^ and Bruce Aune^^ speak approv-
ingly of his discussion of this. But surely, if an act is an event
and a consequence is another event which is an effect of that act, no
amount of linguistic legerdemain will be able to accomplish the
miracle of merging these two separate and distinct entities into one
In fact, both Davidson and Aune explicitly recognize this point (al-
though Austin, D Arcy and Feinberg do not) by stipulating that what
is stretched and squeezed when the accordion effect is operative i.s
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Che descr iption of the act concerned, and not the act itself
posed example of the accordion effect Is the case of Jones's
A pro-
flipping
of the switch, thereby turning on the light, illuminating the room
and alerting the burglar. In this example, for Instance, the term
Jones flipped the switch” is presumed to "cover a smaller stretch of
events than the term "Jones alerted the burglar." Perhaps, on a
Davidsonian ontology of events, according to which a single event
often bears several descriptions and according to which [Jones flips
the switch] and [Jones alerts the burglar] are (in this case) identi-
cal, there is some excuse for saying that the accordion effect is
operative here. For there may be, indeed there surely is (given the
distinction between direct and indirect bringing about) a legitimate
sense in which "Jones alerted the burglar" "covers" the event of the
burglar's becoming alarmed whereas "Jones flipped the switch" does not
and given that, on such an ontology, "Jones flipped the switch" and
Jones alerted tlie burglar" nevertheless describe the same action,
perhaps there is good reason to talk about the "stretching and
squeezing" of descriptions in this case. But, to repeat, there is no
good reason to talk of the stretching and squeezing of actions them-
selves .
On the ontology of events and actions proposed in this chap-
ter, however, talk of the accordion effect would appear unwarranted.
For [Jones flips the switch] and [Jones alerts the burglar] are not
identical, on this theory, and so the fact that the description of
the former fails to cover" an event that the description of the
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latter covers" Is of no special Importance. It seems to me a con-
siderable advantage of the present theory that talk of the accordion
effect may be dispensed with; for having to account for the descrip-
tions of actions, as well as the actions themselves, can only serve
to complicate matters.
In the present context I am of course taking a consequence £
of an event £ to be any event to which £ contributes causally. Note
that, although it is obviously true that, if £ is a consequence of £,
5, may be and indeed very often is distinct from £, it is yet possible
for a doing or deed to be a consequence of a doing or deed. We have
already seen that all indirect deeds are themselves consequences of
direct deeds. That a doing may be a consequence of a doing is made
clear by the fact that, if Smith hypnotizes Jones and Jones walks
around in circles as a consequence, then both [Smith hypnotizes
Jones] and [Jones walks around in circles] are doings, even though
the latter is a consequence of the former.
I
believe in fact that,
in general, a doing has exactly the same consequences, on a particu-
lar occasion, as the deed internal to it, but I am not sure how this
might be proven.
What of problem 2d in particular, however? When Jones kills
Smith, is Smith's death a part or a consequence of what Jones does?
We are now in a position to see how this question requires clarifica-
tion. When Jones kills Smith, he brings about Smith's death indirect-
ly. Smith s death, therefore, is a deed and it is part of the event
which is Jones's killing Smith and which is composed in addition of a
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volition of Jones's and of a direct deed of Jones's contributing
causally to Smith's death. But although Smith's death is part of
Jones's killing him, and although it is of course true that it is
logically impossible that Jones kills Smith and Smith yet live, it is
also true that Smith's death is a consequence of a doing of Jones's.
This is because the killing is an indirect doing, and every indirect
doing is performed partly by means of a direct doing. In the present
case, Jones shoots Smith. Let us assume that his pulling of the
trigger is a direct doing of his. We may then say that Smith's death
IS a consequence of Jones's pulling the trigger. Speaking loosely,
then, we may say that Smith's death is both a part and a consequence
of what Jones does." But this is, of course, just loose talk; the
way in which to make it more precise has just been shown.
Finally, v/ith regard to 2e, it is clear that, on the present
account of action, [Jones butters something], [Jones butters bread],
[Jones butters toast in the bathroom], and [Jones butters toast in
the bathroom with a knife], are all doings of Jones's. [Jones butters
toast in the bathroom with a knife at midnight] is a different matter.
If we take "midnight" to designate a particular midnight (as we
clearly should, given the wording of the illustration), then this
state of affairs is a proposition, and hence not an event, and hence
not an action. There may yet be some sense in which the manner, the
place, and the time are "circumstances" of the particular occurrence
of [Jones butters something] in question, but the temptation to clar-
ify this sense is diminished insofar as, given the present finely-
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grained individuation of actions, not only [Jones butters something)
but also [Jones butters toast], and so on, may safely be said to be
doings of Jones's.
In this connection it should be mentioned that there is
another sense of "circumstance" which is often Invoked in action-
contexts. In this sense, a circumstance is an event which occurs
round about the time at which the action occurs but which is neither
the action Itself, nor a cause of the action, nor a consequence of the
action. I shall forgo trying to render this sense of "circumstance"
more precise here.
6. Intentional Action
We should now turn to an account of intentional action. In
order to facilitate the discussion I shall at first concentrate
solely on intentional direct action.
Let us begin by considering the following proposal, which is
one that no philosopher that I know of has seriously thought to be
adequate
:
—
• S. intentionally brings about £ directly relative to t
and
_t' =df. ~
(i) ^ intends £ at jt; and
(ii)
^ brings about £ directly relative to _t and t'.
Although both clause (i) and clause (il) of this definition do, I
think, state necessary conditions for the truth of the definiendum,
they do not state, singly or jointly, a sufficient condition for its
truth. Consider this counterexample. Let S be Smith and £ be the
event internal to his hitting Jones. Suppose that Smith is talking
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to Brown and, also, lhat ,.e Intends that
^ should occur, and suppose
that. In the course of his talk with Brown, he becomes excited and
starts gesticulating wildly, thereby inadvertently hitting Jones, who
happens (unknown to Smith) to be standing close by. Certainly Smith
does not intentionally bring about p directly, and yet according to
he does.
The most obvious move, in an effort to improve on D.IV.24, is
to introduce the concept of willing here and to attempt to forge a
link between what S wills at p and what is thereby caused to happen.
If we look at D.IV.12 above, the move that immediately suggests itself
is to stipulate that "p" and "r" designate the same event. That is:
IXIV.ld.a : S Intentionally brings about p directly relative to t
and
_t
-df. there is an event £ such that:
~
(i)
^ wills £ at _t in order that £ may occur;(11) wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to
_t and £' to £; and(iii) £ constitutes £ at t'.
Note that the following are implications, and obviously desirable ones
of the definiens of D. IV. 24. a: first, that ^ brings about £ directly
relative to £ and _t' (see D.IV.12); and second, that S intends £ at
t (see A. IV. 10). (The definiens of D.IV.24 of course has these im-
plications also.) But D.IV.24. a will not do, for essentially the same
reasons that Chisholm adduced in the last chapter in his criticism of
D. III. 11. Nevertheless, we may note that the person has certainly
acted successfully, even if npt intentionally, in Chisholm's examples,
and so we may say:
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—
—
' ! directly relative to tthere is an event
^ such that:
£ at _t in order that j? may occur;Ui) IS wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to
_t and
_t' to p; and
(. 111 ) £ constitutes £ at t'.
Wliat has gone wrong with D. IV. 24. a? As Chisholm notes (but
with reference to D. III. 11 in particular), it fails to take account of
the fact that "an agent performs an intentional action provided there
IS something he makes happen in the way he intended
. This observa-
tion is, I think, absolutely right. But what sense are we to make of
the notion of making something happen "in the way one intends"? As we
saw in the last chapter, Chisholm believes that what this amounts to
IS a requirement that the deed be not just successfully brought about,
but that it be brought about in a manner which is "completely success-
ful." On these grounds he proposes D. III. 11. a; but this definition,
too, was found to be wanting.
Several philosophers seem to accept Chisholm's insight that
acting intentionally requires that one's deed or deeds be made to
happen in the way one intends"—as, indeed, I think they should—but
they do not seem to have made it any clearer, although this is not for
want of trying. For instance, Alvin Goldman proposes an account of
intentional action in which a person is said to act intentionally only
if his having an action-plan causes the deed in question "in a certain
53characteristic way." Goldman is of course aware of the vagueness of
this locution, but he claims that it is not incumbent upon him, qua
philosopher, to seek to dispel it. He claims, rather, that this is a
matter which properly concerns the neurophysiologist. But such an
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abjuration of philosophical inquiry is, I believe, premature. Simi-
larly, Gilbert Hantan has suggested that a person acts intentionally
only if an Intention of his causes the deed in question "in a more or
less explicitly specified «ay,"” and Richard Foley has proposed that
a person acts intentionally only if a volition of his causes the deed
in question in the way envisaged. But none of these substitute
locutions is any clearer than that locution which we are seeking to
understand, namely, "in the way one intends.”
At one point Foley suggests a reading of the locution "in the
way envisaged” which results in the following definition (when modi-
fied to fit the present framework):
D . lV.24.b
: ^ intentionally brings about £ directly relative to t
and jt' =df. there is an event £ such that;
~
(1) ^ wills £ at £ in order that £ may occur;(li) wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and _t’ to £ in a manner
which does not surprise S; and
(iil) £ constitutes £ at _t'.^^
But it is wrong to take "in the way one intends” or "in the way en-
visaged to mean the same in this context as "in a manner which does
not surprise £. " For consider this case. Smith is excruciatingly in-
ept and, not unreasonably, totally lacking in self-confidence, llhen-
ever he manages to do what he Intends to do, he is astonished. Now,
Jones is an insensitive, self-satisfied scoundrel who continually
berates Smith, mocking his ineptitude. Smith finally becomes so ex-
asperated at Jones's insulting behavior that he decides to teach him
a lesson. He decides that, if Jones insults him just one more time,
he will punch him in the mouth. The next day Jones again insults
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Smith and Smith carries out his intention i-LULenr . He punches Jones in the
mouth; but, true to form, he is surnriQ^a ^ u, -Lb p sed that he succeeds in doing
so. According to D.IV.24.b, then aH u men. Smith does not act intentionally
when he punches Jones in the mouth. But the fact ic,Lu r s, of course, that
he does.
There are still others who have tried their hand at analyzing
the concept of intentional action. For Instance, Judith Jarvis Thom-
son proposes an analysis in terms of the concept of hope.^^ This
analysis is, I believe, defective, but it is very complicated and 1
shall not discuss it here. 1 propose to turn, rather, to an analysis
of my own. However, before doing so, brief acknowledgment should be
made of a method of treating this issue which is distinct from that
general method adopted by Chisholm, Goldman, Harman, Foley, and others.
G.E.M. Anscombe has given a clear statement of this method. Rather
than deal with the causal history of the deed, Anscombe proposes to
deal with the reasons for which it is brought about by the agent.
(There are those, of course, who believe that such reasons just are
causes of the deed in question, but Anscombe is not of this opinion.)
Her proposal amounts to the following:
D. IV. 24. c
: ^ intentionally brings about directly relative to t
and t^' =df. there is a rational explanation of [S brings
about
_p directly relative to t and t']»^^
Bruce Aune has also given voice to the same intuition. His proposal,
in outline, is this:
D. IV. 24 . d
: ^ intentionally brings about
_p directly relative to _t
and =df. there is an intention such that has
rationally explains brings about
_p directly relative
to ^ and t ' ]
.
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This approach to the present problem is difficult to evaluate, for
the concept of rational explanation must first be clarified. Both
Anscombe and, especially, Aune undertake such clarification, but their
treatment of this issue is incomplete in certain respects, as they are
themselves aware. Nevertheless, I suspect that this approach, even
if adequately clarified, would prove defective. First, 1 think there
may well be intentional actions performed by an agent for which the
agent has no reason, and hence for which there Is no rational explana-
.
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tion. Having a reason for acting is, I think, a mark of deliberate
action, and whereas all deliberate action is intentional, not all in-
tentional action, I believe, is deliberate. (I shall return to the
matter of deliberate action shortly.) Secondly, it would seem to me
possible to give a rational explanation of an unintentional action.
Suppose I want to please my host and, for this reason, reach out for
a second cup of coffee. But suppose that, in so doing, I unintention-
ally knock over the coffee pot, spilling its contents on to my host's
lap. Does my desire to please my host rationally explain my knocking
over the coffee pot? I am not sure, although it seems to me plausible
to say that it does. Perhaps either Aune or Anscombe would reply that
it offers no " complete " rational explanation of this action. There
may be something to this reply but, without further details, it is
one that 1 cannot adequately evaluate. I would rather, therefore,
turn back from reasons to causes and see if we cannot, following the
general method adopted by Chisholm, Goldman, and the rest, come up
with a satisfactory account of intentional action. I think we can.
182
The most striking feature
brought about, over and above its
IS that it comes about in the way
been said, is Chisholm's insight,
complete agreement. But what does
issue this way;
of a deed which is intentionally
being successfully brought about,
the agent intends. This, as has
and it is one with which I am in
this amount to? Foley states the
wbiVh^a’
seems, a criterion of doing something deliberately
perfec^^curacr^fh" ^ coLequanceTith
nni-
also want a criterion which does
s?«foraff!
“®"‘’' mistaken about how theState of affairs in question is caused. 62
I think this is both a correct and a useful way of looking at things.
(Where Foley uses the term "deliberately- I would rather use the term
intentionally," but this is a minor point that I shall overlook for
the moment.) Foley's proposed solution, as has already been mentioned
concerns the element of surprise, and it is one that has been found
wanting. But we should nevertheless attempt to meet his requirements
for a satisfactory criterion. The correct solution, I believe, is
really rather straightforward. For an action to be intentional, it
must come about in one of a certain limited number of ways acceptable
to the agent. In order to pin down this concept we should first give
a preliminary definition, namely:
D. IV. 26; contributes causally relative to jt and t' to p via
_r =df. there is a time p* not earlier than p and notlater than jt' and there is an event p such that:
(i) p contributes causally relative to t and t* to r;
(ii) p contributes causally relative to p and t* to s;(ill) p contributes causally relative to p and t' to p;(iv) p contributes causally relative to p* and t' to p;
(v) p contributes causally relative to p* and t' to p;
(vi) p occurs exactly once at p*; and
(vii) s entails r.^3
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If £ contributes causally to £ via r on some occasion, then r may be
said to be an intermediary on that occasion. We may then say:
At £ comes about, as a result of £, as S intends at
_t =dt . ~
(1) there are events r
^ , . . .
,
r„ such that
(a)
^ intends at _t that, for some time
_t *
, £ shouldcontribute causally relative to ^ and t* to peither via £2 via r^
,
and
~
(b) £ (in fact) contributes causally relative to t
and
_t- to £ either via r or ... or via r ;~and
vii; there is no event £ such that
(a)
^ intends at _t that, for no time £*
, £ should
contribute causally relative to
_t and t* to p
via £, and
~ ~ ^
(b) £ (nevertheless) contributes causally relative
to
_t and £* to £ via r.
n this case, through are anticipated potential intermediaries,
one at least of which turns out to be an actual intermediary. More-
over, there occurs no actual intermediary which was anticipated by S
as not occurring. (Note that this is not to say that no intermediary
occurred which was not anticipated by ^ as occurring.) Clause (ii)
rules out what Foley calls "radical mistakes"; moreover, his stipula-
tion that "perfect accuracy" not be required is also met, especially
since in most cases the disjunction of through r^ of clause (1)
will contain more than one disjunct. It seems, then, that we may
truthfully assert the following:
D. IV. 24 .
e
: ^ intentionally brings about £ directly relative to t
and £' =df. there is an event £ such that:
(i) ^ wills £ at £ in order that £ may occur;
(ii) wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and £* to £;
(iii) £ constitutes £ at £' ; and
(iv) at £' £ comes about, as a result of wills £ in
order that £ may occur] , as ^ intends at £.
In this connection we may note the following theorem:
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D.IV.29;
!
i?t-tlonally brings about j, directly
relative to 1 and f' !
brings about £
If D.lV.24,e is accurate, as I claim, then the concepts of
Intentionally bringing about an event indirectly and of Intentionally
bringing about an event synthetically are easily accounted for. Ue
may say:
DiIV^: S intentionally brings about £ indirectly relative to t
o
event £ and a time _t* such that:
( 1 ) ^ intentionally brings about £ directly relative to
_t and
_t*;
(ii) at
_t' £ comes about, as a result of £, as S intends
at
_t; and —
(iii) £ occurs exactly once at t*.
^ intentionally brings about £ synthetically relative to
_t and t -df. there are events
• •
•
, £, such that:(1) £ is composed relative to _t and of
,
(il) for any event £, if £ is identical with £, or . . .
or £ is identical with £^^, then there are times t*
and £" such that ~
(a)
_t is not later than
_t*, £* is not later than t",
and
_t” is not later than
_t
' ,
and
~
(b) either
(a) ^ intentionally brings about £ directly rela-
tive to jt* and £”
,
or
(3) ^ intentionally brings about £ indirectly
relative to _t* and and
(iii)
^ intends at _t that, for some time £'
, £ should be
composed relative to _t and of £^^, . . . , £^.
It should of course be noted that it is a theorem, first, that [S
intentionally brings about £ directly relative to £ and _t * ] implies
[£ brings about £ directly relative to £ and £' ]
;
second, that [S in-
tentionally brings about £ indirectly relative to £ and £* ] implies
[£ brings about £ indirectly relative to £ and £' ]
;
and, third, that
[£ intentionally brings about £ synthetically relative to £ and £’
]
implies [£ brings about £ synthetically relative to £ and £* ]
•
Given
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that D.IV.24.6, D.IV.28 and D.IV.29 are accurate, we may say:
|^lnte«ionally brings about actively relative to t and
f an^^’fof ^ directly relative to
fo"ran“ct^or ^ “di-^^ctly relative
And we may also say:
1 acts Intentionally relative to t and t' =df there isan event £ such that S intentionally brings about pactively relative to
_t and ^
We may of course also say that S acts unintentionally relative to t
and
_t just in case he acts relative to t and
_t' but does not act
intentionally relative to t and t'.
Let us now see how this account of intentional action measures
up to a few test cases. The most interesting ones appear to concern
indirect action; at any rate, these have been the main focus of atten-
tion in the recent literature, and I shall here confine my attention
to them. First, suppose that Jones is intent on shooting Smith. He
takes aim at Smith's heart and pulls the trigger of his gun. His aim
is a little off, however, and he shoots Smith straight between the
eyes instead, nevertheless still managing thereby to kill him instant-
ly. Now it turns out, according to D.IV.28, that [Jones shoots Smith
straight between the eyes] is not an intentional doing of Jones's; for
Jones has no intentions regarding the event internal to this doing,
and so clause (ii) of D.IV.28 fails to be satisfied. But is this
result not counterintuitive? No, I do not think it is. For Jones
certainly did not intentionally shoot Smith straight between the eyes .
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This of course leaves open the possibility of his intentionally pull-
ing the trigger (probably a direct doing) and of his Intentionally
shooting Smith (another Indirect doing). In such circumstances as
those Just sketched, I would think it almost certainly true that
Jones^ intentionally pull the trigger. Wl,ether or not he also in-
tentionally shot Smith will depend in part upon how detailed his pic-
ture was of how the bullet was to find Its way Into Smith's body.
The fact that Jones did not Intend that Smith should be shot straight
between the eyes does not Imply that, by shooting him straight between
the eyes, he did not Intentionally shoot him. For I tlilnk It Is true
that. If Jones Intended that the event Internal to his shooting Smith
in the heart should occur, then he also intended that that event In-
ternal to his shooting Smith should occur. And, as long as he did
not Intend that this latter event should not be brought about by
virtue of the bullet's piercing Smith's brow instead of his heart,
then Jones did Intentionally shoot Smith, although, to repeat, he did
not intentionally shoot him straight between the eyes.
Or take these two cases given by Aune:
I intend to frighten Smith and decide to do so by making a
threatening gesture. My eyesight is poor, however, and I
approach a rack full of coats, taking it to be Smith. I make
the threatening gesture. Smith, at the other end of the room,
sees me making the gesture to the coatrack and, thinking I
have gone mad, becomes frightened. It seems doubtful that I
frightened Smith intentionally: my decision to make the
threatening gesture does not cause Smith’s fright by the ap-
propriate sequence of events. On the other hand, suppose that
I intend to kill Smith and, as a means of killing him, decide
to stab him with an icepick. I then lunge with the icepick,
but I miss my target, striking his neck with my clenched fist.
A blood vessel breaks in Smith’s neck, and he dies. In this
case it seems that I do kill Smith intentionally, although I
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do not kill him in the way that I Intended to kill him- thesequence of events connecting my decision to stab Smith withSmith's death would seem to be close enough to ?he ei^lsIJnedsequence to render my killing intent ional!64
io
Anne's conclusion is that "[tlhese contrasting cases suggest that the
notion of doing something with an intention is a little too vague to
be pinned down by any precise formula. "‘>5 gut this conclusion is
unwarranted, I think. Clause (11) of D.IV.27 gives us the clue as
to how to adjudicate these cases. Did I Intend that Smith should not
become frightened in the manner that he actually did? If so (and
perhaps this is likely) then I did intentionally frighten him.
Or again, did I intend that my clenched fist should strike
Smith's neck and break a blood vessel? If not (and perhaps this is
likely) then I^ intentionally kill him. The problem in such
cases, I submit, is not with the formula that I have proposed but with
whether or not there is sufficient Information to know how to apply
it accurately.
The concepts of intentional and unintentional doings and deeds
and related concepts may of course be formally analyzed in terms of
D.IV.31, but I shall not present explicit analyses of them here. I
propose, rather to turn now to a consideration of the third group of
problems posed at the outset of this chapter.
Assuming the accuracy of the foregoing account of Intentional
action, encapsulated in D.IV.31, problem 3a has in fact already been
resolved. What of problem 3b? This too may now be resolved. Given
that, on the present theory, doings are finely-grained, the solution
is fairly obvious. Since [Hamlet kills Polonius] and [Hamlet kills
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« seeing how the former „,ay be unintentional and the latter yet in-
tentional, even though Polonius was the
.an behind the arras. And it
«y still be
.aintalned that only one UHling occurred since, to in-
voke the strategy used before in Chapter II and also earlier in this
chapter, [something is killed, occurred only once at the tl.e and
place at which Hamlet killed Polonius.
It has sometimes been claimed that there are no such things
as unintentional actions, even though there are such things as ac-
f.
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ons. This claim is implausible and can now be seen
to be false; at least, it is false when "unintentional action" is un-
derstood in terms of D.IV.31. It has also been claimed that certain
actions cannot be committed unintentionally (first degree murder, for
example). « This is true, but quite compatible with the definitions
presented
.
I mentioned a short while ago that I would use "intentionally"
where Foley uses "deliberately." Perhaps this is Just a question of
ge, nevertheless, there is a concept distinct from that analyzed
In D.IV.31 which it would be useful to analyze, and I propose the
following
:
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S acts deliberately relative to t and t ’ =df t-h.events £ and £ such that: ~ ~
*
(i) there are times t t i .
('o'v ^ . —
I’
—
2’ * •
’
-tn thatIS just prior to
_t,
(b) is not later tlian“t, and
.
. . and t isnot later than t
,
and -^-1
(c) S considers [S wSlls
^ in order that n may
occur] at t^ and
.
. . and S considert (S wills
(11) either
°
^
(a)
^ intentionally brings about q directly relativeto
_t and
_t
' ,
or
(b) ^intentionally brings about £ indirectly rela-tive to £ and t * , or
(c) £ intentionally brings about £ synthetically
relative to
_t and t'.^^
The consideration specified in clause (i) of this definition may be
termed "deliberation." often, of course, deliberation will Involve a
mulling of alternatives and the willing that contributes causally to
£ and £ will then be a choice (see D. IV. 51 below)
. But I shall not
discuss this issue. However, we may say, in connection with D.IV.32:
33
: £ acts impetuously relative to
_t and t’ =df.
(i) ^ acts relative to _t and t^; and~
(il) S_ does not act deliberately relative to t and t'.
And, finally, we may also say:
D . IV. 34
: £ acts voluntarily relative to _t and £' =df. either
(i) ^ acts intentionally relative to t and t'; or
(ii) (a) £ acts intentionally relative to
_t and t', and
(b) [£ acts] is uncoerced at t.
Of course, "uncoerced” is an undefined term, but I shall not seek to
define it here. As to the terms "involuntary" and "nonvoluntary," it
would perhaps be best to adopt the following conventions: a doing may
be said to be nonvoluntary if and only if it is not voluntary; no doing
may be said to be involuntary, since an "involuntary action (deed)" is
commonly held to be one to which no volition contributes causally, and
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-ce is HOC what I call a deed at all. ot coutse. this^ of
is not hindlng-indeed, this is the case with all of the tet.s
-^toduced in this chaptet-so long as the coscents. fot the expres-
sion of which I propose the use of these terms, are clear. In this
J.L. Austin in particular has provided a valuable service
in several of his papers by discussing the usage of such terms as
intentional,"
"deliberate,"
"purposeful,"
"impetuous," and so on.*^’
It is not my aim here to embroil myself in such discussion; nor do
I make any claim that the concepts analyzed in D.IV.31 through D.1V.35
are those unfailingly expressed by the English terms "intentional,"
deliberate," and so on.^“ Nevertheless, I do believe that these
concepts, like the other concepts analyzed In this chapter, are of
first importance to action-theory
.
~
—
By
-Relation and Basic Action
We should now turn our attention to the ”by"-relation and the
resolution of problems 4a, 4b, and 4c. As far as I can tell, there
are few restrictions on how the
-by-’-relation may relate one type of
bringing about to another. In Section 4 above six types of bringing
about were distinguished, and there are doubtless others that could be
distinguished also. There are, therefore, many different possible
exemplifications of the ’'by"-relation. In this section, however, I
shall concern myself with just five of these. These five strike me
as being the most important; an account of the others could be gener-
ated from the account that I shall give of these five.
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Let us take explicit note here of one salient general feature
the by
-relation. This is that it is necessarily true that, if
^ brings about ^ by bringing about £, then S brings about £ and S
brings about £ (although it is not necessarily true that, in such a
case,
^ brings about [£ and £] ) . This feature must be incorporated
into our analysis.
Consider problem 4a and, once again, the case of Jones alert-
ing the burglar by illuminating the room, illuminating the room by
turning on the light, turning on the light by flipping the switch,
flipping the switch by raising his hand, but not doing this last thing
by doing anything else. How are we to account for this? Given the
apparatus that has already been set up in this chapter, the answer
comes fairly easily. If we assume, as I think we should, that [Jones
raises his hand] and [Jones flips the switch] are direct doings of
Jones s and that the remainder ( 1 . e
.
,
[Jones turns on the light],
[Jones illuminates the room], and [Jones alerts the burglar] are in-
direct doings of Jones's, then we should note that there appear to be
three main types of the "by"-relation Involved here. These are,
first, the type which binds a direct doing to a direct doing; second,
the type which binds a direct doing to an indirect doing; and, third,
the type which binds an Indirect doing to an indirect doing. Let us
call the deed internal to [Jones raises his hand] £, that internal to
[Jones flips the switch] £, that Internal to [Jones turns on the
light] £, that internal to [Jones illuminates the room] £, and that
72internal to [Jones alerts the burglar] £. Let us assume that Jones
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brings about each of £ and ^ relative to t and t '
. Now I think it is
correct to assunie that
^ constitutes ^ at t ' , but not^
is in virtue of this fact that we say that Jones brings about
a by bringing about £, but not versa
.
(What event is there that
contributes causally to £ but not to £? One such event is [someone
installs the switch].) Generalizing on this, I believe we may say the
following
;
— ^ brings about £ directly relative to t and t' by
bringing about £ directly relative to £ and 7' =df.(i) ^ brings about £ directly relative to t and t';
brings about £ directly relative to t and t'; and(iii) £ constitutes £ at t'.^^
“ ~ ’
The type of "by"-relation that obtains between Jones's bring-
ing about £ and his bringing about r, however, is not that type ana-
lyzed in D.IV.35. For it is hardly likely that it is the case
—
indeed, for the sake of argument, let us assume that it is not the
case that £ also occurs at £' ; hence £ does not constitute r at t',
and so D.1V.35 is inapplicable. We should note, however, that r is
brought about indirectly by Jones; that this is so in virtue of the
fact that he brings about £ directly; and that it seems that we are
prepared to say that he brings about £ by bringing about £ simply
because it is in virtue of his bringing about £ that he brings about
£. Generalizing on this, I believe we may say the following:
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s brings about
^ indirectly relative to t and t* Kbringing about £ directly relative to t and t'~=df^there is an event £ such that: ~
(i) S brings about £ directly relative to t and t'-(ii) £ contributes causally relative to t' and(XXX s brings about r directly relative lo Tanft-
^(v r
causally relative to t' and t*~to q-V) occurs exactly once at t'; and
~ ~
(vl) r_ entails £. ^‘^
Once again, however, the type of "by"-relatlon that obtains
between Jones's bringing about r and his bringing about s is neither
that type analyzed in D.IV.35 nor that type analyzed in D.IV.36. For
it is hardly likely that it is the case-indeed, for the sake of argu-
ment, let us assume that it is not the case-that r and s occur at
the same time; moreover, both r and s are brought about Indirectly.
But D.IV.36 may nevertheless guide us here. For it appears that r
contributes causally to s, and that it is in virtue of this fact chat
a by
-relation obtains between Jones's bringing about £ and his
bringing about s. (The same, indeed, may be said of Jones's bringing
about s and his bringing about u. ) It seems, then, that only minimal
change to clauses (i) and (ill) of D.IV.36 is required to yield the
correct analysis for this case, and 1 propose the following:
—
IV • 3
7
: ^ brings about £ indirectly relative to _t and t* by
bringing about £ indirectly relative to £ and T' =df.there is an event £ such that:
~
(i) £ brings about £ indirectly relative to t and t';
(il) £ contributes causally relative to t' and t* to £;(lii) £ brings about £ Indirectly relative to t and t';
(Iv) £ contributes causally relative to £' and t* to £;(v) £ occurs exactly once at £' ; and
~
(vi) £ entails £.
We should note that it is not only the case in our example that
Jones brings about £ by bringing about £, tliat he brings about s by
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bringing about r, and so on, but It is also the case that he brings
about u by bringing about^ of j,. r and s. that he brings about
a by bringing about^ of j,. 3 and r, and so on. D.IV.35 through
D.IV.37 yield this result, although I shall not attempt to establish
this in dGtail here.
But what of £ in our example? How is it that Jones brings
this about directly but not by bringing about some other deed direct-
ly? That is just the way it is. (As we shall shortly see, £ may be
said on this occasion to be a basic deed of Jones's.) There is no
real mystery about this; it just happens that Jones raises his hand
but not by doing anything else. It is not necessarily this way; it
just this way. Note, of course, that Jones does not raise his hand
by willing £.^^ Given D.IV.12, it is easily seen why this is so (al-
though I again do not presume that it is necessarily so): [Jones wills
£] is not a doing, direct or otherwise, of Jones's.
Let us now turn to a consideration of problem 4b. This is a
little more difficult to handle. The case to be considered is that of
Jones's raising his hand in order that his neurons may fire; he suc-
ceeds in his endeavor and it therefore seems legitimate to say that
he causes his neurons to fire by raising his hand. The oddness of
this case is brought out by the fact that it is reasonable to assume
both that [Jones s hand rises] is a direct deed of Jones's and that
[Jones s neurons fire] contributes causal.ly to and precedes [Jones's
hand rises]. Given these assumptions, it turns out that [Jones's neu-
rons fire] is neither a direct deed, nor an Indirect deed, nor a
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synthetic deed, and hence, according to D.IV.23, not a deed at all of
Jones's. In order to deal with this problem we should note, first,
that Jones does Indeed bring about [Jones's neurons fire] (call this
event £) unrestrictedly relative to some times t and t' (see D.IV.7)
and, second, that, although he would appear to bring about £ unre-
strxctedly on every occasion on which he raises his arm, the dis-
tinguishing factor in this case is that on this occasion he intention
brings about 2^ unrestrictedly, where:
D.1V.38:
^ intentionally brings about £ unrestrictedly relative
to
_t and £’ =df. there is an event £ such that:
(i) ^ wills £ at _t; and
(il) at £' £ comes about, as a result of wills £]
,
as ^ intends at t.
~
Now, the type of "by"-relation at issue in the present example seems
to be that captured in the following definition:
D.1V.39: S brings about £ unrestrictedly relative to _t and t* by
bringing about £ directly relative to _t and _t* =df7
there are events £ and £ such that:
~
(i) ^ wills £ at £ in order that £ may occur;
(ii) either
(a) wills £ in order that £ may occur] con-
tributes causally relative to £ and t’ to r
via £ at £*, or
~ ~ ~
(b) wills £ in order that £ may occur] con-
tributes causally relative to £ and £* to £
via £ at £' ; and
~
(iii) £ constitutes £ at £' .
At this point we may take either of two paths. Either we may say that
an event, such as £, that has been unrestrictedly but Intentionally
brought about and which contributes causally to a deed which is directly
brought about, is itself a genuine deed—but this is clumsy and would,
in any case, necessitate extensive revisions to D. IV. 8.b, D. IV. 20 and
D.IV.23. Or we may say (and this is what I prefer to say) that an
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event, such as £, that has been unrestrictedly but intentionally
brought about by means of directly bringing about some other event is
an int entional side-effect of the direct doing in question. If „e
take this latter path, as I propose, then we may say:
OiIV^: £ is a side-effect of [S brings about £ directly relativeto
_t and
_t J -df. there is a time such that S brines
about
^ unrestrictedly relative to
_t and t* by bTingine
about £ directly relative to t and t'.
An intentional side-effect will then be one that has been intentional-
ly brought about unrestrictedly but will not necessarily be a deed.
Hence my proposed resolution of problem 4b is that the type of ”by"-
relation at issue is that analyzed in D.IV.39, that [Jones causes his
neurons to firej is not a doing of Jones’s, that [Jones's neurons
fire] is not a deed of Jones's but that [Jones's neurons fire] is in-
deed an intentional side-effect of a direct doing of Jones's.
V/e may now turn our attention to problem 4c. How are we to
account for the fact that Jones drives around the corner first by
signalling, then by braking, then by changing gear, then by turning
the steering-wheel, and then by accelerating out of the corner? The
answer is, I think, easily given. The obvious point to make here is
that [Jones drives around the corner] is a synthetic doing composed of
the direct doings (if they are direct) of his signalling, braking, and
so on; and it seems to be simply in virtue of this fact that he per-
forms the synthetic action by performing the direct actions. Hence I
propose
:
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I
brings about £ syntlietically relative to t and t' hbringing about £ directly relative to and 4f(
) I
brings about £ directly relative to t* and t"-
t’;"anf
^ =>'“'''=tically relative to t Ind
(iii) there are events rj^.
» £n such that/^\ . —X' ’ ’ • y oatju LliaU; a IS composed relative to ? and t' of r
blc:i“i!f“: • • • - £ i<*en-
(c) 2 is not identical with and
(d) t Is not later than t=*, t* is not later than
_c
,
and
^ IS not later than t'.
Other types of the "by-'-relation could be accounted for here-
perhaps the most important of those that remain unaccounted for are
those of a person's bringing about an event
^ synthetically by bring-
ing about an event £ indirectly and of a person's bringing about an
event £ synthetically by bringing about an event £ synthetlcally-but
the foregoing should suffice as an indication of how these other types
of the "by"-relation might be accounted for. I want to turn now to a
very brief discussion of what has come to be called basic action.
The term "basic action" was first introduced by Arthur Danto
and has been the subject of much discussion since that time.^^
Danto' s analysis of the concept differs from that which I shall short-
ly present in significant respects, and other philosophers' account
also differ from mine. But, speaking generally, 1 take a basic ac-
tion to be that which Danto and most of these other philosophers take
it to be, namely, an action which is performed, but not by performing
some other action. Slight complications arise when an attempt is made
to render the concept of basic action more precise, however, due to
the fact, amply demonstrated above, that several types of bringing
-1
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about an event „,ay be distinguished. But, If ue restrict our atten-
tion to those types of bringing about an event which are genuine In-
stances of acting, Chen our task is considerably simplified. For
given D.lV.S.b, only the direct, indirect or synthetic bringing about
of an event constitutes genuine action. Now, we already know (see
U.IV.36) that, whenever one brings about an event £ indirectly, one
does so by bringing about an event £ directly; and so we also know
(see D.IV.41) that, whenever one brings about an event £ synthetically,
one does so by bringing about an event £ directly. It has also been
said that It seems impossible that one should bring about an event
directly by bringing about an event £ indirectly (where £ is not
itself brought about indirectly) and also impossible that one should
bring about an event £ directly by bringing about an event £ syn-
thetically (where £ is not itself brought about directly). Hence,
when it comes to the treatment of basic action, we may confine our
attention exclusively to direct action, and in light of this I propose
the following:
D.IV.42
D.1V.43:
^ basically brings about p directly relative to t and t'
=df. - -
(i)
^ brings about £ directly relative to _t and _t
' ; and
(ii) there is no event £ such that ^ brings about £directly relative to _t and £' by bringing about £directly relative to _t and £'
.
^ nonbasically brings about £ directly relative to t and
=df.
~
(i) ^ brings about £ directly relative to _t and t' ; and
(ii)
^ does not basically bring about £ directly relative
to t and t ' .
Ihe concepts of a basic doing, a nonbasic doing, a basic deed, and a
nonbasic deed may be analyzed in terms of D.IV.42 and D.IV.43. I
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shall not present their analyses here, however,
be noted that, strictly speaking, each of these
agent- and time-relative.^^
although it should
concepts is both
8. Omissions
The concept of an omission Is an interesting one. The dis-
tinction between it and the concept of a mere "non-action" has often
seemed elusive to many philosophers. However, given the apparatus
already set up in this chapter, I think that this distinction may now
be accounted for.
The term "omit" and its cognates appear to enjoy a variety of
uses. This makes it difficult to arrive at a definitive judgment as
to exactly what constitutes an omission. One point seems especially
clear, however, and that is that there is a distinction to be made
between omitting to perform a particular action and simply not per-
forming that action. But what is this distinction? D'Arcy makes this
claim:
A person is said to have omitted X if, and only if, (1) he
did not do X, and (2) X was in some way expected of him.^O
This is suggestive, but difficult to evaluate. How are we to under-
stand the phrase X was in some way expected of him"? Are we to un-
derstand this to mean that the person in question was under some obli-
gation, whether moral, legal, or whatever, to do X? Perhaps his being
under such an obligation combined with his not doing X is sufficient
for his omitting X (although 1 am not persuaded of this), but it
hardly seems necessary for his omitting X. Suppose I consciously
0
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decide nol lo pecfo™ an acUon and. as a nesnU. do nol penlo™ u
can „e nol legUl^alely say thal, u„den such clncu.slances
,
I dellben-
ately omitted to perform lt7 I believe so; and no mention of an ob-
ligation bas been made. Is there some other „ay. then, to understand
D'Arcy’s phrase "X was In some way expected of him" which renders his
criterion true? There is none that I know of.
It might seem that a necessary condition of omitting to per-
form an action Is being able to perform that action. But this. I
think, is also false. For Instance, suppose Smith is sitting In a
chair on his porch and a car-accident occurs in the street right out-
side his house. He witnesses the accident and debates whether or not
to go to the aid of the victims. He decides not to and. as a result,
does not. Surely we may legitimately say that, under these circum-
stances. Smith has omitted to go to the aid of the victims. (Of
course, we would probably describe his behavior In stronger terms than
merely "He omitted to go to the aid of the victims"; nevertheless, the
phrase seems applicable.) What If. unknown to Smith, he was secured
to the chair In such a fashion chat, had he decided to go to the aid
of the victims, he would have discovered himself unable to do so?
This fact seems to me not to warrant retracting the claim that he
omitted to go to their aid.
Other necessary conditions of omitting to act might be pro-
posed, such as that the agent must consider the action in question,
believe himself able to perform the action. Intend to perform the
action, and so on. But it is difficult to determine whether or not
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these conditions are in fact necessary for the emission to act. Per-
haps „e Should try a different tack and atte.pt to work our way back
fro. the concept of intentional o.ission to that of omission in
general
.
Let us consider again thedx cn case of Smith's not going to the aid
of the victims of the car-accident Th-io cro ,is seems to be a clear case of
intentional o.ission. It seems that, in this case. Smith decided not
to go to the aid of the victims and that, as a result, his not going
to the aid of the victims occurred. Smith did not just not go to
the aid of the victims; his not going was a consequence of a conscious
volition of his not to go. In order to generalize on this case we
need, I believe, to Invoke the concept of "can." Now, there are many
types of "can," but the one that is involved here is, I think, that
which is analyzed in D.V1.8 below. This type of "can" may be charac-
terized roughly by the statement that a person can perform an action
if and only if he has the ability and the opportunity to perform it.
With this rough understanding of "can" in mind, we may assert the
following
:
D . IV. 44
. ^ intentionally omits to bring about actively relative
to
_t and
_t' =df. there is an event p such that:
(i)
^ accepts cannot at _t bring about [p and p]
actively relative to p and p' ] at p;
(ii)
^ intentionally brings about p actively relative
to p and p' ; and
(iii) p does not bring about p actively relative to t
and p'
.
~
Note that it would not do to call upon D. 11.12 (where the concept of
the negation of an event is analyzed) and substitute for the definlens
of D.IV.44 the following: p intentionally brings about the negation of
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£ iictively relative to t and i? i
_
_
For whatever
^ brings about must be
an event, and yet there is no 2uaran^«<^ that the negation of an event
is itself an event. Of course n / /t-ours , D.IV.44 suggests that we should also
say
:
D.IV.45: omits to bring about £ actively relative to t and t'
-df. there is an event £ such that: ~ ~(i) S accepts [S cannot at t bring about [p and q]
relative to t and t * ] at t ;
^ ^
fiil^ I ^
^""tively relative to t and t
' ; andoes not ring about £ actively relative to
_t and
And these theorems result:
T.IV.IO:
T.lV.ll:
Necessarily, if S
five to £ and _t'7
omits to bring about £ actively rela-
then £ acts relative to t and t'.
Necessarily, if S
tive to £ and t '
,
relative to t and
omits to bring about £ actively rela-
then £ does not bring about £ actively
The following is, of course, not a theorem:
»
if
^ does not bring about £ actively rela-tive to £ and £' , then £ omits to bring about p activelyrelative to t and t'. sl j
Now, the trouble experienced earlier in attempting to deter-
mine what is and what is not a necessary condition of omitting to per-
form an action causes me to hesitate to assert that our common concept
of omission is adequately captured by D.IV.45. Two points should be
noted here, however. First, it might just be that there is no ade-
quate definition of the term ''omit'' and its cognates; perhaps this
term is irreducibly ambiguous or the concept it expresses irreducibly
vague. Nevertheless, some interesting concept (whether or not it is
properly called the concept of omission) £s captured by D.IV.45.
Secondly, despite my hesitation in claiming that D.IV.45 adequately
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captures our common concept of omission, I am far less hesitant in
making this claim with respect to D.IV.44 and the concept of in-
al omission. That is. D.1V.44 appears to me to be accurate and in
accordance with our common concept of intentional omission. But if
this is so, D.IV.45 thereby receives some indirect support. For it
is surely true that, if S intentionally omits to bring about j, ac-
tively relative to t and t
' ,
then S omits to bring about £ actively
relative to £ and ^ ; and so we should not assert that certain con-
ditions are necessary for the omission to perform an act if we are not
prepared to assert in D.IV.44 that they are also necessary for the
intentional omission to perform an act.
In any case, I shall stick with D.IV.44 and D.IV.45. If the
present account of omission is unsatisfactory, this is not, I think,
so much a fault of the theory presented in this chapter as a fault
with the English language: it is just not clear whether there are pre-
cise rules that may be drawn up for the use of the term ''omit” and its
cognates. If there is an important sense of "omit” other than that
captured in D.IV.45, the present theory, I submit, could be extended
O O
to account for this sense.
Now, what of problems 5a and 5b? The latter is taken care of
simply by noting the distinction between D.IV.44 and D.IV.45. There
is an intentional aspect to every omission— for there is a volition
involved in every omission, just as there is in every other type of
action; but not every omission is intentional, just as not every ac-
tion is intentional. A resolution of problem 5a, however, is not so
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easily achieved. We should distinguish between the concept of omit-
ting to bring about 2 actively and that of falling to bring about £
actively, where:
s fails to bring about £ actively relative to t and t '
=df. — —
(i) £ is not later than _t
' ;
(ii) £ exists at £; and
~
(iii) £ does not bring about £ actively relative to t
and t'. —
But, although there is this distinction, telling, on a particular oc-
casion, whether or not a failure to act is also a genuine omission
may be very difficult. Knowing the fact that, as attested by T.IV.IO,
an omission is yet an action whereas a failure to act may not be, may
be of no practical help. For instance, are any of the currently oc-
curring events of my not eating, not drinking, not walking on Fifth
Avenue, not sunbathing in the Bahamas, and not propounding a disproof
of Goldbach's conjecture omissions? In order to determine this one
must take stock of the causal history of these failures to act and try
to figure out whether or not they are causally related to any volition
of mine, constituted by any deed of mine, and so on. This is extra-
ordinarily difficult, especially if none of these are intentional
omissions of mine. But the problem of correctly applying the concepts
of an omission and of a mere failure to act is distinct from that of
distinguishing these concepts, and it is only the latter problem the
means of whose resolution I claim to have provided in this section.
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9^. Willing, Deciding, and Chnn.c.in»
In Section 2 it was mentioned that there are two main cate-
gories of decision-making, the practical and the theoretical. We
Should now note that there are. moreover, two distinct ways to make a
practical decision that a state of affairs should occur. One way is
sln.ply to form an intention that the state of affairs should occur;
the other is to will the state of affairs. As an Illustration, con-
sider the case where, at one point during the afternoon. Smith de-
cides to watch television later that night and, when night comes, he
turns on the television. It seems correct to say that Smith has made
at least two decisions in this case. The first is the one he makes
In the afternoon; the second immediately precedes the television's
going on—Indeed, It Is a or the cause of the television's going on.
Despite their close relation, these two decisions are of distinct
types. The first, I shall say. Is a decision^, and the second a de-
clslon^. Neither type of decision Is reducible to the other. Put
another way: the term "decision” Is ambiguous.
A decision^^ Is the formation of an Intention. Such a decision
may or may not come about as a result of deliberation. Smith's deci-
sion to watch television later that night may be Impetuous, or It may
be based on the facts that a good program will be on, that he has no
other commitments, and so on. Wliether Impetuous or deliberate, how-
ever, the decision Itself to watch television later that night seems
to consist In nothing more than his beginning to Intend to watch tele-
vision later that night. I therefore propose the following:
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^ decides £ at t =df.
(i)
^ intends £ at _t; and
(li) there
^
is a time
_t' such that
(a) £' is just prior to
_t, and
(b)
^ does not intend £ at t'.
Alternative locutions for "S decides^ £ at t" are: "s n,akes at t
the decision^ that £ should occur" and "S fonns at t the intention
that £ should occur."
Two points should be made concerning D.IV.47. First, it may
seem to some that a third clause should be added to this definition,
to wit, "(ill) s considers £ at t . " But I am not persuaded that all
declsion^-maklng is or must be "conscious" (although I am sure that
most of It is), and so I have not supplied such a clause. Secondly,
whereas, when I make a decision^ that a state of affairs £ should oc-
cur, there Is no necessity that I Intend that £ should occur as a re-
sult of my decision, this is not so when I make a declslonj. For de-
cisions^ just are volitions. Or more precisely:
S decides
2 £ t =df. there is an event £ such that
^ wills £ at _t in order that £ may occur.
Hence A. IV. 9 and A. IV. 11 apply to decisions
2 ,
even though they do not
apply to decisions^.
Decisions^ and declsions
2
alike may or may not be the outcome
of deliberation. We may say:
D. IV. 49:
^ deliberately decides^ £ _t =df. there are times t, ,
Jt 2 >
• •
.
,
_t^ such that:
~
(i) is just prior to
_t;
£] is riot later than £„ ^od . . . and t i is not
later than £ ;
—
n-1
(iii) £ considers decides- £] at t- and . . . and S
considers [£ decides, £] at £ ; and
~
(iv) £ decideSj^ £ at t.
^
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(Compare D.IV.32.) An analogous analysis of the
ate decislon^-maklng (where "decides^" replaces
may be given.
concept of deliber—
decidesj^" in D.IV.49)
At this juncture we should note a i • uu point at which the account
of action proposed here is nm jaccordance with common English
usage. Volitions are often described—
-f fu I they are described at all-
But it is clear from the
as "willings to do” or "willings to act.”^^
foregoing account that it is not necessarily the case that every ob
iect of a volition is a doing.®^ For instance, in earlier sections of
this chapter I have taken pains to state that, in normal circumstances,
when Smith raises his arm what he wills Is not [Smith raises his arm]
but [Smith's arm rises]. Nevertheless, common English usage is such
that we would probably say "Smith wills to raise his arm" rather than
"Smith wills that his arm should rise." This is especially clear when
"decides" (that is, "decldesj") replaces "wills." Whatever the
reasons for such usage, however, I believe that it is misleading.
When, for instance. Smith turns on the television, the television
goes on as a result of a decision^ of his. If his action is deliber-
ate, then his decision^ is that the television should go on; it is
not that he should turn on the television. Nevertheless, it is of
course perfectly possible for Smith to decide^ both that he should
turn on the television and that the television should go on. That is
doings may well be and. Indeed, often are the objects of decisions
;
and if the agent is rational (and understands A. IV. 10 above), then,
I believe, whenever he decideSj^ that a doing should occur, then he
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also decides^ that the event Internal to that doing should occur. But
It is seldom, if ever, the case that a doing is the object of a decl-
sion^ (despite the tendency in English to describe the object of a
decision^ as if it were a doing). Briefly put, the reason for this
is that a decision
2 >
effective, is a component or part of, rather
than a cause of, a doing, and it is thus that the agent intends it.
This should be clear from the foregoing account of action.
Despite the fact that a sharp distinction must be drawn be-
tween the concept of a decision^ and that of a decision
2 , never-
theless often the case that when a decision
2
°^^urs a declsion^^ occurs
also. Given A. IV. 7 and A. IV. 10, it follows, from ^'s willing £ at t
in order that
^ may occur, that ^ intends both £ and ^ at _t. Now, it
may be that
^ did not intend either of these just prior to t. If
this is so, then ^'s deciding
2
both £ and ^ is accompanied by his
decidingj^ them. But what if ^ has decided^ some time prior to t that
both £ and ^ should occur and his intention has not lapsed in the
interim? In such a case, although it is true that he decides
2
both £
and £ at _t, he does not decide^ them. Nevertheless, there is, I
believe, something that he does decide^^ should occur, and that is
that, for some time £*, wills £ in order that £ may occur] should
contribute causally relative to _t and jt* to £. (Compare A. IV. 9 and
A. IV. 11 above.) The example of Smith's turning on the television is
a case in point. Let us say that in this case it is at _t that Smith
decides
2
the event (call it £) internal to his turning on the televi-
sion; he does not at the same time decide^^ £, for he already decided^
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we
It earlier in the afternoon. However, when he decides^ £ he does
decide^ that, for so.ne time £•
,
[Smith decides^ j,) should contribut.
causally relative to £ and t' to j>. Nevertheless. I do not think
can assume the truth of the following:
(22) If
I
decides £ at t, then there is a stateaffairs
^ such that ^ decides^ at t.
The following case renders (22) dubious. Suppose that in the after-
noon Smith decides^ to watch television later that night, but suppose
also that he has two particular times t and t’ in mind and that he
decidesj^ in the afternoon that a decision
2 that the event
(call It £) internal to his turning on the television should occur,
should contribute causally relative to t and t' to m this case
It is not true that Smith decides^ at t that his decisiou
2 £
should occur should contribute causally relative to t and
_t' to £.
there any other plausible candidate for a decision^ by Smith
at
_t. In such a case, then, it seems that the agent decides
2
an
event £ and yet does not also decide^ an event £.
The concept of a choice may be analyzed in terms of the con-
cepts of a decision and an alternative. The latter concept involves
that concept of "can” already used in D.IV.44 and D.IV.45 and analyzed
in D.VI.8 below. We may say:
£ is an alternative to £ for 1 at £ =df. there are times
£ and £* such that:
(i) £ can at £ bring about £ actively relative to t' and
£*
;
(ii) £ can at £ bring about £ actively relative to t’ and
£* ; and
~
(ill) £ cannot at £ bring about [£ and £] actively rela-
tive to t' and t*.
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It might be thought that the definlens of D.IV.50 should include a
belief-condition of some sort. This is not so. A distinction must
be made between the concept of a genuine alternative and that of an
apparent alternative, and It is the former that I have tried to cap-
ture by means of D.1V.50. Nevertheless, a belief-condition should be
Included in the analysis of the concept of choosing, and I shall in-
clude such a condition. Note that there are two main types of choice
Just as there are two main types of (practical) decision. We may say:
D^IV^:
I
chooses^ £ at t -df. there are an event £ and times
—1’ —2’ • • • > such that:
(i) is just prior to
_t;
(ii) is not later than t and
. . . and t
,
is not
later than t
;
-ii-l
(lii)
^ accepts [p^ is an alternative to for S at t]
_t^ and .
. . and at t ;
~
(iv) there is a time such~that
(a) is identical with or
. , . or t ' is
identical with ^ , and^
~
(b) S considers decides £] at jt ' ;
(v) there is a time
_t' such that
~
ia identical with t., or • • . or t * is
identical with t
,
and'^
~
(b) ^ considers [S decides, at _t
' ; and
(vi) ^ decides^ at t.
An analogous analysis of the concept of choosing
2
(where ”decides
2
"
replaces decides^" in D.IV.51) may be given. Note that the follow-
ing is a theorem:
T. IV. 12 : Necessarily, if ^ chooses^^ p^ at _t, then ^ deliberately
decideSj^ £ at t.
An analogous theorem for choices
2
and decisions
2
niay of course also
be given. It may seem that T. IV. 12 and its analogue ought not to
hold, 1 . e
.
,
that it is possible for some choices (whether choices^ or
choices
2 )
to be impetuous. llliile I agree that some choices may indeed
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be capricious or whimsical, It seems to me Impossible that they should
be impetuous (or, at least. Impetuous In the sense that I use the term
"impetuous"). If there has been no consideration or deliberation at
all of what the agent takes to be alternative events, then the agent
cannot choose between them.
In summation, let us take explicit note of the main implica-
tion-relations of the concepts of willing, deciding, and choosing.
If we say:
DiIVc_52: S decides £ at t =df. either S decides, p at t or Sdecides^ £ at _t; ~ ^ £
_c £
BiiVilS: S chooses £ at t =df. either S chooses, p at t or Schooses^ £ at £; 1 ^ _
then we may note that the following are theorems:
TiHLll: Necessarily, If s wills £ at t, then S decides £ at t.
TrlV^: Necessarily, If s chooses £ at t, then S decides £ at t.
The following are not theorems, however:
(23) Necessarily, if ^ wills £ at _t, then ^ chooses £ at _t.
Necessarily, if ^ decides £ at _t, then ^ wills £ at t.
Necessarily, if S chooses £ at _t, then ^ wills £ at t.
Necessarily, if ^ decides £ at £, then ^ chooses £ at t.
Noting these theorems and non-theorems constitutes a resolution of
problem 6a. As for problem 6b, the distinction between what was
called a short-range” decision (or choice) and what was called a
long-range decision (or choice) is the same as that between a deci-
sion
2
(or choice^) and a decision^ (or choice^^). With the resolution
of these final two problems we may now turn from an exposition of the
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posed theory of action to a brief consideration of three
tal objections to it, objections which have been forcefully
the past against accounts of action vdiich share some basic
fundamen-
voiced in
features
with the present account.
10. Objections to the Theory
The point made in the final paragraph of section 4 above bears
repeating. In this chapter I have not attempted to account for every
legitimate use of the term "action” and its cognates; nor have I
attempted to legislate as to their use. The point holds also of such
terms as intention," "omission," "decision," and so on. What I have
sought to do is to isolate and to analyze some particularly important
concepts and to show how they may be coordinated so that an acceptable
theory of human action results-a theory, moreover, which may serve as
a basis for the resolution of problems in other areas of philosophy.
But, in order to bolster the claim that the theory is acceptable,
three fundamental objections to it must be dealt with.
The first objection concerns the concept of Intention and the
use to which I have put it. Thomson says: "My suspicion is that those
who think intentlonality is the mark of action would do best to give
up the idea of defining either 'act' or 'agent. This suspicion
is one to which I have paid no heed. But have I perhaps not been too
hasty? In the last chapter I noted that Annette Baier claims that the
proper objects of intention are actions, and I said there that I
think this claim is mistaken. Nevertheless, it seems to have a
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certain plausibility, for is it not the case
something, I intend to do something, and is
curate to say that the doing rather than the
that whenever I intend
it perhaps not more ac—
something is the object
of my intention?
In answer to this question, it should first be noted that the
primitive locution "S intends £" that 1 have adopted, if rendered into
English proper without the use of variables, would read something like
"This person intends that that should be the case" and not "This per-
son intends to do that." (Once again, I do not claim that the concept
that I seek to express by means of the term "intend" and its cognates
IS the concept which is unfailingly expressed by these terms whenever
they are employed by competent speakers of English. Nevertheless, 1
do believe that often—indeed
,
very often—these terms are used by
competent speakers of English to express this very concept.) This
understanding of the primitive locution mirrors that appropriate to
^ accepts £ which, if rendered into English proper, would read
something like "This person accepts (or believes) that that is the
case. Now, it is true that that concept of intention with which 1
am concerned has an intimate connection with that concept of action
with which I am concerned, other than simply serving as a building-
block for the analysis of the latter. For instance, accepting £ has
often been characterized as a disposition to assert £; and I think it
is in some sense true (given an appropriate intuitive understanding
of disposition") that intending £ is a disposition to act so that £
occurs. Very often, indeed, if ^ intends £ then he will try to make
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sure that j. Is a dead either of his or of someone else's; and so. very
ofren. if s Intends e then £ is, for S. a "would-be deed." But this
is not always the case.^^
Perhaps, however, the elaim that Bater and others intend to
-ake, in saying that the proper objects of Intention are actions, is
not that if s intends £ then £ is. for S. often or even always a
would-be deed, but that if S intends £ then £ is a doing of S's.
Now, it is true that we often utter such sentences as "Smith Intends
to buy a new car," "Jones Intends to go to lunch," and so on. In
circumstances, it is true, the objects of intention that are
attributed to Smith and Jones are doings of Smith and Jones, respec-
tively. That is, "Smith Intends to buy a new car" is, I believe,
equivalent to "Smith intends [Smith buys a new car]." and "Jones in-
tends to go to lunch" IS, I believe, equivalent to "Jones intends
[Jones goes to lunch)"; and both [Smith buys a new car] and [Jones
goes to lunch] are doings. But to acknowledge that doings may be
the objects of intention is a far cry from acknowledging that doings
and only doings may be the objects of intention. The fact is, of
course, that I believe states of affairs other than doings may be the
objects of intention, and I think the examples cited in the foregoing
sections (such as "Smith intends that Jones should be happy," "I in-
tend that Smith's car should be waiting in front of the bank at 3 p.m.,
January 4, 1980," and so on) are ample evidence that this belief is
correct. Moreover, given that the present treatment of intention is
easily able to accommodate the fact that doings may be the objects of
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intention, the contention that this treatment is incorrect or Inade-
quate is surely undermined.
The second objection concerns the cogency of the concept of
volition. In the past it has been both vigorously asserted and vigor-
ously denied that the concept of volition is incoherent. Perhaps
Gilbert Ryle is the first in recent times to have mounted a sustained
attack against the concept of volition. In particular, Ryle makes the
following points. First, he says, the concept of volition is a
philosopher's artifice that serves no useful purpose; secondly, there
are no predicates by which volitions may be described other than in-
directly by means of a description of the events willed; thirdly, the
existence of volitions is not asserted on empirical grounds ("ordin-
ary men," he says, are never aware of their own volitions, and no one
can witness the volitions of others); fourthly, a theory of volitions
requires a transaction between mind and body where there can be none;
and finally, there is a danger of infinite regress if volitions are
themselves regarded as deeds, such that they themselves must be
willed.
Richard Taylor has taken up Ryle's banner and proposed the
same and related arguments. He says:
Surely when I say I can move my finger, and know that what I
am saying is true, I am not expressing the idea of a causal
connection between the behavior of my finger and some such
internal hocus-pocus as this [ 1 . e. , a motion-of-this-finger
volition], the occurrence of which I can seriously doubt.
Besides, even if this picture were not quite fantastic from
the standpoint of ordinary experience, we can wonder whether
I can bring about such an internal mental cause ... If I
can
,
then to what further internal events are these causally
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related? And if 1 ^annot how can we still say that I canmove my finger after all?92
^
Taylor notes that the theory of volitions is not based on any empiri-
cal evidence and claims that the theory is the "offspring of the
marriage" between the metaphysical presupposition that every event
must be caused by some other event and the "bewitchment of grammar"
which IS responsible for the move from "voluntary" to "volition.
(He does not mean to imply by this, however, that deeds are uncaused,
but only that they are not caused by volitions.) Taylor also claims
that volitions are referred to always in terms of their alleged ef-
fects and never in terms of themselves and, further, that it is im-
possible to refer to them otherwise. He argues that, since in any
true causal relationship, if one knows what the relata are, one can
always describe the relata independently of each other, volitions are
95purely fictional. He says that it is "absurd" to suppose that every
voluntary motion is and must be caused by anything like a volition.
(In this connection, by "anything like" Taylor means to include deci-
sions, choices, desires, tryings, intentions, and so on.^^) Moreover,
Taylor claims that, in order for a volition to be volition, I must
cause it; and hence, if 1 can cause a volition, why not cut volitions
go
entirely out of the picture and say simply that I_ cause my actions?
Several philosophers have been persuaded by arguments such as
those proposed by Ryle and Taylor. For instance, H.L.A. Hart opposes
99 100the volitional theory; D'Arcy is content to say simply that the
volitional theory has been successfully undermined by the arguments
of Ryle, Hart, Wittgenstein^^^ and Anscombe;^^^ Arthur Danto has
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denounced the concept of volition and there are many others who
have done likewise. In particular, Melden has inveighed against the
concept of volition. Like Ryle, he asks: If I perform an act by per-
forming an act of volition, by what means do I perform the act of
volition? By another act of volition? If so, an infinite regress of
willing quickly ensues. If not, there is no need for the concept of
volition in the first place. Melden also relies particularly
heavily on the argument that, if a volition (or indeed, any mental
event, such as a motive, a desire, a choice, a decision) is to be
the cause of an action, then it must be describable independently of
its alleged effect, but that this cannot be accomplished
. He says
This then is the logical Incoherence involved in the doctrine
of acts of volition. Acts of volition are alleged to be
direct causes of certain bodily phenomena
. .
.
just as the
latter are causes of the raising of one’s arm.
. . . But no
account of the alleged volitions is intelligible that does
not involve a reference to the relevant bodily phenomena.
And no interior cause, mental or physiological, can have this
logical feature of volition. Let the interior event which we
call ’the act of volition’ be mental or physical (which it is
will make no difference at all)
,
it must be logically distinct
from the alleged effect: this surely is one lesson we can de-
rive from a reading of Hume’s discussion of causation. Yet
nothing can be an act of volition that is not logically con-
nected with that which is willed; the act of willing is intel-
ligible only as the act of willing whatever it is that is
willed. In short, there could not be such an interior event
like an act of volition since
. . . nothing of that sort could
have the required logical consequences
.
Melden also argues that if (to paraphrase) my moving my finger left-
ward is distinct from my moving my finger rightward, then each of the
volitions which allegedly cause these movements must be distinct, and
this in turn implies, first, that it must be possible to offer a set
of characterizations for each of these acts of volition and, secondly,
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that I have learnt that each volition corresponds to its appropriate
effect. However neither of these, he claims, is the case.
Those who reject the theory of volitions naturally do not re-
ject the applicability of the concepts of decision and choice; but
y do of course deny that a decision or a choice may be a volition,
and hence D.IV.49 and D.IV.52 are unacceptable to them. Perhaps J.L.
Evans was the first seriously to attempt to accommodate Ryle's criti-
cisms of the theory of volitions in a theory of choice. According
to Evans, there is a radical distinction to be made between the con-
cepts of decision and choice; for, whereas deciding constitutes a
£reparation for action, choosing, on Evans's account, acting (in
the "standard" sense of "choosing"). That is, all choosing is acting,
although not, of course, vl^ ver^; in particular, choosing is
doing this-rather-than-that" or "taking this-rather-than-that .
"
Evans's theory is based mainly on the claim that the proposition ex-
pressed by the sentence "I chose to do A but did not do it" is self-
contradictory, whereas the proposition expressed by "I decided to do
A but did not do it" is not. P.H. Nowell-Smith proposes a theory
similar to Evans's theory, where choosing is regarded as an act of
selecting. He says:
Choosing is not just doing, nor is it something other than
doing and causally connected to it, it is doing-this-rather-
than-that
.
Taylor has adopted a similar theory of choice and has constructed a
parallel theory of trying. According to him, both choosing and
trying constitute types of acting. Desires, motives and so on may
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also, presumably, be accounted for without recourse to a theory of
And so It IS that the anti-volitionists claim that per-
y atisfactory theories of readily acknowledged mental phenomena
oice, desire, and so on, may be constructed without having
to invoke the repugnant notion of volition.
There is, then, a considerable philosophical tradition in op-
position to the theory of volitions. Nevertheless, I believe it is
111 founded. It will not have escaped the reader's attention that
much of the so-called arguments against the theory of volitions is
nothing more than an intriguing exercise in philosophical rhetoric.
What genuine arguments there are embedded in all of this may, I think,
be fairly easily dealt with. In what follows I shall make no attempt
to answer the anti-volitionists point for point, but shall settle
simply for addressing myself to their more important criticisms.
I think that it is a measure of the weakness of the anti-
volitionists' position that their alternative accounts of deciding,
choosing and so on are so obviously wanting. To consider their pre-
ferred account of choosing: surely it is plainly false that a chosen
act is identical with the choosing of the act. May not a person,
whose arm is paralyzed and who is ignorant of this fact, choose
nevertheless that his arm should rise? (I am here talking of that
type of choise that I have called choice
2
.) Surely he may, and yet
just as surely his arm will not rise (at least, if it does rise, its
rising will not be of his choosing). Taylor, when discussing the con-
cept of trying, claims that trying to do something itself const!-
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tutes doing something typically,
^ will be an exertion of physical
some sort. A corollary of this position, which Taylor
acknowledges, is that a person who is completely paralyzed cannot even
try to move a limb, let alone succeed in doing so. Taylor is pre-
pared to accept this corollary; and yet, even if there is perhaps some
plausibility to the suggestion that trying is the exertion of physical
effort (that this suggestion is plausible is certainly not obvious),
this simply IS not the case with choosing, and so this solution is
not at hand for an account of the choices made in ignorance by para-
lyzed persons.
Moreover, it is surely not the case, as Evans claims, or at
least not obviously the case, that the proposition expressed by the
sentence "l chose to do A but did not do it” is self-contradictory.
W.D. Glasgow points out that the seeming oddness of such a sentence
is due to the fact that chose,” when so used, normally performs an
umbrella function and is used to mean the same as "chose and did.”^^^
It is obviously inconsistent for a person to say ”l chose and did A
but did not do it.”^^^ But, when "chose” does not perform an "um-
brella function, there is nothing inconsistent in saying "I chose
to do A but did not do it.” After all, a person may choose to take
a vacation and never live to see his choice fulfilled. In fact, when
the distinction between the concepts of choice^^ and choice2 is made
explicit, it is clear that the anti-volitionist theory of choice
favored by Evans, Nowell-Smith and Taylor is, ironically, in general
unable to account for those non-volitional choices that I have called
1
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choices
1
'
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Similarly troubling points concerning anti-volitionist
theories of deciding, trying, and so on may be raised, I believe.
But the most telling point of all is that there is no need even to
entertain such alternative theories, for the anti-volitionists' criti-
cisms of the theory of volitions are unsound. I shall consider in
turn their three most important criticisms, namely: that based, first,
on the claim that the theory of volitions has no empirical basis;
secondly, that based on the claim that the theory requires an infinite
(and presumably vicious) regress of willing; and finally, that based
on the claim that a volition and its effect must admit of logically
independent descriptions.
In order to evaluate the first criticism we must ask what sort
of things volitions or willings are. Two of the staunchest advocates
in recent years of the theory of volitions are Wilfrid Sellars and
Bruce Aune, and according to them volitions are thoughts. Sellars
sometimes says that volitions are thoughts of the form "I shall now
bring about X (or avert Z) by Y-ing" or of the form "I shall now do A
in order to bring about (or avert) sometimes he says that they
are thoughts of the form "I shall do A here and now.”^^^ Aune re-
gards volitions to be thoughts of the form "I will do A here and
now.” By stipulating that volitions are thoughts of this type of
form, both philosophers apparently regard volitions to be a species
of "occurrent” intention. Now, I think that talk of the "form" of
thoughts is unclear and that the distinction between "occurrent" and
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"dispositional" intentions is also unclear. Nevertheless, 1 have
assumed that a person's willing a state of affairs £ implies both his
intending £ and his considering £ (see A. IV. 7 and A. IV. 8), and this
contention is obviously closely connected with the contention that
volitions are a species of occurrent intention. Moreover, I see no
reason to disagree with the claim that willing an event is having a
certain type of thought, and the question that must now be treated is:
Wliat empirical evidence do we have that volitions occur?
Although we obviously do not have empirical evidence of all
our thoughts, it is clear that we do have such evidence of some of
them, if Introspection (whatever that is, exactly) may be said to
yield empirical evidence. I believe that introspection reveals the
existence of volitions, especially when volitions are frustrated or
require great resolution. This is of necessity a personal matter, but
I see no reason to bow to the assertions, so forcefully voiced by such
anti-volitionists as Ryle and Taylor, to the effect that no one ever
has any experience of volitions. When I make a real effort, say, to
lift a heavy object, I am often aware of a "Right!" or a "Now!"
spoken, as it were, sotto voce in my mind. These phrases express
thoughts of mine, and I see no reason to doubt that they are voli-
tions. Of course, this is not a clear-cut matter, but if, as Aune for
example claims, a volition is a thought which more often than not is
not accompanied by any imagery, it is hardly surprising that philoso-
phers have failed to discern any "tell-tale phenomenal marks" of voli-
tions in general. Whether or not, then, there is empirical evl-
t
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dence of volitions is a matter of soma debate; it is not obvious that
there is, but nor is it obvious, as some of the antl-volitlonlsts
claim, that there is no such evidence. However, it seems to me that
the most Important point to be made here is that the presence or ab-
sence of empirical evidence for volitions is not strictly relevant to
acceptability of a volitional account of action such as that pro-
posed in this chapter. Simply put, theories do not have to be em-
pirically founded to be acceptable-if they did, the theory of events
proposed in Chapter II would be quite unacceptable—and the antl-
volltionlsts’ insistence that the theory of volitions be empirically
founded seems to me to be an outmoded legacy of logical positivism.
Of course, empirical evidence of volitions cannot hurt the volition-
ists attempt to render their position acceptable; but, as I have
said, I believe that such evidence is forthcoming anyhow.
With regard to the second point concerning an infinite re-
gress of willing, the proper answer to this criticism is easily given.
Even though volitions are often called "acts of will," they are not,
119in general, deeds. This being so, there is absolutely no ground
for assuming that an Infinite regress of willing arises on the theory
120
^or volitions. It may seem to the reader that, in admitting that
'^‘^lltions are not deeds, the volitionist is unable to provide a satis-
factory theory of free human action. This is not so; indeed, the
issues of free action and of volitions' causal relation to action are
^ritirely separate, as I shall seek to show in Chapter VI.
Finally, what of the claim that volitions and their causes
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ought to be independently describabie? Again, this claim is entirely
unwarranted. Note, first, that the antl-volltlonists' point has ab-
solutely no bearing on the analysis of the concept of action proposed
above where action is unsuccessful (for, in the case of unsuccessful
action, the description of the effect of the volition, i.e.
, of the
deed, will be quite independent of the description of the volition),
and that, if it has any bearing at all, it has this only with respect
to successful action. But this is certainly an odd situation, suf-
ficient to give the objector pause. Moreover, Sellars argues that
the logical relation between a volition and its effect, if there is
one, IS not that of entailment or implication but of "aboutness"; he
says that, if the present objection of the anti-volitionists were
sound, an analogous argument could be made to the effect that a red
book could not be the cause of the perceptual belief that one is con-
fronted with a red book.^^^ This is, 1 think, a telling point. But
it is Bruce Goldberg, when commenting on Melden's argument as it per-
tains to the concept of desire in particular, who has best brought
out the fallacy inherent in the present criticism. Goldberg says
(and his point has equal force when "volition" is substituted for
"desire" )
:
Melden s strongest case seems to be where the description of
the desire Includes a description of the event which it is
alleged causally to explain.
. . . The general principle
here seems to be that if a description of A Involves a descrip-
tion of than A cannot be the cause of B. This is supposed to
follow, I take it, from the incompatibility between (1) A
does not entail and (2) a description of ^ is contained in
the description of A. But there is no such incompatibility
.
Certainly, according to Hume's model of causation, to which Melden
I
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".akes appeal, if £ entails (or, simply, strictly implies)
3. then £
cause of 3. But since, as Goldberg correctly points out
£ s not entailing (or not implying) 3 is compatible with a description
of 3 being contained in a description of £, there is nothing (or at
least nothing that the anti-volltlonists have presented) to prevent
£_ s contributing causally to £ when a description of £ (perhaps the
only available adequate description of £) is contained in a description
of £ (perhaps the only available adequate description of £)
.
But perhaps the anti-volitionists
'
point, though this is not
clear, is that a description of the "relevant bodily phenomena" must
be contained in any adequate description of the volitions which are
their alleged causes, and that it is this position which is incoherent.
Yet this version of the argument is as poor as that just considered.
First of all, it is not at all obvious that it is true that a descrip-
tion of a volition must
,
to be adequate, contain a description of its
object. And even if this is the case, still 1 cannot see that there
is any incompatibility between the proposition that £ does not entail
(or imply) £ and the proposition that it is necessary that a descrip-
tion of £ be contained in the description of £; and yet this version
of the anti-volitionists' argument requires such Incompatibility.
Of course, even if the foregoing responses to the main criti-
cisms of those who oppose the concept of volition are successful, no
evidence has been adduced in this chapter which can afford a demon-
stration that what I claim on behalf of that concept, that is, con-
cerning the existence and nature of volitions, is true. Indeed, I
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know of no way to supply such demonstration; but, if there is any
strength to be found in numbers, it should be noted that the theory
of volitions seems once again to be gaining support amongst philoso-
phers. Both Sellars and Aune
,
as mentioned, believe that volitions
occur, and they also believe that these volitions cause actions.
Goldman, too, has propounded a theory of action where actions are
events that are always brought about by wants and normally brought
about by a combination of wants and beliefs. He has called this a
volitional theory of action, although he recognizes that volitions,
though commonly regarded as a species of desire, are also commonly
regarded as a species of Intention. Goldman's view concerning the
causal connection between wants, beliefs and actions is echoed in the
writings of Kurt Baier, Donald Davidson, and others. There
has, then, been considerable philosophical opinion expressed in favor
of the theory of volitions as well as in opposition to it, although
it has been my responsibility here to pay greater attention to that
which has been expressed in opposition to it.
The third and final objection to be considered here concerns
the very propriety of the attempt to analyze the concept of action.
It might be said (one can imagine Taylor in particular saying this)
that on the present theory there is nothing really distinctive about
deeds that marks them off from all other events, that is, that the
present account fails to highlight the peculiar nature of deeds which
does in fact serve to separate them from all other events. For in-
stance, Taylor and Chisholm, especially, insist that a deed is an
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event caused ^ an agent , and that no other type of event can boast
130
of this. For instance, Taylor says:
[W]hen I think and act— as distinguished from merely having
thoughts occur to me, or having motions occur in my body,
as in the case of my heartbeats or the growth and shedding
of my hair— I seem to be making something happen
, initiating
something, or bringing it about. I do not in this case just
passively undergo changes, whether of body or of thought, but
seem actively to produce those very changes in myself and,
consequently, in my environment . ^31
It is Taylor's contention that there is an "absolute distinction" be-
tween the concept of acting and the concept of being acted upon, and
that the concept of acting cannot be analyzed in terms of the con-
cepts sufficient for the description of inanimate behavior or, indeed,
132in terms of any simpler accounts. His claim is that, in order to
give an account of action, one must invoke the concept of an active
agent and that this renders the notion of an action's being the ef-
133feet of a mental occurrence worthless. He says:
There is ... an inherent implausibility in the suggestion
that, whenever I can truly say that I am doing something, this
ought to be understood to mean that something not identical
with myself is the cause of whatever is being done.^^'^
And he urges: if a volition were to cause my hand to move, but _I did
135
not move it, my hand's moving would not be an act of mine. To
illustrate this fact, Taylor considers the following four sentence-
schemata:
( 27 )
( 28 )
( 29 )
( 30 )
e occurs.
Something makes ^ occur.
A does e.
Something makes A do e. 136
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(Possible substitution-instances of (27) through (30) are:
(27a) My finger moves.
(28a) Something makes my finger move.
(29a) I move my finger.
(30a) Something makes me move my finger. ^^^)
Now Taylor claims that the only entailment-relations that hold between
(27) through (30) are these: (30) entails (29), (29) entails (28), and
(28) entails (27). In particular, (28) does not entail (29), as the
volitionists have it.
Taylor's reasoning, however, is not persuasive. I would
readily grant that, in the case of free action, an agent seems "ac-
tively to produce" his deeds, but this is very different from saying
that he does so in all cases of action. Suppose determinism is
^
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true; on such a supposition it would seem that any special type of
causation that might be effected by agents would be wholly superfluous
and hence it would seem that there is no reason to believe that such
causation ever takes place. Yet even under such conditions, that is,
even if determinism is true, there are still such things as actions.
Although Taylor explicitly and repeatedly states that his theory of
139action IS independent of the truth or falsity of determinism, it
seems nevertheless to be the case that his theory of action is based
on an intuitive model of free ( i.e. , undetermined) action. Taylor is
of course right to point out that the only entailment-relations (or,
at least, implication-relations) that hold between (27) through (30)
are those that he cites; but he is wrong to attribute to the volition-
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ISCS the view that (28) entails (or implies) (29). The volltlonists
would rather say that (28b) (or something like it) entails (or im-
plies) (29), where (28b) is as follows:
(28b) A s willing that
^ should occur makes e occur.
There seems to be no way, simply by looking at the form of the
sentence-schemata (28b) and (29) (which is the method Taylor seems to
rely on), to decide whether or not (28b) entails (or implies) (29).
There is, I believe, and as I pointed out in the last chapter,
a proper role for the concept of agent-causation to play in a theory
of action. But this role is not that of providing an opportunity for
an account of the concept of action itself, but rather that of pro-
viding an opportunity for an account of the concept of free action.
Be that as it may, for the present we may simply note that the theory
of action proposed in this chapter does succeed in singling out both
deeds and doings from all other events, as the resolution of problem
la makes clear, and that the charge, that it presents no account of
the distinctive nature of deeds, is therefore unwarranted.
With this my exposition and defense of the present theory of
action is completed. It is clear that the theory could be filled out
in various ways. For instance, closer attention could be paid to the
concepts of a part, a purpose, a means, an end, a reason, level-
140generation, deliberation, and so on, some of which have received
only cursory discussion in this chapter and some of which have not
been discussed at all. Nevertheless, I believe that the truly key
concepts have been adequately discussed and the project that I wish
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now to undertake is that of giving an adequate account of free human
action. The remaining two chapters will be concerned with the com-
pletion of this project.
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that type of bringing about which is genuine actlnfls 1 T ^ ®haps, also, there are leRitimate iT-T
^
involved. Per-
"Smith bends his knee" wL“nhLrtLms df^or "™" ""*
s.“~ £=i-£^^
reinforcine the onnor-oi t-u u . ^ ^ uere ror the sake of
about an eJent Ss^ ,’r ? that to act Is to bring
are f f
Al o, It must of course be acknowledged that there
Logirof Mf Hector-Nerl CastaSeda, "'He': A Study in theic o Self-Consciousness," Ratio
, 8 (1966), "On the Logic of Attri-
noloT Self-Knowledge to Others," TI^ Journal of PhiLsonhv. 6S
Sii
papers), who take, for Instance, "Smith brings aboutarm s rising" and "Smith brings about his arm's rising" to ex-
e'men'r^ra
^ am not of^is oplnlorand
If il Z I reflects this opinion,
i-h
^ °at that my opinion is false, I do not doubt that
alL
^^tion that ensues could be modified accordingly. Io do not doubt that such modification would be complex—any de-account of any type of indexical expression and designLion ofstates of affairs will be complex.
2 6
rn
^°aald Davidson, "Reply to Comments," in Nicholas Rescher,
bu;gh^eL°!£vbbI University of Pitts-
should be noted that there are perhaps more phrases
available in English to express events internal to doings than one
might at first suspect. For instance, those intransitive verbs
which, as Thomson puts it (^, p. 134), "match" transitive verbslend themselves to the construction of such phrases.
28
^it may be thought that I am overstating my case here. After
all, why not say that "a roast is being carved" expresses that deedinternal to the carving of a roast,
,
that [a roast is being
carved] is the deed internal to [someone carves the roast]? Why it
would be wrong to say this is perhaps best seen by means of an analogy.
It has been said that [Smith's arm rises] is the deed internal to
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[Smith raises his arinl
. Notp ^hat- 1
1
- ,
Is raised] Is the deed in question—andto me that [Smith's arm Is raised! is ths
® reason. For it seems
raises Smith's arm], and this is certainlv^a'^^p*''^''*^ [something
rises]. In the same way, then "a roast is beL^cLved”erly be said to express that deed internal to tL carving “'“ roasr
concept of'acttoi SeIo“ (c'^^s'br that
Necessarily, S acts relative to t anf?' f anS
event £ and a time £» earlier thin or Identical w^Jh P ^s wills D at ^ pnri fc -n i it _t such that (i)
Iand l*^f£-’
IS «ills£] contributes causally relative to
rngthe
to be a theorem. It would have to be assumed that necessarjr Ifncons itutes [^ and r ] , then either £ constitutes £ "rp co^sU^u fs^£. I believe that this is In fact true, but I hefltatf [rasser[ itn the form of a formal assumption.
thi« rrh^Q^
reason for the inclusion of clause (iil) in D.IV.13 is
, \ ® clause may be understood in terms of D.1I.40.) Given the
Lcu7mo°re"r'^ ^ ^>-t a™t
v^sJL r^a ^ granted, it is easy to en-i ion a case where an agent S brings about an event q directly rela-
relative~to'^r*~
Alaska) and where
^ contributes causally
hrina K ?
-
^o £ (say, in Hawaii), but where S does notb g about £ indirectly relative to t and t '
.
(Comparl note 7a ove.) he stipulation that £ occur exactly once at t* rules outiis sort of case. It is in fact an article of faith on my part
at, whenever an agent brings about an event £ indirectly, there isan event £ that occurs exactly once and further fulfills the condi-tions required of it by D.1V.13. But, since events are such finely-grained entities (see A.I1.12), this faith is, I think, well-founded.In connection with this issue see D.IV.26 and also note 63 below.
Note that D.1V.14 constitutes an analysis of the concept of
ordered composition. For instance, to say that £ is composed of £
3-2’ • • • > is not the same, according to D.IV.14, as saying that
£ IS composed of £ ,£^, . . . ^ ^ Although I think it is clearhow one would go about the task of distilling from D.IV.14 a general
analysis of the part-whole relation (as it applies to events), where
the order of composition is not relevant, it is also clear that the
task is a technically forbidding one.
,, _
i locution "not later than" to mean the same as
earlier than or identical with." Note that, according to D.IV.14,
every event, when it occurs, is composed of itself. Hence, according
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..oiable aacapbibb la Richard Taylor'a MR. Chaprar II.
The MacjnrLCny'^"95l)"-5fi^"^^ York:
book as "PI." I shall refer to this
36
brings about q directlvl is tha^ u
t t' is entpilpa K • occurrenceIS a ed by
_S s bringing about a direrM^t .-rai.To I and t' -f
"" n' lr^cdr^uri;:t
^ _ , or any times t and t'. Comnarf. lo i. ^
relative
point holds analogously of Ts brings about n inWrectlv 1°!
h’’-'""
about i synthetically], and,“indeed, of all staJero^^!; ~
"constructed" from time-relativized coLepts!
never a d!ing”S false°for 't^fLS''
hi<. V® .1 ^
^ following reason. Suppose Smith bendsnee voluntarily on one occasion but merely as a reflex "action"
IVTu"". si-" -y -count of "tiof tLt[ ith bends his knee] is a genuine doing of Smith’s on the first oc-lon but not a doing of his on the second? 1 think not. The cor-rect move here is, 1 believe, to note that it is the phrase "Smitrends his knee" that is ambiguous; on some occasions it may properly
Xperlv''bf r =°"'® occasions It may
r3th h a other purpose. It Is not the event
InoJliir ?h
’ ^ occasion and n^T^
question arises, however: Is [Smith bends his knee] ang or not. I am not sure how this question ought to be answered,tor an adequate answer would involve treatment of the issue of howbest to express and to designate states of affairs—an extremely im-portant issue, but one that I have for the most part studiously
avoided. (For instance, it is certainly Incorrect to claim that everyplacing of a well-formed assertoric English sentence inside squarebrackets results in the designation of a state of affairs. But what
restrictions should be placed on this device of designation is a mat-ter that I cannot enter into here.) Perhaps the proper answer is that
there^^i^ no event that is adequately expressed by "Smith bends hisknee, even though the phrase "Smith brings about [Smith's knee bends]
actively does adequately express a particular event (an event which
IS of course a doing). In this connection see note 25 above.
38.,My treatment of this issue should be compared to that of
Judith Jarvis Thomson who, in her celebrated paper "The Time of a
Killing," The Journal of Philosophy
. 68 (1971), and in Chapter IV of
AOj^, in essence says (to put it in the present vernacular) that, if
Smith kills Jones relative to _t and
,
then the killing occurs from
_t up to and including t'.
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,Are actions observable‘s A T /t-.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1961) *pp 2i"2refer to this book as "FA”) claims tha^
'henceforth I shall
tional theory of action requires that t-hp h the voli-
entering into this controversy here, I suLest'^tltr^s^^
‘ 1be settled by distinguishing betwee; doin^ and d^^ o^ """f
Which the la™:i i
(La sane. IlUnols^OpL Coun"iiA';HSr^:i:’
40„
,.
,
‘-be discussion in Chapter III Section 9 ,•diately precedes the discussion of D.III.l.*
2 tzl? ;=
"
1
““
.
Si Si S2t:i./;s-„s2S s sr-
(henceforth r^h^efer to"hi™
86 (T977) i is ib '’’f
Action," The Philosophical Review .
Eric H °r P to^ls article as "DA") ;
ai ihe
Their Moral Evaluation (Oxford
biok L A ?oa L (henceforth I shall refer to thiso as
^ );
une, I, p. 199.) Such talk is always problematic andbest avoided. (^. Roderick M. Chisholm, "States of A^fairnLL "
f^T ^ Daniel Bennett, "Action, Reason and Purpose "T^
l
Journal of
^
Philosophy
,
62 (1965), pp . 86-7; Goldman, ™, pp. I^IO.so, £f. Aune s reply to Goldman on Davidson's behalf, pp. 13 _
Nicholas Rescher has urged that one resist advocating theinfinite divisibility" of actions ("On the Characterization of
ctions, in Myles Brand, ed.
,
The Nature of Human Action (Glenview,
Foresman and Co., 1970), pp. 247-254); Melden agrees(FA, p. 64) .
3.L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," in Alan R. White, ed..
The Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.40. Henceforth I shall refer to this article as "PE."
44
D'Arcy, HA, p. 15.
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HA. P- 32.
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HA, p. 16.
Joel Feinberg, "Action and Responsibility," in Alan R. White,
The Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968),
p . 40.
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See note 41 above.
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that Smith's hypnotizing Jones does
certain events and this willing's having
cept of
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Action," The Journal of
Goldman, THA
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Philosophy
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Harman, PR, p. 445 .
Foley, DA, p. 67.
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Thomson, AOE
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Chapter XIX.
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,Anscombe, p. 9 .
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Anscombe explicitly disagrees (I, §20).
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,, ,Foley, DA, p. 68 .
6 3
This definition is probably a little more complicated than
would at first appear necessary, but there is a good reason for this.
Basically, anything less complex runs the risk of getting snagged on
the possibility that £ occur more than once at Unless the con-ditions Involving £ are added, it may be that £ contributes causallyto £ and £ to r, and even £ to £, without £ contributing causally to
£ via £. See note 31 above.
64
,
Aune, R&A
,
p. 110 n. 69.
^^R&A, p. 110 n. 69.
66
„For instance, see J.W. Melland, "Are There Unintentional
Actions?" The Philosophical Review
, 72 (1963).
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Austin, PE and "Three Ways of SpillingItie Philosophical Review
. 75 (1966). ^ ^
70..
^ ,
are to be fold lllimip/slf ’
“ Alan R. Whitk ed.. The PMlokohv TZm..tuxtord: Oxford University Press r> i o oTP t". ^ “
Por-ar^r. o ^ .
>-y ri , lyoaj, p. 139ff.; and Lorenne M.
• t i’
Application of ’Voluntary,' 'Not Voluntary ' and
'Involuntary'," Analysis
. 26 (1966^.
^noc v
,
71y ,
.
,I think It IS impossible for a person to bring about anevent
^ directly by bringing about an event £ indirectly (where q isnot Itself brought about indirectly), and also impossible for a per-
svni^°i
'''' ^ directly by bringing about an event py thetically (where £ is not itself brought about directly), butmany different possible exemplifications of the "by"-relation remain,
^ ^dink there are phrases available to express £, r, and sin English, but not to express £ and u. I believe that "Jonis's hand
rises expresses £, that "the light goes on" expresses r, and thatthe room lights up" expresses s.
. ^
that, given T.1V.3, the type of "by"-relation analyzedin U.IV.35 IS reflexive. This may strike some as inappropriate. It
should be noted, however, that given the possibility that an event
may occur more than once at a time, this relation is definitely
neither asymmetrical nor irreflexive—suitable cases to demonstrate
this fact are easily concocted. It may nevertheless be thought that
the relation should be said to be nonreflexive rather than reflexive.
I have some sympathy with this view, but it seems to me to be no
serious matter to stipulate that the relation is reflexive. Nothing
adverse follows, I believe, and such stipulation considerably simpli-
fies matters.
Compare D.IV.13 and D.IV.26 and also note 31 and 63 above.
Melden correctly emphasizes this point (FA, pp. 40 and 65).
7 6
This definition relies implicitly on the following schematic
definition: £ contributes causally relative to _t and _t' to £ via r at
=df. (exactly as in the definiendum of D.IV.26, except
that "£* is" replaces "there is a time t*.")
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See note 71 above.
79t_
think fho
° essentially the same point when he savs- "Ithere is nothing that is always and in each of it^an unmistakably basic action" (BA, p. 46). He goes tn a • ,those people who are "positively abnormal" (l.e ?hoL wh^tfgreater renertniT-o" u . , ~ ’ Luose o have a
those who are "neaatlvelv ^
eetions than the 'normal" person) from
"repertoire'' tha^^^e "
abnormal" (^, those who have a smallerC an th normal person). Some of ^
penetrating, some erroneous (such as the claim that every’’"iorLr
^
person has the same "repertoire" of basic actions (BA p 51)) butI shall not discuss them in detail here ’’’
80I
D'Arcy, m, p. 41.
81m
^
accurately, Smith willed an event p which is internal
currencrof''smitl
Is physically incompatible with the oc-e of Smith s going to the aid of his victims, and p conse-quently occurred. See D.IV.44 and D.IV.45 below. Also see the nextsection for a discussion of the phrase "decides to do."
An alternative locution for ”S omits to bring about p ac-
ari- ^ 1 ^*^8 _t'" is ”S refrains from bringing about pctively relative to t and t*." I restrict the present LalJsJs^o
— about for the sake of simplicity and also in orderto highlight T.IV.IO below.
83,
"accepts"
For instance, one could substitute "accepts truly" forin clause (i) of D.IV.45; or one could substitute "S can-
not at
_t bring about [£ and £] actively relative to t and t"'~forthat clause; and so on. ~ ~
The word "outcome" is loaded. Giving an account of it here
would require giving an account of practical reasoning. But this is
a complex topic and I shall not try to deal with it here. In this
connection, however, see Sellars, T&A; Robert Binkley, "A Theory of
ractical Reason," The Philosophical Review
, 74 (1965); Aune, R&A,
Chapter IV (where other relevant writings are listed).
85
^^See Wilfrid Sellars, T&A, p. 109, and "Volitions Re-
Affirmed, in Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, ed.
,
Action Theory
(Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976),
p. 47 (henceforth I shall refer to this article as "VRA"); also Aune,
R&A
,
p. 63ff.
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always an event Internal to a doln°.’ However
is almost
of the present account that It Is necessarily ’ true£ (directly or Indirectly), then j, is not a L^rofl's.
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If ihev^d" — exprLs distinct events
this CO
account of action must be modified somewhat. Inconnection see note 25 above.
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cept of Choice
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mere is no necessity that a person not will to will, but
the only occasions for this that I can think of (at least, for a
rational person) are either when the resolution of some overly long
deliberation is required or when an attempt is made to gather intro-
spective evidence of volitions. Compare note 86 above.
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chapter V
ON COMPATIBILISM
1. Introduction
The account of human action given in the last chapter implies
neither that such action is free nor that it is not free. To say
what free human action is, therefore, requires a separate account.
shall provide such an account in the next chapter. This will be an
Incompatibilist account, however, and since claims for the truth of
compatibilism^ have been so often and so forcefully made throughout
the history of modern philosophy, some of these claims deserve evalua-
tion here.
Classically, the stage is set by the antagonism on this issue
between David Hume as compatibilist and Thomas Reid as incompatibil-
ist. According to Hume, one acts (or refrains from acting) freely
when one acts (or refrains from acting) "according to the determina-
tions of the will. Against this Reid claimed that not only must
the act be determined by the will, but also this determination must
be in the "power" of the agent, if the act is itself properly to be
said to be free. The debate has continued to this day; participants
in this debate have refined and elaborated on Hume's and Reid's posi-
tions, only seldom forsaking these positions in order to base their
4arguments on some other foundation.
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But what, exactly. Is meant by 'compatlblllsm" and "incom-
PatlblUsm-1 If one claims that compatibilism Is true, then one
Claims that it is metaphysically possible that determinism be true
and free action yet occur. An Incompatlbillst denies this possibil-
ity- But what, then, is meant by "determinism" and "free action"?
Given
Of 'a
-dr“„““f condition relative to t and for
^
df. £ and £ are events such that: “ ~
(i) occurs at t;
xfff? — earlier than or identical with t'- and
nLe'lsaJr^thaJ'' -taphyslcally^eces ry, that, if £ occurs at t, then £ occurs
let us say that determinism is the proposition that, for any event a
and any time
,
there are an event £ and a time t such that £ is a
sufficient causal condition relative to t and t' of ^ And what of
the concept of free action? Let us, for the time being, say the
following
:
—
‘ 1 bring about £ actively relative to t'and
_t* =df. —
(x)
^ can at £ bring about £ actively relative to t'
and
_t*; and -
(ii) there is an event £ such that
(a) ^ can at _t bring about £ actively relative to
_t’ and
_t*, and
(b)
^ cannot at _t bring about [£ and £] actively
relative to
_t' and
_t*.
The following theorem may immediately be stated:
liVa: Necessarily, if S is free at t to bring about £ actively
relative to
_t' and £*, then there is an event £ distinctfrom £ such that ^ is free at _t to bring about £ actively
relative to £' and t*.
Moreover, given D.IV.50, we may say that £ and £ in D.V.l and T.V.l
are alternatives to one another for S at t.
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D.V.l constitutes an attempt to express, 1„ terms of the
technical vocabulary Introduced In the preceding chapters, a proposi-
tion to which boy, compatlbllists and IncompatlblUsts are prepared
to assent, and which may be expressed more loosely but more popularly
as follows, a person Is free to perform an action just in case he can
perform that action and he can also act otherwise.^ Of course, D.V.l
contains a term ("can") which has not yet been defined, and It is the
interpretation of this term which constitutes the bone of contention
between compatibilists and incompatibilists
.
In what follows I shall consider in detail two main versions
of compatibilism. These versions appear to me to be the strongest
versions yet made available in defense of compatibilism. I shall show
the first version to be defective, and I shall show that there is no
good reason to believe the second version true.
2. A Conditional Version of Compatibilism
The first version of compatibilism that I shall consider has
its origins in the writings of Hume and its history can be traced
from him, through G.E. Moore, ^ to P.H. Nowell-Smith^ and beyond.
There has been a tendency, ever since Moore's writings were pub-
lished a tendency strongly reinforced by the appearance of Nowell-
Smith s work and also of J.L. Austin's pivotal paper "Ifs and Cans"^
—
to found this version of compatibilism on the following conditional
analysis of the concept of "can":
^ can do ^ =df. ^ will do a., if he chooses to do a.D.V.2:
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So.eU.es one finds "wants," "tties," „t so.e sue,, verb. In pUce of
"Chooses"; but the weight of tradition Is In favor of "chooses." and
I shall stick closely to the spirit of tills tradition.'®
Given the account of human action presented in the last chap-
ter. it is obvious that D.V.2 requires revision before It can be con-
sidered even initially plausible. First, one must make clear what
type of conditional D.V.2 employs. It seems evident that the advocate
of D.V.2 Intends the conditional to be understood subjunctively, and
this fact should be made explicit. Secondly, D.V.2 falls to make
clear whetlier a is a doing or a deed (see D.IV.20 and D.IV.23).
Thirdly, it Is questionable whether tiie concept of cliolce is best
suited for the role which It plays In D.V.2. The closely related con-
cept of willing would appear more appropriate here." For the concept
of choice (see D.IV.51) involves tlie concept of an alternative, where-
as the concept of willing does not; and the concept of an alternative
seems more pertinent to the matter of what one is free to do (see
D.V.l) rather than to the matter of what one can do. Fourthly, the
fact that D.V.2 requires that what would actually occur, if the choice
were made, be identical with the object of choice (the event is desig-
nated by "a” in both cases) suggests that, even if otherwise adequate,
it would be unable to account for those actions which one can perform
but which, were one to perform them, would be instances of unsuccess-
ful action (see D.IV.25). Fifthly, D.V.2 glosses over the distinction
between direct, indirect, and synthetic action (see D.IV.12, D.IV.13
and D.1V.15); one would suspect that this distinction would play a
249
«le In constructing an adequate account of the concept of "can," Just
as it did in constructing an adequate account of the concept of action
in general. Finally, there Is no mention of times in D.V.2, and this
Is a grave omission. In fact, three distinct designations of times
should be made, namely, that of the time at which the "can" In ques-
tion is operative and those to which the bringing about in question is
relative. 12 For instance, there are presumably many things that I can
now do, some of which I can now do now and some of which I can now do
later. An adequate account of "can" must be able to deal with all
Such cases.
Given these considerations, it would appear that the phrase
that is in need of definition in this context is not "S can do a”
but rather "S can at
_t bring about £ actively relative to
_t’ and t*.”
Indeed, this is the phrase that figures in clause (i) of D.V.l. But
xt is plausible to assume that, in order to arrive at a definition of
this phrase, one must first arrive at definitions of each of "S can
at
_t bring about
^ directly relative to and "S can at t
bring about £ indirectly relative to £' and
_t*," and "S can at t
bring about £ synthetically relative to
_t' and t*.” Moreover, it
appears that, in order to arrive at a definition of the phrase ”S
can at
_t bring about £ directly relative to _t’ and
_t*" one must first
arrive at a definition of the phrase can immediately at t bring
about £ directly relative to t and (The need to arrive at a
definition of this latter phrase will be discussed more fully in the
next chapter.) Now, if we pay attention solely to this last phrase
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and bear In mind both the definition of "S brings about directly
relative to t and given in D.IV.12 and also D.V.2 above, it seems
that the compatlblllst thesis that „e are now considering is such
that, according to it, the following is true:
iTanH^-df" ^ «l«tveto t and t
-df. there are events
^ and r such that if
\lTls lnis -a'" occur, the:;(1) [S will
^ in order that r may occur] would con-tribute causally relative to
^ and t' to q, and
^ii; £ would constitute £ at t'.
(Compare D.IV.12.) At any rate, I shall assume that D.V.3 is a defi-
nition to which the advocate of D.V.2 would be prepared to assent.
Presumably, the phrases "S can at t bring about £ directly relative to
^ and £*, ^ can at £ bring about £ indirectly relative to £' and
t*," ”S can at t bring about £ synthetically relative to
_t’ and
_t*,”
^ can at t bring about £ actively relative to _t' and £*," and fin-
ally "S can at
_t act relative to £' and £*" would then be definable
in terms of D.V.3. However, if it can be shown, and I believe it can,
that D.V.3 is defective, then there is no need to go beyond it to an
evaluation of the definitions of these other phrases.
Before moving to a criticism of D.V.3, two points should be
noted. First, in moving from D.V.2 to D.V.3, some objections to the
conditional compatibilist thesis that have been voiced in the past are
nipped in the bud, insofar as they pertain, if they pertain at all, to
the former and not to the latter definition. (Perhaps the most promi-
nent of these objections is the one raised by Austin to the effect
that the if in "I shall, if I choose" is not a conditional "if."^^)
Secondly, the 'can" in D.V.3 is tenseless, which is in keeping with
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the treatment of tense in foregoing chapters. Consequently, there
will be
chapter
3ble di
no treatment of the peculiarities of 'eould have" in this
, despite the fact that this has been the subject of consider
scussion in recent years.
Evaluation of This Version
There are three main ways to object to a definition such as
D.V.3. The first is to object to it on formal grounds, to try
to show that, given certain incontrovertible assumptions, it leads to
contradiction. The second is to try to show that, according to D.V.3,
we cannot perform certain actions which, according to common sense, we
can. The third is to try to show that, according to D.V.3, we can
perform certain actions which, according to common sense, we cannot.
Each of these methods of objection has been adopted by philosophers
in the past. I shall discuss what seem to me the most significant
efforts made in this respect and shall argue that, of these attempts,
only one (one which employs the third method of objection) succeeds
in refuting D.V.3.
There have been (at least) two major attempts to object to
the conditional version of compatibilism on formal grounds. The
first of these owes its origins to Austin.
I
shall first discuss
the matter in terms appropriate to D.V.2, since it is to something
very much like this definition that Austin addresses himself. I shall
then give an account of the implications of this discussion for D.V.3.
Austin points out, rightly, that it is perfectly legitimate
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to utter sentences which are (roughly) of the form
—
ten do if he chooses to do a,
where the "can" Is to be construed as the "can" presently at issue.
An example of such a sentence is:
<2) Smith can run a four-minute mile, if he chooses.
But, whereas sentences of the form of (1) are obviously meaningful,
sentences of the following form are decidedly odd:
7
chooses to do a, if he chooses to do
3l •
And yet, Austin points out, if we apply D.V.2 to (1), (3) is yielded
by means of substitution. But how can it be that (1) and (3) are
deflnltionally equivalent, when (1) is so obviously meaningful and (3)
SO decidedly odd?
In pursuing his point, Austin makes the following intriguing
observations. The "if" of (1) is not a conditional "if," for two
reasons. First, it allows for the affirmation of the detached con-
sequent. That is, from (1) one may infer
^ can do
Secondly, it does not allow for contraposition. That is, from (1)
one may not infer
.§. cannot do he does not choose to do a.
Neither of these points holds of a conditional "if." The first claim
is in fact controversial; it has been argued that there are some sub-
stitution instances of (1) which do not allow for the inference of the
corresponding substitution instances of (4).^^ Nevertheless, the
second claim seems to be quite correct, and it is sufficient on its
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own to warrant the conclusion that the "if" of (1) is not a condl-
tional "if."
Keith Lehrer has taken up these remarks of Austin in an early
article of his (and I emphasize "early,” for Lehrer may now be fully
prepared to disavow the conclusions of that article) and from them
attempts to forge an argument against D.V.2.^^ It runs like this.
Let us assume, for purposes of reductio
, that
(6) ^ can do a iff S will do a, if he chooses to do a
(where "iff" is the main connective)
. Then we must admit that
do a, if he chooses to do £ iff ^ will do a , ifhe chooses to do a., if he chooses to do a.
~
Now, the right-hand side of the biconditional in (7) has the form
If £, then if £, then £," which, Lehrer notes, is equivalent to
simply "If then We may therefore say:
^ will do £, if he chooses to do £, if he chooses to
do a iff
^ will do a_, if he chooses to do a.
From (7) and (8), via substitution, we then derive
^ can do a_, if he chooses to do a_ iff ^ will do a , if
he chooses to do a.
~
But let us note that it is false that
(10) ^ can do a. iff ^ will do a.
Therefore, it cannot be the case that (9) is true. Hence we have a
contradiction. Therefore (6) is false. Therefore D.V.2 is false.
Is this a good argument? Manifestly not. Note that the re-
duction of will do _a, if he chooses to do a_, if he chooses to do
to will do a_, if he chooses to do a." is warranted only if both the
"ifs" in will do a_, if he chooses to do £, if he chooses to do £"
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are conditional "Ifs." But Lehrer himself assun.es, following Austin,
that this Is not the case.^O Therefore the argument fails. (i„
addition to this, one may well have doubts about the propriety of
the move from the denial of (10) to the denial of (9).)
The moral to be dra^.m from this, I think, is that (3)’s being
odd-looking and (l)'s not being so does not imply that (3) is not
definitionally equivalent to (1). It is certainly true that sentences
the form of (1) are stylistically superior to sentences of the form
of (3), but this is quite irrelevant to the present issue. Similarly,
a sentence of the form "S can immediately at bring about £ directly
relative to
_t and £’
,
if he chooses” will be far more digestible than
a sentence of the form of the definlens of D.V.3 with "if he chooses”
tacked on; but this provides no basis for arguing that the latter is
not definitionally equivalent to the former. Hence no argument a la
Lehrer will fare any better in this case than it did in its original
setting.
The second major attempt to show the conditional version of
compatlbilism false on formal grounds concerns itself with the issue
of the application of "can” to the concept of willing. Lehrer, once
again, has discussed this issue; so too has Chisholm.
I
shall re-
construct their observations to suit the present context.
First, consider the following two propositions:
(11) If ^ were to will £ at £, then wills £] would con-
tribute causally relative to _t and t' to £;
(12) ^ cannot will £ at _t.
Given T.IV.l, T.IV.3, D.IV.12, and D.V.3, (11) implies
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(13)
^ ^ relative
But suppose the following is also true:
“
^hers'l'”^H“*4'?““ ^ t and
,
tnen
^ would will at t. —
It is Lehrer's and Chisholm's contention that ( 11 ). ( 12 ) and (U) are
jointly consistent, but that (12) and (14) jointly Imply
(15)
livTt:'t'rrj' tela-
I£ this is true, then D.V.3 Is certainly false. For if (12) and (14)
j tly imply (15) and are also jointly consistent with (11), then
(11) cannot Imply (13); for (13) contradicts (15).
There are two main ways to Interpret this objection to n.V.3.
The first is to view it as an objection based on purely formal con-
siderations; the second is not restricted to such considerations. 1
shall discuss the second interpretation later. As for the first, it
may be made clearer by the use of certain perspicuous symbolism. The
argument, when so Interpreted and so symbolized, runs thus. Consider
the following two propositions:
(11a) Wp > C[Wp],p;
(12a)
~0*Wp.
Given T.IV.l, T.IV.3, D.IV.12, and D.V.3, (11a) Implies
(13a) 0*Bp.
But suppose the following is also true:
(14a) Bp > Wp.
It is Lehrer's and Chisholm's contention (on this interpretation of
their argument) that (11a), (12a) and (14a) are jointly consistent,
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but that (12a) and (14a) jointly imply
(15a)
If this is true, then D.V.3 is certainly false. For if (12a) and
( a) jointly imply (15a) and are also jointly consistent with (11a),
then (11a) cannot imply (13a); for (13a) contradicts (15a).
But the advocate of D.V.3 has a ready response to this ver-
sion of the Lehrer-Chisholm argument. Certainly there seems to be
good reason to accept that the argument presented in terms of (11a)
through (15a) may well be valid (although whether or not it U valid
of course ultimately depends on the interpretation given to "<> 5V" ^nd
'>"), but there is no good reason to believe that (11a) through (15a)
adequately symbolize (11) through (15). In fact, there is good rea-
son to suppose that the former do no^ adequately symbolize the latter.
In particular, there is good reason to believe that the ''can'' in (12)
is distinct from that in (13); for in the former the "can" pertains
to willing, whereas in the latter it pertains to acting, and (as we
saw in Chapter IV) there is good reason to believe that willlngs are
seldom, if ever, actions (despite the prevalence of the term "act of
2 A
^III )• This being so, the "cans" in (12) and (13) surely require
different analyses and are not to be symbolized indistinguishably
,
as
they are in (12a) and (13a). Making this distinction explicit, then,
and keeping (11a), (12a) and (14a) as before, it does indeed seem that
it may well be true that (12a) and (14a) jointly imply (15a). But the
advocate of D.V.3 will not accept that (11a) implies (13a); he will
rather insist that (11a) implies
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(13b) 0+^P
(or something of the sort). There Is no obvious formal contradiction
between (13b) and (15a). however, and the argument collapses.^
The first method of objection to D.V.3, 1^. that of trying
to show D.V.3 objectionable on purely formal grounds, is not, then,
successfully employed in either of the above two arguments. Moreover.
I know of no other such attempt which Is successful. Let us, there-
fore, turn to the second method, 1^, that of trying to show that,
according to D.V.3, we cannot perform certain actions which, according
to common sense, we can. Perhaps the most celebrated attempt to em-
ploy this method is that of Austin, who gives this example:
Consider the case where I miss a very short putt and kickmyself because I could have holed it. It is not ?^at Ishould have holed it if I tried: I did try, and missed. ItIS not that I should have holed it if conditions had beenifferent: that might of course be so, but I am talking
about conditions as they precisely were, and asserting that
I could have holed it. There is the rub.
. . . But if 1tried my hardest, say, and missed, surely there must havebeen something that caused me to fail, that made^unable
to succeed? So that 1 could not have holed it? Well, a
modern belief in science, in there being an explanatic^n of
everything, may make us assent to this argument. But such
a belief is not in line with traditional beliefs enshrined
in the word according to them
,
a human ability or power
or capacity is Inherently liable not to produce success, on
occasion, and that for no reason (or are bad luck and badform sometimes reasons?).
Austin's case is in fact directed against the following definition:
DJLiA: 1 could have done a =df. ^ would have done a, if he
had tried to do a.
Moreover, holing a putt is an indirect doing. The case therefore re-
quires adaptation in order to fit the present context.
Let us, first, alter the case slightly so that what Austin
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failed to do was simply to strike the golf ball, and let us assume
(as seems natural) that for Austin, at the time and place in ques-
tion, the event internal to his striking the ball, had it occurred,
would have been brought about directly by him. Let us call this event
£ and the times, relative to which the striking of the ball would
have occurred, t and
. Let us further say the following, in the
spirit of D.V.3:
I
can immediately at t successfully bring about pdirectly relative to
_t and
_t’ =df. there is an event
such that, if S were to will
^ at _t in order that pmight occur, then ^
(1) [S wills
^ in order that £ may occur] would con-
tribute causally relative to _t and to q, and(ii) c[ would constitute at t’.
(Compare D.1V.25.) Then, ignoring tense and substituting "wills" for
tries," we may reconstruct the broad outline of Austin's argument as
follows. According to D.V.4, and given D.IV.ll, the following is
true
:
Necessarily, if Austin can immediately at p success-fully bring about p directly relative to ^ and t', thenthere is an event p such that, if Austin were t^ will pat p in order that p might occur, then [Austin wills pin order that p may occur] would contribute causally
relative to p and p' to p.
Let us, for the sake of simplicity, assume that there is only one
event which satisfies what is said of p in (16) , and let us call
this event p. Now it happens that the following two propositions are
in fact true:
Austin can immediately at p successfully bring about pdirectly relative to t and t'
;
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(18) Austin wills a at j: In order that j, ,„ay occur but[Austin wills £ in order that £ may occur] does notcontribute causally relative to
_t and t' to £.
It follows that (16) is in fact false; and so. D.V.4 is false also.
Now, it is seriously questionable whether or not this argu-
ment IS sound. What evidence does Austin adduce for the consistency
of (17) and (18)? None, really; he merely states that "the tradition-
al beliefs enshrined in the word can" imply their consistency. Aus-
tin's case has convinced some^^and failed to convince others.
I
side with the others. That is (and this will be implicit in my
treatment of "can" in the next chapter), I am inclined to deny that
(17) and (18) are jointly consistent. Specifically, I believe that
(16) is true and that the truth of (17) implies the falsity of (18).
(This is not to say that I endorse D.V.4, however.) But it may appear
that this denial that (17) and (18) are jointly consistent is errone-
ous. After all, are there not many things 1 can do but which, on
occasion, 1 may fail to do, even though I will them?
The answer to this question is "Yes," and yet this does not
affect the truth of the contention that (17) and (18) are not jointly
consistent. To see this, we must ask ourselves what type of "can"
it is with which Austin is concerned in his example. It is clear, I
think, that Austin is concerned with a "can" of ability and not with
some other sort of 'can" (such as the "can" of logical possibility,
physical possibility, causal possibility, epistemic contingency,
moral permissibility, and the like). But which "can" of ability? In
Ifs and Cans ' Austin distinguishes tv\/o main "cans" of ability. First
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there Is a narrow "can," and then there Is a wider "can" which com-
prises both the narrow "can" and the matter of having the opportunity
to exercise one's narrow ability. Austin calls the wider sense of
can the "all-in, paradigm" sense of "can."^^ Nowell-Smith, elabor-
ating on this, suggests that one has an all-ln ability to perform an
action Just in case one has both the opportunity and the narrower
type of ability to perform that action. Perhaps a more suggestive
way of putting this would be to say that the all-ln "can" expresses
a specific ability and that the narrower "can" expresses a general
ability, and that Nowell-Smith’s thesis then Is: one has the specific
ability to perform an action just In case one has both the opportunity
and the general ability to perforin that action.
I think that Nowell-Smith's thesis may well be true, but I
shall not begin to try to give an analysis of the concepts of general
ability and of opportunity in this context. However, an example of
a general ability and of a specific ability may be helpful here.
Suppose that Jones's ankles are securely shackled; suppose also that
Jones is an accomplished sprinter. There is a sense of "can” accord-
ing to which it is appropriate to say that Jones can run a hundred
yards in ten seconds, even though his ankles are shackled. "Can" in
this sense expresses what 1 call a general ability. It is equally
clear that there is a sense of "can" according to which it is appro-
priate to say that Jones cannot run a hundred yards in ten seconds,
and this is true simply because his legs are fettered. "Can" in this
sense expresses what I call a specific ability. In this case, Jones
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lacks the specific ability to run a hundred yards in ten seconds
because, although he has the general ability to do this, he has no
opportunity to exercise this general ability.
It should be clear that the sense of "can" which lies at the
heart of the present discussion is the specific, all-in sense. It
IS this sense of "can” which is appropriate to D.V.l and which the
corapatibilist seeks to analyze by means of D.V.3.^^ Therefore, if it
is the general sense of "can" which concerns Austin in his example,
we may safely ignore this example. But I do not believe that Austin
IS concerned with the general sense of "can" in his example, for he
presents this example while discussing Moore's use of "can," and the
latter is almost certainly to be understood in the specific sense.
My contention, then, is that (17) and (18) are jointly in-
consistent, although it remains true that there are perhaps many things
that a person (such as Austin) has a general ability to do but which,
on occasion, he fails to do, even though he wills them. In such
cases the person simply lacks the opportunity to exercise his general
But the main contention of the reconstructed version of
Austin s argument is that there are many things that a person may have
a specific ability to do but which, on occasion, he fails to do, even
though he wills them. This I deny. What evidence can I adduce for
the truth of my denial? None, really. I believe that Austin's
example appeals to some people because they fail to realize that it is
possible to have a general ability to perform an action even when one
33is bereft of the specific ability to perform that action. Never the-
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less, the fact remains that my denial of the consistency of (17) and
(18) is left undemonstrated, just like Austin's affirmation of it.
But my denial is, I think, intuitively much more plausible. Moreover,
from the compatlbilist
' s point of view, the fact that Austin’s asser-
tion that (17) and (18) are consistent is left undemonstrated and
that It also appears implausible justifies denying that his example
constitutes a conclusive refutation of either D.V.3 or D.V.4.
Let us now turn to the third method of objecting to D.V.3
1.^, that of trying to show that, according to D.V.3, we can perform
certain actions which, according to common sense, we cannot. The
second main way to interpret the Lehrer-Chisholm argument, presented
by means of statements (11) through (15), is to be considered in this
context. This interpretation, unlike the first, allows for the "cans"
of (12) and (13) to be of different types. Nevertheless, it is
claimed, even though the "cans" of (12) and (13) are (or may be)
distinct, (11), (12) and (14) are jointly consistent, (12) and (14)
8o jointly imply (15), and hence (11) cannot imply (13). For con-
sider the following case. Suppose that Jones has an overwhelming
pathological fear of snakes. Smith presents him with a large basket
containing a placid python and asks him to touch the snake. Nothing
other than his fear prevents Jones from touching the snake; but,
also, nothing other than a choice on his part to comply with Smith's
request will cause him to touch the snake. More precisely, if Jones
were to will that event internal to his touching the snake, his voli-
tion would cause that event (see (11)); moreover, he would touch the
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snake only xf this volition were to occur (see (14)). But the point
IS that his fear of snakes renders him incapable of making this
volition (see (12)). And so he cannot in fact touch the snake (see
(15)), even though, according to D.V.3, he can touch the snake (see
(13)).
This case, I believe, constitutes a decisive refutation of
D.V.3. What recourse does the compatibilist who is inclined toward
a conditional account of "can” have? He might simply insist that the
case does not constitute a refutation of D.V.3, and he might argue
for this contention in the following manner. How, he might ask, are
we to understand the "can" of (12) in light of the case of Jones and
the placid python? The answer is apparently that (12) must be taken
either to mean the same as or to be implied by
(1^) There are a time
_t* and an event
^ such that:
(1) there is a sufficient causal condition relative
to
_t* and
_t of and
(ii) it is physically necessary that, if ^ occurs at
_t, then
^ does not will jd at t.^^
But if this is right (so the compatibilist might argue) then there is
no good reason to regard the case as a refutation of D.V.3. For all
reasonable compatibilists are prepared to assert that, on occasion,
^ can immediately at ^ bring about directly relative to t and t'
even though
^ does not bring about
_p directly relative to t and t'.
3 6Moreover, as determinists
,
all reasonable compatibilists are pre-
pared to acknowledge that it is a consequence of their position that,
if ^ does not will at _t, then (19) is true. Hence the objector has
not adduced any evidence not already familiar to the compatibilist to
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support his contention that Jones cannot touch the snake; and hence
the case is unconvincing.
But this argument of the compatibillsfs is itself unconvinc-
ing. It may be true that the objector to D.V.3 has not adduced any
evidence not already familiar to the compatlbilist
,
but this is ir-
relevant. The fact is that, given the circumstances, Jones cannot
touch the snake, and this is all that needs to be said.
If the compatiblllst is prepared (as he ought to be) to ac-
knowledge that the case of Jones and the placid python constitutes a
refutation of D.V.3, he may nevertheless seek to maintain that "can"
should be interpreted conditionally. For instance, he may propose,
in response to this case, the following:
s can immediately at
_t bring about £ directly relativeto t and £'
-df. there are events £ and £ such that:(i) if ^ were to will £ at £ in order that r might
occur, then ~
(a) [S^ wills £ in order that £ may occur] would
contribute causally relative to t and t * to a
and ~
(b) £ would constitute £ at £' ; and(ii) S_ can will £ at £ in order that £ may occur.
But how are we to understand the phrase ”£ can will £ at £ in order
that £ may occur"? If this is to be understood in the manner of
(19) above, then the compatlbilist has forsaken his deterministic
stance, and I have no quarrel with him. (On this score, see D.VI.4
in the next chapter.) But perhaps the compatlbilist would prefer to
assert the following instead:
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at
^ in order that r may occur =df thereare events s and u and a time t^rsuch that, if S werrto will £ at _t* in order that u might occur, then [Swills s in order that u may occur] would contributecausally relative to t* and
_t to [S wills
^ in order that£ may occur]. ~ j-m uiu ma
But D.V.5 is objectionable. First, it appears to rely on the conten-
tion that, whenever one wills an event, one wills to will that event.
This is not only false. it leads to an infinite regress. Second-
ly, and more importantly, D.V.5 is open to the same sort of counter-
example just levelled at D.V.3. We need only substitute
-will to
will- for
-will- in the case of Jones and the placid python and make
further corresponding adjustments, and D.V.5 is in turn refuted.
The compatibilist may attempt at this point to provide alter-
natives to D.V.3 which do not succumb to the sort of counterexample
given, but 1 know of no such attempt which is successful. Moreover,
given that D.V.3 has been refuted, there is no reason for us to con-
cern ourselves here with a more comprehensive conditional version of
compatibilism in which an account is given not just of the phrase "S
can immediately at
_t bring about jd directly relative to t and t’,"
but also of all those other phrases which provide the means of ac-
counting for the phrase ”S can at ^ act relative to and t*." At
this point, therefore, I shall turn from a consideration of the most
popular fonn of compatibilism, that based on a conditional account of
can, to a more novel form of compatibilism, one based on an account
of "can" in terms of possible worlds.
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4. A Possible-Worlds Version of Compatibilism
Whereas variants of the conditional version of compatibilism
just considered have been proposed by many philosophers from Hume on-
ward, the version that I shall now consider has had only one major
proponent, namely, Keith Lehrer
. This is, perhaps, mostly due to the
fact that Lehrer 's version of compatibilism was first proposed only
very recently. Despite his opposition to the traditional conditional
account of "can" favored by most compatibilists
,
Lehrer nonetheless
believes compatibilism to be true. In a recent paper he has proposed
a novel analysis of the concept of "can" within the framework of
possible-world semantics. The paper has provoked considerable dis-
40 ^ .cussion. In it Lehrer claims that he demonstrates the truth of
compatibilism.^^ Others have claimed that this is not so,'^^ but at
least one commentator has asserted that Lehrer 's analysis strongly
43supports compatibilism. In this section I shall give a brief expo-
sition of Lehrer 's account of "can" and then in the next section I
shall seek to show that it fails to render compatibilism any more
plausible than incompatibilism. Indeed, I shall seek to show that,
if one of Lehrer 's primitive concepts (the concept of an "advantage")
is understood as it seems it should be understood, then there would
seem to be good reason to believe that his analysis supports not
compatibilism but incompatibilism.
Lehrer explicitly assures the reader that he is concerned to
give an account of the "all-in" sense of "can." It is clear, then.
that the "can" with which he is concerned is the same as that which
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IS at issue in this chapter. Lehrer also stresses, as I have stressed
above, that an adequate account of "can" involves a double time- index,
one time-reference being to the time at which the person has the (all-
in, specific) ability and the other being to the time of the action.
(In actual fact, of course, 1 have stressed the need for a triple
time-index, insofar as I believe two distinct mentions of times are
required to state "the time” of an action. But this is a technicality
which I shall suppress here in favor of reporting Lehrer 's own account
more accurately.
)
To set the stage of his inquiry, Lehrer gives the following
two definitions.'^'^ Where "a” names the actual world:
~~
•
^ • Condition C occurring at time jt . in a determines that
^ do action A at time _t in a =Sf.
(i)
_t . is earlier than _t
;
(ii) there is a possible world w in which C occurs at
and ^ does not do A at t ; and
(iii) for every possible world w, if w has the same
natural laws as a and £ occurs at _t. in w, then
S does A at t in w.
~
— — —
^ • It is ancestrally determined that £ do A at £ in a =df.
(i) there are a time _t. and a condition C such that C
occurring at in a determines that £ do A at t
in a; and
~
(ii) for every time £. and for every condition C, if C
occurring at in a determines that £ do A at
in a, then there are a time and a condition ^
such that
(a)
_t^ is earlier than £. , and
(b) £' occurring at in a determines that £ occur
at t . in a.
—1
It is Lehrer 's aim, then, to show that its being ancestrally deter-
mined that £ not do A at in a does not imply that there is no time
t. such that S can at t . do A at t in a.
—
1
—
—1 — —n
Before embarking on his own analysis of the concept of "can"
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Lehrer seeks to dismiss what seems at first glance to be a simple and
plausible principle concerning that concept and seems. Indeed, to be
a principle which ought to be incorporated into the analysis of that
concept. The principle in question is this:
^ A at _t^ (in a) only if no necessary condition
for doing A at t^ (in ot) is lacking.
Lehrer argues that (20) is too restrictive. For, he says, some
necessary condition is lacking for any action which does not in fact
occur, and it is obviously false that one can perform only those ac-
tions which one in fact does perform. He gives the following illus-
tration:
[I Imagine that I leave the fingers of my left hand relaxed
at From the simple fact that 1 do this, it would be
peculiar to suppose that I could not have clenched my fingers
into a fist instead. Yet there is a certain muscle in my arm,
flexor digitorum profundus to be precise, that must be flexed
for my hand to be so clenched, and that muscle is, in fact,
unflexed. The flexing of that muscle is a necessary condition
of my clenching my fingers into a fist, and that condition is
unfulfilled. Hence, according to the proposal it would fol-
low that I could not have clenched my fist because a necessary
condition was lacking.
But if (20) is false, we may nevertheless arrive at a satis-
factory analysis of the concept of "can” and to do so, Lehrer con-
tends, it is helpful to invoke the concept of a possible world. Now,
it is obvious that the following does not capture that concept of
"can" which concerns us here:
D. V- 8
: ^ can at A ^ in a =df. there is a possible
world in which ^ does A at t^.
D.V.8 requires restriction. For, according to D.V.8, any meta-
physically possible action is one which ^ can perform at _t^. Similar-
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ly, the following also requires restriction:
^ can at do A at t in a =Hf
such that: is a world w
(li) f d^^Ltari^
For according to D.V.S.a. any physically possible action Is one which
S can perfo™ at t^. At this point Lehrer Invokes the concept of
minimal difference, of which a brief account is here in order.
The concept of minimal difference was first introduced by
John Pollock in an attempt to give a satisfactory account of sub-
junctive conditionals.^^ Whereas Robert Stalnaker would analyze a
statement of the form
( 21 )
by means of
If C were to occur at _t
,
then S would do A at t
—
—
n
is s world w in which C occurs at
_tj^ and S doesA at and which is more similar to a than any'other
world w’' in which C occurs at t •
,
and whereas David Lewis would analyze (21) by means of
(21b) There is a world w in which
^ occurs at t. and S doesA at and which is more similar to a than any~world
w* in which C occurs at
_t^ and ^ does not do A at
Pollock would choose, for reasons that I shall not discuss here, to
analyze (21) by means of
(21c) For every world w, if w is minimally different from a
with respect to ^’s occurring at t
• ,
then S does A
at t in w.^/ ~ ~
The main difference between the relation of comparative similarity and
that of minimal difference is that the former orders worlds simply
whereas the latter only partially orders worlds. But this differ-
ence is of no importance here, according to Lehrer; the analysis that
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is to follow could maka equally good use of the concept of compare-
tive similarity.
In pursuing his account of what it means to say "I could have
done A- Lehrer talks of the need to find a possible world which is
"minimally changed to accommodate” A. A slightly odd feature of such
talk IS the absence of any mention of any particular condition, or
even any particular type of condition, with respect to which the pos-
sible world in question is supposed to be minimally changed in order
to "accommodate” A. At any rate, when indulging in such talk, Lehrer
seems implicitly to rely on the following definition:
—
-ti world w accommodates, with respect to world w*
— A ^t =df. there is a condition C such That:(i) is earlier than or identical with t
;(ii) w is minimally different from w* with~^espect to
£'s occurring at t^; and
(lii)
^ does A at _t^^ in w.
Lehrer also makes the assumption that for every world w, every world
w*, every condition C, and every time t^, if w is minimally differ-
ent from w<' with respect to s occurring at
_t^, then w has the same
natural laws as w*. Armed with this definition and this assumption,
Lehrer then considers the following proposal:
D . V. 8 . b
: ^ can at _tj^ do A at _t^^ in a =df. there is a world
such that at w accommodates, with respect to a,
^ doing A at _t^.
But D.V.S.b still requires restriction. Lehrer gives the following
Illustration:
[E]ven if there is a possible world having the same laws and
only differing minimally from the actual world so that I per-
form an action I did not perform in the actual world, it by
no means follows
. . . that I could have performed that ac-
tion in the actual world. If, for example, I am chained to
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a wall from which 1 am anxious to move, but do not because
am chained, we can find a possible world with the same laws,minimally changed to accommodate my moving from the room
namely, a possible world in which I am not chained. But* ithardly follows that I could have moved from the room in the
actual world. In the possible world I have an advantage Ilack in the actual world, to wit, of being unchained. Thatpossible world is not accessible to me. ^9
This observation, Lehrer says, suggests a further modification. A
possible world w, minimally different from a so as to accommodate,
with respect to a, S doing A at
_t^, must indeed be found, but it must
be one where ^ enjoys no advantage for doing A at
_t^ in w that he
lacks in a. Thus:
^ can at _t^ do A at in a =df. there is a world w
such that: ~
(i) at w accommodates, with respect to a, S doing A
at and ~ ~
(li)
^ has no advantage at in w for doing A at t
that he lacks at _t^^ in a.
—
_
n
But the analysis still requires modification. Lehrer gives this
example
:
There may be some time
_tj^ at which I have the advantages I
need at that time to do A at ^ but by some time subsequent
arid prior to
_t^ something happens to prevent me from
doing A at _tj^. I might, for example, have promised to repay
a debt in a loan house at a specific time, say between one and
two o'clock on Friday. On Thursday, I have the money and am
not too far distant from the appointed place. But Friday
morning a tornado strikes the loan house, . . . and, as a re-
sult, I am unable to repay the debt at that place at the ap-
pointed time.^^
The example shows that I cannot at t. repay the debt at t . But
D.V.8.C does not yield this result. Lehrer points out, however, that
to propose the following as a response to this case would be too
restrictive
:
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s can at t. do A at t in n -Af
luch thatT^
-
^ H
I
^vantages at In „ for doing A at t„that he lacks at t in a — _n
—
n
D-V.S.d is too restrictive for the reason that
some advantages a person acquires subsequent to t. may be aconsequence of what he does from t, to t
. Arriving La
bLLLLeL? f ‘ Washington fifteen minutesefore the plane departs gives me an advantage for getting on
whL ^ remained home instead. Buten fail to act so as to secure that advantage, it hardlyfollows that I could not have gotten on the flight.
These considerations lead Lehrer to the conclusion that a
distinction between types of advantages is called for; some will be
admissible" and some not. He proposes the following definitions in
this regard:
D.V.IO;
D.V.ll
An advantage, v, that ^ has at _t. in w for doing A
_tj^ results from
^ doing Bi at in w =df.
(i) is earlier than or identical with t-;
(ii) is earlier than or identical with and
(iil) for every world w* and every time if at tj^ w*
accommodates, with respect to w, S not doing B at
then ^ lacks _v at tj in w*.
~
—
i'
An advantage, v, that ^ lacks at in a
is admissible to ^ from a =df
(i) . .
(ii)
for doing A at
is earlier than or identical with-tk
there are a time t.
and either
and a world w such that
(iii)
(a)
_tj is earlier than or identical with j^,
(b) ^ has V at _tj^ in w,
(c) V results from ^ doing something JB at t^ in w,
and ~
(d)
^ has at _tj in w no advantage for doing ^ at t^
that he lacks at in a; or
~'
there are a time
_t. an^ a world w such that
(a) jtj is earlier ’Jhan or identical with
(b) ^ has V at _tj^ in w,
(c) results from ^ doing something ^ at _t. in w,
and
~
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B^af ”, V' for doing
~j
.
—j
that he lacks at in a, then v' isadmissible to S from a andkesults from"“what
^ does prior to in w.
Note that D.V.ll Is recursive. Given these definitions, behrer be-
lieves, „e are finally In a position to give an acceptable analysis
of that concept of "can" which concerns us here. He proposes the
following
:
D.V.S.e:
icTthatf' ^ li
at
_t^ w accommodates, with respect to a, S doing A°
—
( 1 )
(ii)
a t
_t
; and
for every time
_tj later than or identical with t.
and earlier than or identical with t and for every
advantage v for doing A at
_t^, if
^ has v at t • in
I
and lacks v at tj in a, then v is admiIsibll\o Sfrom a. —
In Lehrer's own words, what D.V.S.e amounts to is roughly this:
The intuitive idea captured by our analysis is that a person
could (at
_t^) have done A at just in case there is a pos-
sible world or scenario beginning at
_t . in which what theperson does culminates in his doing A at It is crucialthat at
_t^ and subsequently to he not have any advantagesin the scenario for doing A at t which he, in fact, lacks,
except those that result from what he does earlier, though
not prior to
Lehrer's main contention, given D.V.S.e, is of course that its
being ancestrally determined that
^ not do A at (in a) does not im-
ply that there is no time
_t. such that S can at t. do A at t . It is1
—1 —
—
n
certainly true that this implication is not formally deducible with-
out the aid of some axioms concerning the concept of an advantage.
But it is Lehrer's contention that the provision of any such axioms
which would allow for the deduction of this implication is unwarranted.
To support this contention he says the following:
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I can find no reason whatever for supposing that a conrl-tfior.that determines my not performing some actLn, evL rcondUionthat existed before I was born, should have the result that at
^ advantage I needed to per-
T Ih
^^tion. To be sure, if I have the required advLtages
the aciio^ "^But^tr
hypothesis, I do not perform
’
n tion. But the determination might explain why 1 do not
taU thati ^ not en-ail at I lacked some advantage needed to perform the action
_t IS my contention that many human actions are to be explainedan just this way. For example, suppose an action is exp^aJ^ef
y assuming that a person is reasonable at a given time andhat being reasonable, he chooses to perform that action whichhas the greatest expected utility for him. His not performing
some other alternative action would be explained in terms ofthat action having a lower expected utility for him than the
action he chose. He could have chosen the action with lower
expected utility, though perhaps that would have been unreason-
able. It may well be the case that when he was very young, or
even before he was born, conditions existed that determine ’whyhe would find himself acting the way he does, that is, reason-
ably. But why should we conclude from [this] that he could nothave acted otherwise? He lacked no advantage he needed to act
otherwise, it is simply that his so acting would have been lessbeneficial to him and, in this sense, unreasonable.
This completes my exposition of Lehrer ' s account of "can."^^
It is a complex account and it requires careful consideration. How-
ever, I think it will be seen that, after such consideration, the
account in no way renders compatibilism more plausible than incom-
patlbilism. Indeed, it will be seen that, given a certain natural
interpretation of Lehrer ’s key concept of an advantage, the account
appears to favor incompatibllism rather than compatibilism.
5. Evaluation of This Version
I have no real quarrel with D.V.6 or D.V.7. D.V.6, indeed,
is very close to my analysis of the concept of a sufficient causal
condition; and D.V.7 matches fairly closely my characterization of
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determinism. There is perhaps some slight formal difficulty with
D.V.7 in that clause (ii) (b) of that definition concerns one con-
dition's determining another, whereas the concept of determination
is analyzed in D.V.6 in terms of a condition's determining a doing;
but this is very minor. Rather, my first difficulty with Lehrer's ac-
count arises with his treatment of the principle embodied in (20).
It is unclear exactly what Lehrer's motivation is for discussing this
principle, but perhaps he feels that in undermining it he has suc-
ceeded in dismissing a principle towards which incompatibilists are
inclined and hence that, to a certain extent, he has succeeded in
rendering incompatibilism implausible. If so, then he is mistaken.
For there are two crucial obscurities in (20). The first is that no
time is assigned to the "can"; the second is that what sort of neces-
sary condition it is to which appeal is being made is left unexplained.
From the example concerning f lexor digitorum profundus it seems that
Lehrer takes (20) in fact to express that principle which is more
adequately expressed by
(20a) ^ can at do A at only if, for every event B, if
it is physically necessary that, if ^ does A at
then ^ occurs at _tj^, then B occurs at
Lehrer rightly dismisses (20a) ; it is false and his example shows
this. But Lehrer does nothing to prove the following principle false:
(20b) ^ can at _tj^ do A at _t^ only if, for every event B,
if
it is physically necessary that, if ^ does A at
then ^ occurs at then ^ occurs at _tj^.
Nor does Lehrer's case touch the following principle:
S can at do A at _t^^ only if, for every event if it
Ts physically necessary that, if S_ does A at _tj^, then ^
does not occur at jt^^, then ^ does not occur at _tj^o
(20c)
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Both (20b) and (20c) strongly support incompatibilism. I shall do
no more here, however, than point out this limitation of Lehrer's
56discussion of (20).
When it comes to treating "can" in terns of possible worlds,
Lehrer is surely right to dismiss D.V.8 and D.V.S.a. But I do not
understand why he deems it necessary to invoke the concept of minimal
difference. Certainly, D.V.S.a requires restriction, and certainly
D.V.S.b is more restrictive than D.V.S.a; but, as Lehrer himself
points out, D.V.S.b still requires restriction. The restriction that
Lehrer imposes concerns the concept of an advantage, and once this
concept has been invoked, there would seem to be little need to make
use also of the concept of minimal difference. In my opinion, D.V.S.c
through D.V.S.e could be harmlessly simplified by striking clause (i)
of each.^^ Perhaps Lehrer would demur. Perhaps he would say that it
is possible that there be a possible world which at no time accommo-
dates, with respect to a, ^ doing A at _t^ and yet in which ^ does A
at t with no, or at least admissible, advantage; and perhaps Lehrer
^n
would say that there being such a world does not imply that ^ can at
some time do A at _t^ in a. I do not know, and my ignorance is
partly due to the fact that I am unclear as to just what constitutes
a minimal change and what does not.
More important than coming to grips with the concept of mini-
mal difference, however, is coming to grips with the concept
of an
advantage; for it is this concept that lies at the heart
of Lehrer’s
analysis. It has already been noted that, without the
provision of
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certain axioms concerning this concept, the following implication is
not formally deducible from any of the definitions Lehrer gives:
it is ancestrally determined that
^ not do A at tin a, then there is no time such that S can~at t~"do A at
_t^ in a. ^ ~ -i
But it should also be noted that the negation of (22) is also not
formally deducible from any of Lehrer 's definitions. This fact in
itself undermines Lehrer' s contention that he has demonstrated the
truth of compatibilism. For note that it is open to one to accept
Lehrer 's account of "can” and yet to insist that incompatibilism is
true. One may do this simply by claiming that, if S not doing A at
in a is causally necessitated, any world in which S does A at t
~ —
—
n
(and hence in which
^ not doing A at is not causally necessitated)
is one where
^ enjoys an enormous and inadmissible advantage for doing
A _t^, to wit, the advantage of its not being causally required that
58he not do A at Now Lehrer certainly says (see the long quota-
tion which completes my exposition of his account) that he finds no
reason to accept this incompatibilist claim, but I in turn find no
reason not to accept it. For it seems to me that this move is open
to the incompatibilist unless and until an account of the concept of
an advantage is given which rules the move out.
The main point to be made here is, of course, that the tena-
bility of Lehrer 's version of compatibilism is contingent upon an
adequate account of the concept of an advantage. But Lehrer provides
no such account. Let us, however, attempt to provide one (but only a
rough one) for him. Terence Horgan suggests that we understand the
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concept of an advantage as follows:
(23) Necessarily, for every world w, S has at t
. in w an
advantage for doing A at that he lacks at t Tin a
xf and only if el_ther S has at t^ in w a bettl^ oppor-tunity to do A at than he has at
_t
. in a or S has
at t
. in w a better ability to do A at t^ th^ he has
at
_t^ in a.
Now Lehrer does not himself state (23), but it seems to constitute
a reasonable interpretation of the concept of an advantage, or at
least of his use of it. At any rate, in what follows I shall take
(23)
,
despite its having obscurities of its own, as accurately
characterizing Lehrer 's notion of an advantage.
The question now to be addressed is this: Does Lehrer 's ac-
count of "can” prove the truth of compatibilism when the concept of
an advantage is understood as it is in (23)? Before attempting to
answer this question, however, we should briefly take note of another
issue concerning (23). It is Morgan's contention that, if (23) is
accepted, then Lehrer s account of "can" suffers from conceptual
circularity. His argument runs as follows. It would seem that
(24) S_ can at jt^ do A at _t^^ in a
is equivalent to
(24a)
^ has at both the ability and the opportunity to do
A at in a. ^(^
If we construct the inelegant neologism "canning" from the verb "can,"
we may infer from the equivalence of (24) and (24a) the following:
(25) The concept S canning at t
j^
do A at t
^
in a is identical
with the concept S having at t j^ both the ability and the
opportunity to do A at t
^^
in a .
But since, according to (23),
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(26) The concept of an advantage Is to be understood Interms of the concepts of ability and opportunity,
we may conclude
Lehrer’s analysis of the concept of "can" is conceptual-ly circular. ^
This is in fact a reconstruction of Horgan's argument, for he
does not present it in quite so explicit a manner. But if the re-
construction is accurate, then it is easily seen that Horgan's argu-
ment is inconclusive.^^ First, it is not at all clear that one pro-
position's being equivalent (that is, I take it, strictly equivalent)
to another implies that the concepts constructed from them in the
manner of (25) are identical. For a criterion of identity for con-
cepts would first have to be given. Secondly, even granting that (25)
2^ true, it is not clear that (27) follows from (25) and (26). It
would seem at least that (26) should be strengthened to read as
follows
:
(26a) The concept of an advantage is to be understood only
in terms of the concepts of ability and opportunity,
and even then it is not clear that (27) would follow.
Arguments against Lehrer's account of "can" may be made on
various levels. Consider the following:
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Argument A: (1)
Therefore (2)
Therefore (3)
and (4)
(5)
Therefore (6)
Therefore (7)
It is ancestrally determined that S not do A at tin a. ~ —
n
There are a condition (call it C) and a time (call it
li) such that C occurring at in a determines that
^ not do A at _tj^ in a.
C occurs at in a.
For every world, w, if w has the same laws as a and
—
occurs at in w, then ^ does not do A at t in w.
For every time,
_t, if ^ can at _t do A at~t i^a,
~
then there is a world w such that (a) w h^s the same
laws as a, (b) for every event ^ and time t* earlier
than or identical with _t, if
^ occurs at t* in a then
B occurs at
_t* in w, and (c) ^ does A at I in w.
^ cannot at t. do A at t in a.
^ ~
it It is ancestrally determined that
^ not do A at tin a, then there is no time
_t. such that ^ can~at t~^^do A at
_t^ in a.
“
Argument A constitutes an attack on Lehrer ' s account without making
mention of the concept of an advantage. In order to block the con
elusion, Lehrer must deny the truth of premise (5). This denial
strikes me as highly unintuitive. What such a denial amounts to is
roughly the following: it is possible that ”S can at t . do A at t
—
—1 —
—
in ot be true even though there is no world _w having the same natural
laws as a (and this includes a, of course) in which S's past history
up to and including
_t^ is as it in fact is ( i. e. , as it is in a) and
in which ^ does A at _t^. Or in other, even rougher, words: it is
possible that ^ can at do A at _t^ even though his actually doing
A physically requires that an indefinite number of events, which
in fact did occur, never occurred.
I think Argument A is an embarrassment to Lehrer. If we now
invoke the concept of an opportunity, we may produce a short argument
which, in my opinion, is an embarrassment to any compatibilist . Con-
sider the following principle:
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P.l: If It IS ancestrally determined that
^ not do A at tin a, then there is no time such that S has'at tT^lity to do A at t
—
—
n
in a an opportuni
P.X seems to me to be true. Lehrer might not agree, but nothing in
his paper implies that it is false. Nov consider the following argu-
ment
:
Ar£umen^: (1) For every time, £
. ,
if s can at do A at t in a
/o\ -i- “
“ opportunity to do A at t’.(2) P.l. —
Therefore (3) If it is ancestrally determined that
^ not do A at
_tj^ in a, then there is no time
_t . such that S 7an at
_tj^ do A at in a. ~
Both premises seem true to me. But I think that we may construe cer-
tain of Lehrer 's remarks in such a fashion that, were he confronted
with Argument B, he would deny that the first premise is true, though
on what grounds I cannot say.
If neither Argument A nor Argument B is sufficiently embar-
rassing to Lehrer, it may yet be pointed out that, in answer to our
principal question as to whether or not Lehrer *s account of "can"
proves the truth of compatibilism when the concept of an advantage is
understood as it is in (23), it can be shown that it ^ open to the
incompatibilist to accept Lehrer 's account insofar as it is consti-
tuted by the definitions that he presents together with the account of
the concept of an advantage that is provided by (23). In order for
this to be demonstrated, P.l and also some further principles must be
Invoked. The other principles are:
P 2 • If there is no time
_t^ such that ^ has at _t^ in a an op-
portunity to do A at then, for every world w and for
every time
_t
j ,
if ^ has at _tj in w an opportunity to do A
-tn’ then this opportunity is inadmissible to ^ from a.
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P.3:
P.4:
time‘T"''irff o, and for every
. fri^: J inadmissible to
I
from a, then there Is an advantage v such thars Lat in w and v is inadmissible to S from a. s V
For every world w, if S_ does
a time
_t^ such that ^ has at
A at t
.
—
—
n
—
—n then there is
_t^ in w an opportunity to do
Each of these principles is perhaps more controversial than its suc-
cessor, but each seems reasonable to me. P.2 of course relies on the
concept of admissibility with regard to opportunities. I shall not
provide an analysis of this concept here; I expect that some recursive
analysis akin to that given in D.V.ll would suffice. The plausibility
of P.2 rests on the observation that at time does S have in a an
opportunity to do A at
_t^; hence it would seem that, if in some world
w he does at some time have such an opportunity, the opportunity must
arise from some prior action of his in w for which he has some ad-
vantage inadmissible to him from a. This reasoning is, of course, not
conclusive, and P.2 is perhaps the most questionable principle of the
four principles invoked here. P.3, given a proper understanding of
the admissibility of opportunities, would seem to follow directly from
(23). But I shall not attempt to show this, and so I include it as
a new principle. Finally, P.4 seems to be obviously true.
With the aid of P.l through P.4 I shall now prove the truth
of that proposition which serves as a conclusion to both Argument A
and Argument i
. e
.
,
I shall now prove the truth of (22).
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Argument C : ( 1 )
( 2 )
Therefore (3)
(4)
Therefore (5)
at
( 6 )
Therefore (7)
( 8 )
Therefore (9)
( 10 )
Therefore ( 11 )
Therefore (12)
Therefore (13)
has at
_t^ in a an
u is ancestrally determined that S not do A
P.l.
There is no time
_t
. such that S
opportunity to do A at t
~
P.2. ~
For every world w and for every time t., if s has atin
^
an opportunity to do A at t then this oo-portunity is inadmissible to ^ from^a.
^
For every world w and for every time t^, if s has atin w an opportunity to do A at then s“has atin w an advantage for doing A at t„ and this ad-vantage is inadmissible to S from
P
. 4 .
~
For every world w, if
^ does A at _t in w, then there
forV-""
""""
^ - advantager doing A at
_t and this advantage is inadmissibLto
^ from a.
D.V.S.e.
For every time t., if s can at tj do A at t„ in a,then there is a world w in which
^ does A at t andin which S does not have at
_t^ an advantage f^ doingA at which is inadmissible to ^ from a.There is no time such that S can at t/do A at t
If it is ancestrally determined that S not do A
in a, then there is no time t. such that S
do A at t in a. ~
—
—
n
at t
can at
_t^
I think the strength of Argument C lies in the fact that none
of P.l through P.4 is as strong a principle as those expressed in
premise (5) of Argument A and in premise (1) of Argument B. This
being so, any claim by a proponent of compatibilism that Argument C
in some manner "begs the question" is even less warranted than such
a claim would be when made with regard to Argument A or Argument B.
I can imagine, however, that Lehrer would wish to dispute P.l and
P.2 in particular, though what his reasons for doing so would be I do
not know. But this fact, if it is a fact, is not so important as the
fact that nothing in Lehrer 's paper serves to rule out any of P.l
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through P.4. This being the case, and given that (22) is provable
from them and D.V.S.e, it is certainly not true that Lehrer's analy-
sis of the concept of "can" (D.V.S.e) proves the truth of or even
strongly supports compatibilism, even when the key concept of an
advantage is understood as it seems it should be (see (23)). His
analysis fails to render compatibilism any more plausible than
incompatibilism. Indeed, if, as I believe, P.l through P.4 are
reasonably held to be true, then Lehrer's analysis appears to sup-
port, not compatibilism, but incompatibilism.
NOTES
Compatibilism also goes by the name "reconciliationism"
when coupled with determinism, is said in philosophical circles
constitute soft determinism.
and
to
„ ,
David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human UnderstandinP TNew
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1955), p. 104: "By liberty ? . . wecan only mean a power of ac ting or not acting according to the
/-\-P ^-Vv TTTit n / mi ! ' ' r . "•» ' Ti ~n—* —-—minations of the will ." (The use of the word power here is puzzling.
since elsewhere (A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: At the ClarendonPress, 1888), p. 171) Hume denies any interesting philosophical func-
tion to this term by claiming that the distinction between power and
"without foundation.") Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan
(Colller-Macmillan, Ltd., 1962), p. 54), who says that a voluntary act
is simply one which "proceeds from the will."
Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind
(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 254 and 265. T~it^ll
consider Reid's views in somewhat more detail in the next chapter.
4
Recently, incompatiblllsm has been defended by recourse to
certain theorems of quantum physics, to Godel's theorem, and to is-
sues concerning the "observer-predictor" puzzle. These matters pro-
vide dubious support at best for incompatiblllsm, and I shall not
discuss them in this chapter.
See Chapter IV, note 138. Also c^. Roderick M. Chisholm,
Person and Object (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.,
1976), D.II.4.
Two Interesting points should be made in connection with
D.V.l. Note, first, that it would not be appropriate to substitute
for clause (ii) of that definition the following: ^ can at jt bring
about the negation of £ actively relative to _t' and For there
is no guarantee (as mentioned in the last chapter when discussing the
concept of omission) that the negation of £ is an event, even if £ is;
and yet whatever ^ actively brings about must be an event. Secondly,
D.V.l does not rule out either of the following two types of cases:
(i) ^ free at _t to bring about £ actively relative to _t' and _t*,
£ constitutes £ at Jt*, and ^ is not free at _t to bring about £ ac-
tively relative to _t' and _t*; (li) ^ ^ free at _t to bring about £
actively relative to _t' and _t*, £ constitutes £ at _t*, and ^ is not
free at _t to bring about £ actively relative to £' and _t*. But I can
see no harm in this.
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Books, Ltd;^lS^and"'•^fs (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
peals to the IZ Z°t >=hat type of analysis which ap-
Chisholm "I I i context, see Roderick M.
ed Free Will’ a^n^"
^ Philosophical Papers," in Bernard Berofsky
343-4~ Determimsni (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp.
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connection the classic compatibilists such
notf 2 aLve^ '^he concept of willing. See
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Austin, I&C^, p. 301.
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M 3.0 especially Austin, I&C pp. 305-6 and 310 nNowell-Smith, I&Cr,
, pp . 330-1 "
^
11
; and
'To la* a to .4' “ also M.R. Ayers, "Austin onuld and^^ Could Have
,
Philosophical Quarterly
. 16 (1966); andDon Locke, Ifs and Cans Revisited," Philosophy
, 37 (1962)—hence-forth I shall refer to this article as "ICR."
15
Austin, I&C
, pp. 299-301, where Austin considers Moore's
account of can."
16
^One should not confuse the "can" of (1) and (2) with the
can of permission.
^^David Pears ("Ifs and Cans," Part I, The Canadian Journal of
Philosophy
,^^1 (1971), pp. 254-5—henceforth I shall refer to this
article as ^^^
3 *
Part I") makes this claim where "do a" in (1) and
(4) is replaced by "resign." He contends that one can resign only
if one chooses to resign. It is unclear to me, however, how this
point is relevant, even if true.
18
Keith Lehrer
,
"Ifs, Cans and Causes," Analysis
,
20 (1960)
19
.
7
That is: Necessarily,
^ can do ^ if and only if ^ will doif he chooses to do ^ (where "if and only if" is the main connective).
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assume that Lehrer and Austin are both right on thisIthough It should be noted that the point is controversial See
ef Non-conditional Ifs •' T^u^^ar^^PhilLo-
Uruce Goldberg and Herbert Heidelberger ("Mr Lehrer nnconsecution of Cans," Analysis, 21 (1961)) sp!ll
explicitly. David Pears (I6C
3 ,
Part I, pp. 271-2) also has reserva-tions concerning Lehrer *s argument.
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Lehrer, "An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?" in
T
^
^ I^^^dom and Determinism (New York: Random House,nc., 1966), pp. 195-7, and "'Can' In Theory and Practice: A Pos-sible Worlds Analysis," in Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, ed
. ,
Actionh|^ (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A. : D. Reidel Publishing
19/6), pp. 248-250 (henceforth I shall refer to this article as "CTP")-Roderick M. Chisholm, "He Could Have Done Otherwise," The Journal ofphilosophy
, 64 (1967), p. 311, and p. 57.
23
The response that follows is close to the main point made
OT "Hypotheticals and 'Can': Another Look," Analysis,27 (1967). ^
^
24
25
See Chapter IV, note 119,
That the "cans"- of (12) and (13) are in fact distinct will
be assumed later when it is said that ( 12 ) either means the same as
or is implied by (19).
26
,Austin, I&C^, p. 308n.
27 ^L
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Nowell—Smith (I&C„, pp. 331—6); Arnold S. Kaufman
("Ability," in Myles Brand, ed.. The Nature of Human Action (Glen-
view, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1970), p. 195).
2 8
» Bruce Aune ("Abilities, Modalities, and Free Will,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
, 23 (1963), p. 399).
29
Austin, I&C^, pp. 319-320.
30
The terms "specific ability" and "general ability" are
borrowed from Don Locke (ICR, p. 254). Locke does not use them in
quite this way, however. A.M. Honore ("Can and Can't," Mind
,
73
(1964), p. 463) makes a similar distinction.
Certainly the general sense of "can" is not appropriate to
D.V.l. Consider this case. Let the "can" in the definiens of D.V.l
be the "can" of general ability; let "p' designate the event internal
to Jones's taking one step to the right; let "p' designate the event
internal to Jones's taking one step to the left; and let Jones's
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32
.
.Austin's discussion of Moore Int; it-o o- -•
P. 296) in the examination of the sense of ''cL" thiJ
V'""'
in the following passage (Moore, E. p 128)-
^ at Moore employs
have walked a mile in twenty minutes this morningbut I certainly could not have run two miles in five mlnu esI did not, in fact
,
do either of these two things; but iti^pure nonsense to say that the mere fact that I did not doesway with the distinction between them, which I express by
S^not*" —
within my powers, whereas ?he othL
It is clear from Moore's subsequent discussion of this example thathe has the specific sense of "can" in mind, and it is almost L c!Lrthat Austin so understands Moore.
33
Even so, 1 cannot see any reason to believe that one mav
anr
“bother specific or general, to perform an actionnd yet fail to perform it for "no reason" whatsoever-an issue sup-pressed in tlie reconstructed version of Austin's argument. Thus
olerloL'^a''
specific abilities with general abilities islooked, Austin s point would seem very questionable. MoreoverIt will be clear from the next chapter that my saying this is not
’
grounded in some "modern belief in science."
34
Adapted from Lehrer (CTP, pp. 248-9) to fit D.V.3.
35
The mention of
^ is required since does not will p] isnot an event; hence, given D.lV.l, there can occur no sufficient
causal condition of does not will
.
36.,
Mote that, while most compatlbilists are in fact determin-
ists, the truth of compatibilism does not imply the truth of deter-
minism, just as the truth of incompatibilism does not imply that
humans ever in fact act freely. Compare note 1 above.
37
See Chapter IV, note 119.
38.,Mote that whether or not the regress is "vicious" is a
separate question. See Chapter IV, note 120.
39
Lehrer, CTP.
Terence Horgan, "Lehrer on ' Could ' -Statements ," Philosophi-
cal Studies
,
32 (1977) (henceforth I shall refer to this article as
LCS ); Robert Audi, "Avoidability and Possible lAJorld^," Philosophical
Studies
,
33 (1978) (henceforth I shall refer to this article as "APW").
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42
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Morgan, LCS
,
p. 409; Audi, APW, p. 419 ,
Audi, APW, p. 419.
44
a 1 - u
definitions that in this section I attribute to I ehrpr
modified versions of tliose that he himself gives Theedifications are designed to dispose of some superficial formalproblems and to promote clarity of exposition whilst aithe sametime preserving the spirit of the original definitions.
Lehrer, CTP
,
p. 253.
46
John L. Pollock, Subjunctive Reasoning (Dordrerhr Hniior,a/
Boston. U.S.A.: D. Reldel P^Ib-ilshlng Co.
,
1976)^ Hencefor h TsUallrefer to this book as
.
putting the matter only in rough form. Pollock inact distinguishes between many kinds of subjunctive conditionals.
^^Pollock
, PP . 22-3.
49
Lehrer
,
CTP, P- 254.
Lehrer CTP, P- 255.
^^Lehrer
,
CTP, P- 256.
^^Lehrer CTP, P- 257.
^^Lehrer CTP, P- 266.
For the sake of simplicity
iaw.wi.ci. CMC cLLecL inac an event may be ancestrally determined
even though none of its causes occurs more than ten minutes before
it does.
See D.IV.l. The main difference between D.V.6 and D.IV.l
is that, whereas in the former
_tj^ is stipulated as being earlier than
—
n» latter _t is stipulated as being either earlier than or
identical with t'.
^^(20b) and (20c)
chapter
.
will be discussed more fully in the next
Audi (APW, p. 414) also suggests that the concept of minimal
difference is dispensable. Note that this concept still figures im-
plicitly in clause (iii) of D.V.IO, however.
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CHAPTER VI
A THEORY OF FREE HUMAN ACTION
1. Exposition of the Theory
The theory of free human action that I shall propose and seek
to defend in this chapter is an incompatibilist theory. The reader
should be aware that one of the main purposes of the theory is that
It should enable one to deal effectively with the following argument:
(1) If determinism is true, then no one ever has control
over his actions.
(2) If Indeterminism is true, then no one ever has con-
trol over his actions.
(3) Either determinism is true or indeterminism is true.
(4) If a person is morally responsible for some state of
affairs, then he must have or have had control over
some of his actions.
Therefore (5) No one is morally responsible for any state of
affairs
.
The conclusion is, I believe, false. In order to treat this argument
properly, however, I would have to give an account not only of the
terms ''determinism'' (and, derivatively, "indeterminism") and "action,"
as I have already done in earlier chapters, but also of the terms
"control" and "morally responsible." This task is beyond the scope
of the present dissertation. Nevertheless, I can say here that it
is premise (2) that I find objectionable. There is a species of in-
determinism (namely, libertarianism) which is, I believe, both true
and also such that, according to it, one has control over certain of
one's actions (to wit, one's free actions). It is my purpose here to
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propose and defend a certain version of Incompatibillsm which, when
coupled with the claim that determinism Is false, constitutes a cer-
tain version of libertarianism. The adequacy of this version of
libertarianism in terms of a demonstration that premise (2) is false.
however, Is something that I shall here leave unargued.
The incompatiblllst theory of free human action chat I shall
expound rests on a primitive concept which has not yet been employed,
except vicariously In Chapter III when discussing Chisholm’s theory of
action. This Is the concept of agent-effectuation
. Since this con-
cept has a long and controversial history, it Is appropriate briefly
to indicate certain highlights of this history.
The concept of agent-effectuation, when discussed at all, is
commonly said to concern a certain type of causation, often called
agent-causation. Sometimes agent-causation is said to be a species of
a broader type of causation, often called object-causation. I regard
any talk of agent-causation (or, as I shall henceforth call it, ef-
fectuation) in terms of causation to be highly misleading. This is
because causation is nowadays commonly thought to be a relation that
holds between one event and another, whereas effectuation is a rela-
tion that holds between a person and an event. The relations are
quite distinct and have very few significant characteristics in com-
mon. Nevertheless, the concepts have a common origin; hence the mis-
leading talk.
We may, I think, trace the origin of the concept of effectua-
tion at least as far back as to the writings of Aristotle. Aristotle
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of course distinguishes various kinds of caused But of particular
note Is his discussion of the concept of an efficient cause. ^ He
seems to say that an efficient cause is always a substance; what it
ses may be the generation of another substance or a change in
another substance. There is at least prima facie evidence, then,
that Aristotle regards efficient causation to be a relation that holds
between substances on the one hand and events on the other (though
just how events fit into his ontology is unclear). Prior to this
century
,
the most forceful advocate of the concept of effectuation
in modern times is Thomas Reid. Action, he says, is the exertion of
active power, and whatever exerts such power is the cause of the
changes that such exertion brings about. ^ The means of such exertion,
according to Reid, is the agent's will.^ A person is free insofar as
he, and not some other agent, is the cause of the "determination" of
his will. Indeed, Reid does not explicitly discuss the possibility
that causation be a relation that binds an event to an event.
^
Immanuel Kant does explicitly discuss this possibility, however, but
also seeks to distinguish between agent-causation and event-
g
causation. According to him, a rational agent may himself be the
cause of effects that take place in the phenomenal world. ^ In this
century, C.A. Campbell stands out as a strong supporter of the con-
cept of effectuation. He insists that, for an agent to act freely,
he must be the sole cause of his act.^*^ According to Campbell, free
action is, in some sense, a matter of "self-determination."^^ Richard
Taylor, with the sort of argument concerning moral responsibility
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given above explicitly In mind, is just as Insistent that the concept
of effectuation be accorded its proper place in the philosophy of
action. But Taylor, as we saw In Section 10 of Chapter IV, regards
all action, and not just free action, as essentially Involving this
concept. Finally, as we saw in Chapter III, Roderick Chisholm's
theory of action is also dependent on this concept.
The fact that some prominent philosophers have espoused the
concept of effectuation should not of course be taken to provide
conclusive evidence that that concept is either meaningful or applic-
able to actual situations. Indeed, it is not at all clear that it is
the same, univocal concept that is invoked by each of these philoso-
phers. Nevertheless, it is from such philosophers’ writings that the
concept of effectuation that 1 invoke is drawn, and the use to which
1 put this concept is strongly influenced by these writings.
Rather than talk of (agent-)ef fectuation simpliciter
,
I think
it will be useful to distinguish two types of effectuation, to wit,
direct and indirect effectuation. The unanalyzed concept will be
that of direct effectuation, and the primitive locution that I shall
adopt is: ^ directly effectuates '' A partial characterization of
the concept of direct effectuation is contained in the following
assumptions
:
A.Vl.l:
A. VI. 2:
Necessarily, if ^ directly effectuates £ at _t, then
(i) ^ is a person and ^ exists at _t, and
(ii) £ is an event and £ occurs at _t
.
Necessarily, if ^ directly effectuates £ at £, then ^
directly effectuates directly effectuates £] at _t
.
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A. VI. 3;
A. VI. 4:
Necessarily, if S directly effectuates n at t thenthere is no event £ which strictly implies [s’directlveffectuates £] and which is such that, for any time t'
^"^^"tical with £, there is a sufficiintcausal condition relative to
_t' and t of £.
Necessarily, if S directly effectuates £ at t and thereIS no event £ such that £ strictly impl^s [S direct^f fectuates £] , then there is an event £ such that pstrictly implies decides £] .
And we may say
;
Ihyizl- S indirectly effectuates £ relative to t and t' =df.there is an event £ such that: ~
(i) £ occurs exactly once at t;
(ii)
^ directly effectuates £ at _t; and(iii) £ contributes causally relative to t and t' to £.^^
All of this calls for some comment. A.VI.l is, I think, self-
explanatory. A.VI.2 and A. VI. 3, combined, constitute the essential
weaponry needed in the attack on premise (2) of the argument given
at the beginning of this chapter. Roughly put, every direct effec-
tuation is such that it is not event-caused but is agent-caused;
this, it may be contended, is the source of the agent's "control" over
his free actions. A. VI. 4 allows us to say, roughly, that, whenever
an agent directly effectuates an event which is not itself a direct
effectuation, then that event is a decision by the agent. (It
should be recalled—see T.IV.13
— that every willing is a decision.)
Finally, D.VI.l, though not of any particular importance here, is of
use to one who attempts to give an account of moral responsibility
based in part on the notion that an agent is morally responsible for
his free actions and certain of the consequences of those actions.
Armed with A.VI.l through A. VI. 4, we may proceed to give an
analysis of what it is to act freely. Such analysis must be under-
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taken piecemeal. First, we need the
to will something. More precisely:
concept of an agent’s being free
I
IS free at
_t to will at
_t' in order that £ may occurdt. for any time earlier than or identical with t:(i) there is^no sufficient causal condition relative~to
_t* and
_t' of wills £ in order that q may occur! •
and j j »
(ii) there is no event r such that
(a) it is physically necessary that, if r occurs at
_t
,
then
^ does not will £ at _t' in order that
£ may occur, and
(b) there is a sufficient causal condition relative
to £* and t' of r.
Clause (ii) would be simpler if it read "there is no sufficient causal
condition relative to t* and t’ of [S does not will £ in order that £
may occur]," but does not will £ in order that £ may occur] is not
an event, and so this reading would be inadequate. Why have such a
clause at all? If such a clause were not included, then it might be
physically Impossible, given the conditions that obtain at t, for [S
wills £ in order that £ may occur] to occur at
,
and this certainly
seems inconsistent with ^'s being free at _t to will £ at t' in order
that £ may occur. ^ We may also say:
D. VI
. 3 : ^ freely wills £ at _t in order that £ may occur =df
.
^ directly effectuates wills £ in order that £ may
occur] at jt.
This is an important definition; for, to put it roughly, it is whether
or not an action is freely willed that determines whether or not it
is freely performed. (Note that, given A.VI.l through A. VI. 3, [S
freely wills £ at _t in order that £ may occur] implies both wills
£ at ^] and is free at _t to will £ at _t in order that £ may oc-
cur]
. ) Definitions analogous to D.VI.2 and D.VI.3 may be drawn up
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for the purpose of defining the phrases "S Is free at t to decide £
at t'," "S freely decides £ at t," "S is free at t to choose £ at
t'," "S freely chooses £ at t," and so on. (For analyses of the con-
cepts of deciding and choosing, see D.IV.52 and D.IV.53, respective-
ly-) But I shall forego giving these definitions here.
When in the last chapter we discussed the conditional com-
patibilist approach to the issue of freedom of human action, the
following definition was considered:
~ ^ can Immediately at t bring about £ directly relative
to
_t and
_t' =df
. there are events £ and £ such that, if
^ were to will £ at £ in order that £ might occur, then
(i) [£ wills £ in order that £ may occur] would con-
tribute causally relative to £ and £' to £, and(ii) £ would constitute £ at t'.
It was argued that this definition is defective because it fails to
take into account whether or not £ can (or is free to) will £ in
order that £ may occur. But this defect is now easily repaired, for
we may say:
D^V££|.: £ can immediately at £ bring about £ directly relative
to £ and £' =df. there are events £ and £ such that:
(i) £ is free at £ to will £ at £ in order that £ may
occur; and
(ii) if £ were to will £ at £ in order that £ might
occur, then
(a) [£ wills £ in order that £ may occur] would
contribute causally relative to £ and £' to £,
and
(b) £ would constitute £ at £'
.
Of course, D.VI.4, by virtue of clause (i), is not in keeping with
the original compatibllist enterprise that gave rise to D.V.3, but
it is perfectly in keeping with the current incompatibillst enter-
18
prise. However, D.V1.4 deals only with a restricted use of "can.”
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How are we to account for its other relevant uses?
It was claimed in the last chapter, without argument, that an
adequate definition of the phrase "S can immediately at t bring about
£ directly relative to t and t'" could serve as a basis of an adequate
definition of the phrase "S can at t bring about £ directly relative
to t' and t*." This point may now be explained. The distinction
between the two phrases (highlighted by the presence of "immediately"
in the first and its absence in the second) concerns the times to
which the bringing about of £ is said to be relative. In the first,
one of these times (that designated by "_t") is stipulated as being
the same as that at which the "can" is operative; in the second, no
such stipulation is made. This distinction between the phrases re-
flects the fact that "cans" may operate on actions not in the imme-
diate future as well as on actions in the immediate future. For
instance, I can now stop writing now; but I can now also start writ-
ing tomorrow. In fact, some of the "cans" that now apply to me have
no definite limit in the future. Suppose that someone discovers the
secret of Immortality, harnesses it in a pill, and that I take this
pill twenty years from now; if this is possible, it may (for all I
know) be true that I can now read a book not just in 1979 but in
7979. An adequate account of "can" must accommodate this possibility.
Let us take a more mundane example. I can immediately stop
writing. However, I cannot immediately drink from a glass of water,
for I am sitting at my desk in my study and the nearest glass is in
the kitchen; but I can now drink from a glass of water in a very short
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while, for the kitchen is just a few yards away. I need not do any-
thing first in order to stop writing; that is (partly) why I can im-
mediately stop writing. I must do something first if I am to drink
from a glass of water; I must stop writing, get up out of my chair,
walk a few yards, open the door, go into the kitchen, and so on. The
poxnt IS, in a case such as that of my drinking from a glass of
water, 1 can now perform this action by virtue of the fact that I can
xmmediately perform some action (that of ceasing to write) and, if I
were to perform this action, I would then be in such a position that
I could immediately perform another action, and then another, and then
another, and so on until I could immediately drink from a glass of
water. By generalizing on this case, I think we may properly say the
following. Where 1 1 i 5 n:
—
• ^ ^ can at bring about £ directly relative to t' and
_t* =df. there are events
,
. .
.
,
^nd times
. .
.
,
_tj^ such that:
(i)
_t is not later than
_t^ ^^d . . . and is not
later than t ;
(11)
^n-1 identical with _t' ;
(ill) is identical with
_t*;
(Iv) is identical with £;
(v) ^ can immediately at _t bring about directly
relative to _t and
_t^; and
(vi) if is distinct from then for every and
for every
_t^, if ^ were to bring about direct-
ly relative to and then ^ could imme-
diately at _tjj^ bring about directly relative
to and
_t^-|-T*^^
Of course, this definition deals only with the direct bringing about
of an event, and not with action in general. However, given D.VI.5
and keeping D.IV.13 in mind, we may say the following;
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T* 1 about £ indirectly relative to t' and
_t df. there are an event £ and a time t" such that:U; £ can at _t bring about £ directly relative to t'
and and —
(ii) if S were to bring about £ directly relative to
_t' and £”, then
(a) £ would contribute causally relative to t" and
_t* to £, and
~
(b) £ would occur exactly once at t".
And then, keeping D.IV.15 in mind, we may also say the following:
^ can at _t bring about £ synthetically relative to t' and
t* =df. there are events
, £^ such that:~(i) for any event £, if £ is identical with 3^1 or . . .
or £ is identical with £^^, then there are times
_t° and
_t'' such that
(^) is not later than £°
,
_t° is not later than
_t
" , and _t” is not later than £*
,
and
(b) either
(a) ^ can at £ bring about £ directly relative
to _t° and
_t”
,
or
( 3 ) ^ can at £ bring about £ indirectly relative
to £° and £''
; and
(li) if, for some time £ not earlier than £' and not
later than £*, £ were to bring about £j eitherdirectly or indirectly relative to £* and £ and . . .
and if, for some time £ not earlier than £~ and not
later than £*, £ were to bring about £^^ eitherdirectly or Indirectly relative to £ and £*, then
£ would be composed relative to £* and t* of £^,
With D.VI.5, D.V1.6 and D.VI.7 given, definitions of the remaining
two relevant phrases follow easily. These are, first:
D. VI. 8
: £ can at £ bring about £ actively relative to £' and £*
=df. either
(i) £ can at £ bring about £ directly relative to £'
and £* ; or
(ii) £ can at £ bring about £ indirectly relative to
£' and £* ; or
(iil) £ can at £ bring about £ synthetically relative to
£' and £*.
(Compare D.1V.16.) And second:
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D^V^: S can at t act relative to t' and t* =df. there is an
event £ such that ^ can at £ bring about p actively
relative to
_t' and t*.
(Compare D.lV.S.b.) Definitions of such phrases as ”S can at
_t act
successfully relative to t’ and t*,"
-'S can at t act intentionally
relative to
_t' and
_t*,'' and so on, may be given along the lines of
D.V1.4 through D.V1.9 and in accordance with the definitions of
Chapter IV. 1 shall not give these definitions here.
Consider the following principle:
(1) Necessarily, if £ brings about £ actively relative to t
£ , then £ can at £ bring about £ actively relative
to £ and £' .
Is it a theorem of the present theory? No, it is not. Should it be?
No, it should not. For £ may bring about £ actively relative to t
^^d £' and there may be a sufficient causal condition relative to
some time £* and £ for his so doing, in which case, according to the
sense of "can" in D.VI.4 through D.VI.9, £ cannot at £ bring about £
actively relative to £ and £' , since his willing at £ is not free.
But if we call the sense of "can" given in D.V.3 "can*" and imagine
this sense of "can" to be elaborated by means of definitions analo-
gous to D.VI.5 through D.VI.9, we may note that the following are
theorems of the present theory:
T.VI. 1 : Necessarily, if £ can at £ bring about £ actively rela-
tive to £' and £*, then £ can* at £ bring about £
actively relative to £* and £*.
T. VI .
2
: Necessarily, if S brings about £ actively relative to £
and £'
,
then £ can* at £ bring about £ actively relative
to £ and £* .
Given T.VI. 2, we may say that there is indeed a sense of "can" accord-
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ing to which the common philosophical dictum '"Does' implies 'Can'"
is true. How interesting this sense of "can" is, however, is another
matter.
In connection with our discussion in the last chapter of Keith
Lehrer's account of "can" the following principles were mentioned:
I-
do A at only if, for every event B, if
it is physically necessary that
,
if S does A at t
,
then ^ occurs at _t^, then ^ occurs at t^.^^
_S can at _tj^ do A at
_t^^ only if, for every event B, if
it is physically necessary that, if
^ does A at T * , then
B does not occur at _t^, then ^ does not occur at't^.^l
When slightly modified and also restated in the terminology of the
present chapter, these principles turn out to be theorems of the
present theory. I have in mind the following:
Necessarily,
^ can at Jt bring about £ actively relative
to £' and
_t* only if, for every event £, if it is
physically necessary but not metaphysically necessary
that, if ^ brings about £ actively relative to t' and
_t*, then £ occurs at _t, then £ occurs at t.
Necessarily, ^ can at £ bring about £ actively relative
to _t' and
_t* only if, for every event £, if it is
physically necessary but not metaphysically necessary
that, if £ brings about £ actively relative to jt' and
_t * , then £ does not occur at jt, then £ does not occur
at £.
That T.VI.3 and T.VI.4 are Indeed theorems may be seen by noting that
they are equivalent, respectively, to:
T. VI . 3 . a : Necessarily, ijf there is an event £ such that (i) it is
physically necessary but not metaphysically necessary
that, if £ does not occur at £, then £ does not bring
about £ actively relative to _t' and _t*, and (ii) £ does
not occur at
_t
,
then £ cannot at £ bring about £ active-
ly relative to £' and £*;
T.VI.3:
T.VI.4:
and
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Necessarily, ^ there is an event £ such that (i) it isphysically necessary but not metaphysically necessarythat, if ^ occurs at t, then S does not bring about pactively relative to t’ and t*, and (il)
^ occurs at t
_th^
^ cannot at _t bring about £ actively relative to
^ and _t*.
of T.VI.3.a or T.VI.4.a were false, then the following would
There are events £ and r_ such that (i) £ is a sufficient
causal condition relative to
_t and
_t' of r; (ii) it Is
not physically possible both that £ occur~at t* and Sbring about £ actively relative to t' and £* ;~and (iTi)
^ can at £ bring about £ actively relative~to t' and t*.
that, according to D.VI.4 through D.VI.9, £ can at _t bring
about £ actively relative to £' and £* only if £ is free at t' to
will some state of affairs; given that, according to D.VI.2, S is free
at
_t' to will some state of affairs only if there is no sufficient
causal condition of some event which is physically incompatible with
his so doing; and given that clauses (i) and (ii) of (4) rule this
out, it follows that (4) is necessarily false, and hence that T.VI.3.a
and T.VI.4.a are Indeed true.
With the understanding provided by D.V1.4 through D.VI.9 of
that concept of "can" which I believe is crucial to any adequate dis-
cussion of free action, we may now turn to the concept of an agent's
being free to bring about an event actively. Here we are faced, I
think, with two main options (on which there are variations that I
shall not mention). We could say:
D. VI . 10
: £ is free^^ at _t to bring about £ actively relative to
and _t* =df. £ can at £ bring about £ actively
relative to t’ and t*.
T.VI.4.a:
If either
be true:
(4)
But given
Or we could say
:
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R IQ f'T'PP f- +- 1
t' and 5^4f.- ® relative to
!nd444^4"“8 ^‘>°« £ >^<=latlve to t'
(ii) there is an event
^ such that
a) S can at t bring about
^ actively relative to1 and _t*, and
(b) S cannot at t bring about and actively
relative to
_t ' and
_t*.
^
Note that definitions of the phrases "S is freej (or free2 ) at t to
bring about £ directly relative to t' and t*," "S is freej (or freej)
at
_t to bring about £ indirectly relative to _t' and
_t*," and "S is
free^ (or free
2 > at _t to bring about £ synthetically relative to t'
and
_t' could also be given along the same lines as D.VI.IO and
but I shall not give them here.
Just as two main senses of "S is free to bring about £ ac-
tively may be distinguished, so two corresponding main senses of
^ freely brings about £ actively” may be distinguished. We may say
first of all:
2iVIil2:
^
freely^^ brings about £ directly relative to _t and t'
-df
. there are events £ and £ such that:
~
(1) ^ freely wills £ at _t in order that £ may occur;(ii) wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and £' to £; and(iii) £ constitutes £ at t'.
Note that the only feature that distinguishes D.VI.12 from D.IV.12
(where ”£ brings about £ directly relative to £ and £* " is defined)
is the addition of "freely” to clause (i) of the former. This is,
however, an important feature. An analysis of the concept of freely^^
bringing about an event indirectly can be given along the same lines
as D.1V.13, with D.VI.12 incorporated, and the result is the follow-
ing:
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—
!- ^ Indirectly relative to t and
- /Tf • Z'’®” a nnd a time t* such'that:U) S freely^ brings about £ directly relative to
^ and ;
(ii)
^ contributes causally relative to t* and t' to
and ~ —
(iii) occurs exactly once at t*.
Note that the only distinguishing feature is the addition of "freely^^"
to clause (i). Finally, an analysis of the concept of freely^^ bring-
ing about an event synthetically can be given along the lines of
D.1V.15, with D.VI.12 and D.VI.13 incorporated, and the result is
the following (presented schematically)
:
^ freelyj^ brings about £ synthetically relative to t
and t’ =df. there are events
,
n such that:
(i) (as clause (i) of D.IV.15); and
(ii) (preamble as in clause (ii) of D.IV.15)
(a) (as subclause (a) of clause (ii) of D.IV.15), and
(b) either
(a) ^ freelyj^ brings about £ directly relative
to
_t* and
_t”, or
( 3 ) ^ freely^ brings about £ indirectly relative
to and Jt".
Once again, the only distinguishing feature is the addition of
freely to subclause (b) of clause (ii). And then we may of course
say
:
D. VI . 15
: ^ freely^ brings about 2_ actively relative to _t and t’
=df. either
(i) _S freely^^ brings about directly relative to t
and
_t
' ; or
(ii)
^ freely^ brings about £ indirectly relative to
_t and
_t *
; or
(iii) ^ freelyj^ brings about p^ synthetically relative to
_t and _t ' .
With this definition, and given D.VI.ll, the following definition
follows straightforwardly:
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D.V1.16:
^ freely 2 about p actively relative to t and t'
=df. ~ —
(i) ^ freelyj^ brings about p actively relative to t
and p'
; and
~
(ii) there is an event p such that
(a) p can at p bring about p actively relative to
p and p' , and
(b) p cannot at p bring about [p and p] actively
relative to t and t'.
Further definitions, such as definitions of the phrases ”S
is free^^ (or free
2 ) at _t to act relative to jt' and t*," "S freely^^
(or freely
2 > ^^ts relative to _t and _t' "£ is a free doing of S's,"
"p. IS a free deed of ^'s at _t^, . .
.
,
and so on, could of
course be provided. But I shall not provide them here. Rather,
D.VI.IO through D.VI.16 themselves require comment. First, the
following theorems should be noted:
T.V1.5: Necessarily, if p is free 2 at p to bring about p active-
ly relative to p' and p*, then S is freej^ at t to bring
about p actively relative to t* and t*.
T.VI.6: Necessarily, if p freely 2 brings about p actively rela-
tive to t and t’, then S freely^^ brings about p actively
relative to t and t*.
T.VI. 7: Necessarily, if p freely 2 brings about p actively
relative to t and t', then S is free
2 at t to bring
about p actively relative to t and t^.
T.VI.8: Necessarily, if S freely^ brings about p actively
relative to t and t'
,
then S is freei at t to bring
about p actively relative to t and t'.
These are Important theorems. Why distinguish two types of freedom?
Well, notice that it follows from T.VI.6 and T.VI.8 that, whether we
are talking of freedom^ or freedom
2 ,
the following holds:
T.VI. 9: Necessarily, if S freely brings about p actively rela-
tive to t and t'
,
then S can at p bring about p active-
ly relative to t and t'.
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It is obviously desirable that „e should be in a position to assert
T.VI.9. But notice also that, although T.VI.9 is a theorem of the
present theory and although it makes implicit use (via its use of
can”) of a subjunctive conditional, of D.VI.15 and D.VI.16 it is only
the latter which also makes (implicit) use of a subjunctive condi-
tional. That is, D.VI.15 is testimony to the fact that it is pos-
sible to produce an analysis of the concept of someone's freely
bringing about an event actively without resorting to the use, whether
explicit or Implicit, of subjunctive conditionals. This is, I think,
a clearly desirable result, given that no account of subjunctive con-
ditionals has been provided in this dissertation (and none is going
to be).
But is D.VI.15 an adequate foundation for the analysis of the
concept of acting freely? It will not have escaped the reader's
notice that D.VI.ll is exactly the same definition as D.V.l, except
that the sense of 'free" which is at issue in the latter is now more
fully specified by the former. It was said in Chapter V. that D.V.l
constitutes an attempt to express a proposition to which both com-
patibilists and incompatlbillsts are prepared to assent. And, cer-
tainly, it is D.VI.16, and not D.VI.15, which is that analysis of the
concept of freely bringing about an event actively which more closely
"corresponds" to D.VI.ll. That is, of D.VI.15 and D.VI.16, it is only
the latter which is such that from it the following theorem (roughly
stated) may be derived:
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— Necessarily, if S freely acts relative to t and t
'
then ^ can also "act otherwise" relative to t and t'.
Now, is it desirable that we should be able to assert T.VI.IO? If so
(and this was indeed implied in Chapter V), then I have not suc-
ceeded in giving a satisfactory account of free human action which is
Itself free of the use of subjunctive conditionals. For I know of
no way to circumvent such use in the analysis of the concept of "can."
But perhaps it is not the case that an adequate theory of free human
action requires that T.VI.IO be a theorem. Perhaps the implication
of Chapter V that it j^s desirable that it be a theorem seemed plaus-
ible at the time only because the compatibilist would otherwise have
no means at all to account for the alternatives that undoubtedly
accompany all free action. But D.V1.15, simply by virtue of implying
that ^'s volition at _t occurs freely, allows for an alternative course
of events to take place (in some sense of "alternative" other than
that specified in D.1V.50), and perhaps this is all that should be
required.
Some may think it unsatisfactory that a theory of free human
action should wind up with two alternative analyses of the concept
of freely bringing about an event actively. Which, it may be asked,
is the "true" analysis? On the other hand, some may think it desir-
able that no one analysis of this concept be paraded as the "true"
analysis. I am inclined toward the latter position. For the concept
23
of acting freely is certainly not univocal and, even within the
narrow confines of the present enterprise, it seems better not to
latch on to one of its senses to the exclusion of all others. Pre-
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sumably, which analysis is more Important will depend upon the use
to which the present theory is put, and the theory should be adequate
to a variety of uses. (One important use of the theory would be to
provide an effective treatment of the argument given at the beginning
of this section.)
Finally, it is time to redeem two promissory notes. The first
concerns the concept of the provision of opportunity. This concept
was first mentioned in Chapter III, Section 2 when discussing Chis-
holm's use of the concept of event-causal contribution. It was noted
that Chisholm regards it possible that an event should contribute
causally to a free action, whereas my use of the concept of event-
causal contribution (see A. IV. 4 and the assumptions and definitions
of this chapter) rules out this possibility. I would rather say
that, in such a case, the event in question provides the agent with
the opportunity to act freely. (Compare also the remarks made in
Chapter III, Section 2 concerning A. III. 8.) It was noted also in
Chapter IV that an analysis of the concept of willing broadly (see
D.IV.2) rests on an analysis of the concept of the provision of oppor-
tunity. Given what has been said in this chapter, this analysis may
now be provided. We may, I think, say the following:
D. VI . 17 ; provides relative to _t and j;'
,
with the opportunity
to bring about p actively relative to _t* and _t" =df.
(i) £ occurs at jL; and
(ii) £ contributes causally relative to _t and _t' to
can bring about q actively relative to t* and
t"].
We could then say, roughly, that an event £ provides an opportunity
for p's occurrence just in case there is a person ^ such that £
310
provides S with the opportunity to bring about actively; and we
could also say that a person ^ provides an opportunity for £*s oc-
currence just in case there is a person S' and an event £ such that S's
bringing about £ actively provides with the opportunity to bring
about £ actively. D.VI.17, moreover, may serve as the basis of the
analysis of such concepts as willing for a purpose, acting for a pur-
pose, and so on. I shall provide no such analysis here, however, for
it is very complicated. But, roughly, 1 think we can say that a
person wills an event £ for the purpose of an event £ just in case he
wills £ and he intends either that his so willing should contribute
causally to £ (see D.IV.3), or that his so willing should (in some
sense) "just be" £, or that his so willing should provide the
opportunity for £*s occurrence. A similar statement may be made con-
cerning acting for a purpose by substituting "brings about actively"
and its cognates for "wills" and its cognates. From this an analysis
of the concepts of a means, a mere means, an end, an end-in-itself
,
and so on, could perhaps be generated. But these are matters that
I shall not discuss here.
The second promissory note concerns the concept of a person.
In Chapter II I did not include this concept in my list of unanalyzed
concepts, but referred the reader to this chapter for its analysis.
Here it is:
D. VI
. 18
: ^ is a person =df.
(i) ^ is a thing; and
(ii) there are an event £ and times _t, _t' and _t* such
that it is physically possible that ^ can at £
bring about £ actively relative to _t' and Jt*.
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At the end of the next section I shall address the charge that this
definition introduces circularity into the theory that has Just been
25presented.
2. Objections to and Comments on the Theory
The most objectionable aspect of the theory of free human
action proposed in the preceding section is presumably its reliance
on the unanalyzed concept of effectuation. Certainly this concept
has received its share of vilification in the past; but some of the
criticism that this concept has met with has been strongly argued.
At the outset I said that the theory of free human action
proposed here, when coupled with the claim that determinism is false,
constitutes a certain version of libertarianism. 1 shall provide no
definition of the term "libertarianism," but roughly 1 take a liber-
tarian theory of free human action to be a theory which is incom-
patibilist, Indetermlnist
,
and dependent upon the concept of effectua-
tion. But some have claimed libertarianism (of whatever form) to be
necessarily false, and their claim has apparently been based either
on the contention that there can be no such relation as effectuation
or on the contention that, if there is such a relation, it can never
2 6be exemplified. In the former case, the reasoning seems, in out-
line, to be as follows: necessarily, any causal relation, when exem-
plified, relates events to events; effectuation is claimed to be an
exemplif iable causal relation that, when exemplified, relates persons
(and not events) to events; therefore, there can be no such relation
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as effectuation. In the latter case, the reasoning seems to run as
follows: necessarily, any causal relation, when exemplified, relates
events to events; effectuation is claimed to be a causal relation
that, if xt were exemplified, would relate persons (and not events)
to events; therefore, effectuation cannot be exemplified. To my mind,
both premises of each argument are quite dubious. No doubt the argu-
ments that are presented in the literature to prove libertarianism
necessarily false are more complex than either of the arguments just
given, but in many cases I think the basic structure of these argu-
ments is the same as that of those just given. If this is correct,
then the proper conclusion would seem to be that any attempt to prove
^ priori that libertarianism is (necessarily) false is ill-advised.
A far more telling charge than the charge that effectuation
cannot be a relation, or at least an exemplifiable relation, is the
charge that the concept of effectuation is simply very obscure. In-
deed, it seems to some (when confronted, for instance, with liber-
tarian attempts to prove the second premise of the argument cited at
the beginning of this chapter false) that the concept of effectuation
is nothing more than a deus ex machina and that it purchases the im-
munity of libertarianism only at the price of unintelligibility.
Strangely enough, it seems that proponents of libertarianism are them-
27
selves more prone to consider this objection (at least in writing)
than opponents of libertarianism are to advance it, although at least
two prominent critics of the doctrine have very recently reiterated
it. Campbell's response to the charge that the concept of
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effectuation is unintelligible is that we are all aware, from an "in-
trospective" viewpoint, of the phenomenon of effectuation:
[IJntrospection makes it
. . . clear that I am certain thatIt IS
^ who choose; that the act is not an ’accident ' butis genuinely my_ act.^^ ’
Hence, according to Campbell, the concept is not unintelligible, even
if there is no suitable account of it forthcoming from an "external"
viewpoint. Taylor's response is similar:
Now this idea [of causation by agents] strikes many as quite
incomprehensible. And indeed in a way it is.
. .
. Yet it
should be noted that it is mysterious or incomprehensible
only in the sense that it is not what a man having any
familiarity with physical science or the general history of
speculative thought would be led to expect. In another
sense it is strange indeed to speak of some perfectly famil-
iar thing ... as being in any sense mysterious
.
For his part, Chisholm considers the objection in the guise of the
question "What is the difference between saying, of an event A, that
A just happened and saying that someone caused A to happen?", and he
responds to the objection in this way:
The only answer, I think, can be this: that the difference
between the man’s causing A, on the one hand, and the event
A just happening, on the other, lies in the fact that, in
the first but not the second, the event A was caused and
was caused by the man.^^
O O
Chisholm acknowledges that this answer "may not entirely satisfy,"
but he claims that there is an analogous problem with the concept of
33
event-causation. How is one to answer the question "What is the
difference between saying, of two events A and that happened and
then A happened, and saying that ^’s happening caused A’s happening?"
The only answer that one can give to this question, he contends, is
that in the second case but not in the first, ^ did cause A.
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According to Chisholm, then, the concept of agent-causation may not
be clear, but that of event-causation is no clearer.
Chisholm overstates his point, I think. It is possible to
give a fuller characterization (see A.IV.l through A. IV. 4) of the con-
cept of event-causal contribution than that which is provided when one
merely notes that an event £ contributes causally to an event £ only
if £ precedes £. (Indeed, if what I say in Section 2 of Chapter IV
is true, then it is in fact not true that such temporal priority is
a necessary condition of such causation.) But the spirit of Chis-
holm's point remains, I believe, if it is acknowledged that the as-
sumptions given in this chapter (namely, A.VI.l through A. VI. 4) are
accurate. For a partial characterization of the concept of direct
effectuation is given by means of them just as a partial characteri-
zation of the concept of (event-)causal contribution is given by
means of A.IV.l through A. IV. 4, and so there appears little justifi-
cation for claiming the latter concept to be any clearer than the
34former. Moreover, I believe that Campbell and Taylor are both
right in contending that we are all thoroughly familiar with the
phenomenon of effectuation. Hence, although I would indeed like to
be able to give a fuller account of the concept of effectuation, the
fact that I am presently not able to do this seems to me to be a very
poor reason to dismiss this concept. (If metaphor helps, then we may
perhaps regard the person who effectuates an event to be the "ground,"
the "source," the "author," the "well-spring," and so on, of the
event
.
)
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An objection related to the immediately foregoing is one
tendered by Donald Davidson, who says:
One is [in trouble] if one supposes [as libertarians urge]
at agent-causation does not introduce an event in additionto the primitive action. For then what more have we said
when we say the agent caused the action than when we say he
was the agent of the action? The concept of cause seems to
P ay no role. We may fail to detect the vacuity of this
suggestion because causality does . . . enter conspicuously
into accounts of agency; but where it does it is the garden-
variety [j^ . e
.
, event-type] of causality, which sheds no
light on the relation between the agent and his
. .
. ac-
tions
.
This objection may be pertinent to some accounts of effectuation (it
applies to Taylor's, I think), but it is not pertinent to mine. For
it is based on the understanding that, according to libertarianism,
_whenever a person acts, he effectuates his action. This is something
I deny. It is only when one acts freely that one (directly) effec-
tuates one's willing and thereby (Indirectly) effectuates one's deeds.
(The failure to distinguish doings from deeds is a source of confu-
sion in Davidson's objection.) Hence there is a distinction between
being the agent of an act and "agent-causing" that act.
Another objection to my sort of account of effectuation is
36to be found in Taylor's writings. As recorded in Section 10 of
Chapter IV, Taylor regards the doctrine of volitions as "quite fan-
37
tastic" and indefensible, and one of his arguments for this view
runs roughly in this rhetorical fashion: if the concept of effectua-
tion is found to be indispensable and I am to be said to be able to
effectuate my volitions, why not simply say that I effectuate my ac-
tions and do away with the concept of volition altogether? The proper
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response to this is fourfold: first, without the sort of account
g‘ en in the first section of this chapter and presented in terms of
the effectuation of volitions, it is difficult to see how one can
distinguish free action from unfree action; secondly, the sort of
account given in the first section allows for a related account of
free decision and free choice even when no action ensues (for a deci-
sion may be a decision^ and a choice a choice^), whereas it is again
difficult to see how such an account could be given on the basis that
Taylor provides; thirdly, without such an account as that given in the
first section, it seems that Davidson's objection, just cited, will in
fact be pertinent; and fourthly, it is clear that an agent is in no
sense "sufficient" for his deeds (for instance, if the deed is his
arm s rising, his arm must not be paralyzed, it must not be tied down,
e^c^, etc
.
) , so that Taylor's understanding of the concept of effec-
tuation must be that it is, in some unexplained way, complex, whereas
my understanding of the concept is that an agent is indeed in and of
himself "sufficient" for his free volitions, so that the concept of
effectuation, on this account, conceals no unexplained complexities.
These considerations would seem to provide strong support for the sort
of theory of (free) action that I favor and Taylor opposes.
But it should be explicitly noted here that my account of
action is fairly unusual insofar as it invokes both the concept of
^nd that of effectuation. Traditionally, it seems, there has
been a tendency to think that, if an account invokes one of these con-
cepts, it can and should reject the other. (Reid's account is an
317
exception here.) Furthermore, I claim that effectuation is exempli-
fied when and only when one acts freely; when one acts unfreely, it
is not exemplified. In this respect my account opposes the accounts
of Reid, Taylor and Chisholm, which are less restrictive than mine
and according to which M action is effectuated by the agent.
Only Campbell, amongst the prominent modern agent-causation theorists,
seems to be in agreement with this aspect of my account; but Camp-
bell's account is in fact much more restrictive than mine, in that
he believes that one acts freely (and is then and only then the
agent-cause of one's actions) only in those comparatively rare cases
of moral temptation where one acts in accordance with one's percep-
tion of duty and in opposition to one's strongest desires. My
belief is that the domain of free action is much broader than Camp-
bell allows for, but I shall not enter into this here.
There are those who oppose the sort of account of effectua-
tion that I have given for yet other reasons. One objection that
has been given is that, whereas I sharply distinguish effectuation
and (event-)causation, no such sharp distinction should in fact be
made. It has been contended that effectuation (and, more broadly,
"object-causation," of which effectuation is supposed to be a species)
may be fully accounted for in terms of event-causation. Foremost
amongst such objectors, in recent times, are Wilfrid Sellars, Alvin
40Goldman, and Bruce Aune. These authors claim that, just as a
statement like "The brick caused the window to break" is elliptical
for some such statement as "The impact of the brick caused the window
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to break" (where the brick is an object, its impact is an event, and,
of course, the window's breaking is also an event), so a statement
like "Jones caused his arm to rise [ i, e. , Jones raised his arm]" is
elliptical for some such statement as "Jones's willing caused his arm
to rise" (where Jones is an object—an agent
— ,
Jones's willing is
an event, and his arm's rising is also an event). It is clear that
I go along with such paraphrase to a certain extent; Chapter IV is
testimony to this fact. Nevertheless, I maintain that, when it comes
to the matter of acting freely
,
such paraphrase is inadequate, and I
do not think that anyone has successfully refuted this contention
.
Another problem concerns the revered Principle of Sufficient
Reason. Many appear to be fond of this principle. Is the present
theory inconsistent with its truth? That, of course, depends upon
how the principle is interpreted. Roughly, the principle seems to
be that every event has a cause. But what type of cause? Now Reid,
who seems to have thought that every causal chain may be traced to
an agent-cause, claims this principle to be self-evidently true and
42
asserts that his theory is consistent with its being true. Others
may interpret the principle to concern event-causes only, in which
case it seems to be the same as or similar to determinism, in the
sense of "determinism" that I have given in Chapter V. In this case,
my theory of free human action is still not inconsistent with the
principle's being true; for I do not claim to have demonstrated de-
terminism false. What is the case, according to my theory, is that
it is impossible that determinism be true and some action be freely
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performed. Another possible interpretation of the principle is that,
according to it, every event has either an event-cause or an agent-
cause. My theory is certainly not inconsistent with this interpre-
tation; indeed, some action may be freely performed the principle
be true, on this interpretation. I sometimes think that people are
inclined to accept that every event has a cause because they believe
that no event occurs or can occur in a totally "isolated" manner.
Note, however, even if it were the case that some event occurs without
being either event-caused or agent-caused, this intuition may yet be
accounted for. It may be that the principle that such people are
groping for is that every event has an effect . This principle may
of course be true even if indeterminism, as I believe, is also true.
In connection with the issue concerning there being a "suf-
ficient reason" for the occurrence of each event one should discuss
the matter of the predictability of actions, which is often thought
to be a function of their being caused to occur. It has been claimed
that all actions are in principle predictable, but that undetermined
events would not be predictable; hence no actions can be undetermined.
Campbell's response to this objection is that it is not true that all
actions are in principle predictable; he agrees that very many ac-
tions indeed are in principle predictable, but there are a rare few,
namely those freely performed in situations where temptation is over-
43
come, which simply are not predictable even in principle. I am not
sure how to understand the concept of being predictable in principle,
but, if I understand it at all, I think Campbell is surely right to
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reject the contention that M actions are predictable in principle.
l^Jhy on earth should we think this to be true? Cannot people some-
times act on a whim, and freely so? If so, I would hardly think such
action predictable, even "in principle.” But a more telling point is
surely that the causes of an event need not be known in order for
there to be a basis of predicting its occurrence. Prediction may be
based on a statistical inference, where events occur, or at least
are taken to occur, randomly . Thus, if prediction of an event's oc-
currence is often and properly based independently of any knowledge
of its causes (if it has any)
,
it would seem that whether or not it
has any causes is irrelevant to the prediction. Moreover, it seems
to me that it is just such prediction that is at issue in the predic-
tion of actions freely performed.
Some have objected to the concept of effectuation in some such
manner as this:
If we say that John moved his hand at time _t, we may indeed
add that he caused his hand to move at that time. But to
say this is not to say that he was the irreducible cause of
his hand's motion; if he were, then, since he existed yes-
terday, his hand should have moved the same way yesterday
too. After all, if A is the irreducible cause of B, then
whenever we have A, we should have ^ as well.^^
The objection seems persuasive. After all, if a person ^ is , as I
claim to be true in cases of free action, sufficient for his willing
as he does, what is there to stop him always willing in this way?
Why now rather than ten minutes ago? But I would suggest that the
persuasiveness of this objection lies in part in the confusion of
(event-) causation with effectuation (and hence the advisability of
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divorcing the latter concept from that of causation). It may be that.
If A is the irreducible ^vent-cause of B, then, whenever A occurs, so
does B. (Presumably, by "irreducible event-cause" is meant something
very close to what I have called a sufficient causal condition—see
D-IV.l.) But what reason is there for believing, and what grounds for
asserting, that, if S effectuates p, then £ should occur at every
moment that
^ exists? None that I can see; indeed, there is good
reason not to accept this. Perhaps part of the point of the objection
IS this: actions, like all events, are open to explanation; yet no
explanation for (free) actions is forthcoming if all that can be said
is that the agent (indirectly) effectuates his deeds. Perhaps, if all
that could be said in the case of free actions is that the agent (in-
directly) effectuates his deeds, then there would be no explanation
forthcoming; and perhaps, then, the objector would have a point (al-
though I see no reason to believe that all actions are open to expla-
nation, even "in principle"). But, in most cases of free action, this
is emphatically not all that can be said. We need to distinguish two
types of explanation: rational explanation and causal explanation. I
shall not attempt to give an adequate account of either type of expla-
nation here, but the distinction should be familiar enough. When
one gives a causal explanation of an event, one cites causes of the
occurrence of that event; when one gives a rational explanation of an
event (typically an action)
,
one cites reasons for the occurrence of
that event. Now, there are some who maintain that reasons are a type
of (event-)cause, and that rational explanation is a species of causal
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explanation. I do not share this view. Causal explanation is typio
ally "backward-looking" and concerns what has preceded the event which
IS to be explained; rational explanation is typically "forward-looking"
and concerns the goals and purposes the agent has in virtue of which
he decides to act as he does. Roughly, 1 believe that all decisions
which occur freely but as a result of deliberation (see D.IV.49) are
in principle open to rational explanation but not to causal explana-
.
. 47
.txon; tor those decisions which are Impetuously but freely arrived
at I believe there is no explanation, rational or causal. (Of course,
there are a number of terms which, in a fuller treatment of this issue,
ought to be accounted for here, to wit, "as a result of," "explainable
in principle," "rational explanation," and "causal explanation.")
Those decisions which are not freely arrived at, whether deliberate or
impetuous, are presumably open in principle to causal explanation, un-
less they occur totally spontaneously. Those deeds which are freely
and deliberately brought about are, I believe, in principle open to
both types of explanation; the rational explanation will concern the
reasons for the agent's decision or decisions, the causal explanation
will concern how the decision or decisions contributed causally to the
deed. Now all of this is certainly rough as it stands, but its state-
ment serves two main purposes: first, it provides further reason to re-
' ject the "Why now?" type of argument, just considered, against the con-
]
cept of effectuation; secondly, it provides a brief introductory ac-
I
count of another area in which the present theory of free human action
; , ,
48
! may profitably be employed.
I
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With this I am done considering objections to the concept of
effectuation. None of them seems conclusive to me. Some are stronger
than others, but none warrants rejection of the concept. Indeed, the
concept of effectuation is, I believe, an essential tool in an ade-
quate analysis of the concept of acting freely.
I shall complete this chapter by considering objections to
D.VI.18, in which the concept of a person is analyzed. First, it
might be objected that the definition is circular; for it is given in
terms of other definitions in which the concept of a person is invoked.
Formally, this is correct. But the damage could easily be repaired by
substituting "thing” for "person" in all of those previous definitions.
Such substitution would not adversely affect those definitions.
Secondly, it might be objected that a person may be born in this world
and then die before it is even physically possible that he or she be
able to bring about an event actively. But it seems to me that, if it
is true that something of this nature concerning a human being could
happen, it is then simply the case that the human being is not in fact
a person. This gives rise to the third and final objection, however,
which is that it is possible, given D.VI.18, that no human being be a
person. For determinism may yet be true; but the concept of "can,"
according to D.VI.4 through D.VI.9, involves an element of indetermin-
ism in its invocation of the concept of an agent's being free to will
an event (see D.VI.2). This is indeed so. If some find this objec-
tionable, they may always substitute "can*" (see D.V.3, T.VI.l and
T.VI.2) for "can" in D.VI.18. But this seems to me an inadvisable
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move. I believe that determinism is false. Moreover, I believe that
people often act freely. D.VI.18, indeed the whole theory of free
human action provided in the preceding section, is based on the con-
viction that human beings can indeed sometimes act freely, that they
can indeed achieve personhood. In other, more traditional terms: I
believe that the present incompatlbilist theory of free human action,
when coupled with the claim that determinism is false, allows, as no
compatibilist theory does, for the fact that human beings are blessed
with a certain degree of dignity, the dignity of being, at least in
49part, in control of their own destiny.
NOTES
^Aristotle, Metaphysics A2 1013a24-34 (henceforth I shall
refer to this work as
2
As Richard Taylor ("Causation," The Encyclopedia of Phil-
oSophy
, 1967, 11, p. 57) notes, it is the concept of an efficient
cause that underlies both the modern concept of agent-causation and
the modern concept of event-causation.
3
Aristotle, M, 1013a29-32 and 1013b23-25.
4
Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind
(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 11. Henceforth I shall
refer to this book as "
^Reid, p. 37.
Reid, pp. 259 and 265.
^Reid, especially pp. 265 and 335.
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Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1965), A532/B560 - A558/B586. (Henceforth I shall
refer to this book as "CPR . ") To my knowledge, Kant is the only
philosopher in modern times to Insist on the need for this distinc-
tion and yet to hold to a version (albeit exotic) of compatibilism.
(Reid's advocacy of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (see below)
seems not to be compatibllist in nature, since, in advocating it, he
seems to be concerned primarily, not with event-causation, but with
agent-causation.
)
\ant, C^R, A541/B569.
^^C.A. Campbell, In Defense of Free Will (London: George Allen
and Unwin, Ltd., 1967), pp. 36-7. Henceforth I shall refer to this
book as " IDFW ."
^^C.A. Campbell, IDFW, pp. 48-9; "Is 'Freewill' a Pseudo-
Problem?" in Bernard Berofsky, ed
. ,
Free Will and Determinism (New
York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 131-5 (henceforth I shall refer to
this article as "IFWPP"); On Selfhood and Godhood (London: George
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1957), pp. 156-7 (henceforth I shall refer to
this book as "OSG")
.
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Taylor, "Determinism and the Theory of Agency," inidney Hook, ed.. Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Mndpm Science(London: Colller-Macmillan
,
Ltd., 1958), pp. 227-8-“X^n and Purnose(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966),~|)"p. 9
,
lo, 13 ^21-2, 60-1, 109-112 (henceforth 1 shall refer to this book*as "A&P").
13
,See especially Roderick M. Chisholm, "Freedom and Action,"in Keith Lehrer, ed.. Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House
’ PP* 17-21 (henceforth I shall refer to this article as
Person and Object (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing
Company, 1976), pp. 69-70, 73-6 (henceforth I shall refer to this book
as "P&O")
.
14
By directly effectuates £ at _t" is meant: [S directly
effectuates £] occurs at t.
~
^^Compare the principle of Chisholm's referred to in note AO
of Chapter III.
16
Compare the principle of Chisholm's cited in note 38 of
Chapter III. Also, compare note 31 to Chapter IV.
^^I have not assumed—see Section 2 of Chapter IV— that any
state of affairs £ is such that it is metaphysically Impossible for
someone to will £. If there is any such state of affairs, however,
D.VI.2 must be supplemented with the clause: "and it is metaphysic-
ally possible for ^ to will £ at _t' in order that £ may occur."
For D.VI.2, as it stands, implies that, if it is metaphysically im-
possible that will £ at _t' in order that £ may occur, then, for
any time
_t, ^ is free at _t to will £ at _t' in order that £ may occur.
This is, I think, an undesirable implication and ought to be blocked
in the manner just indicated. My remarks in this note are prompted
by a criticism by Michael Corrado ("The Power to Act," (unpublished),
pp. 2-5) of a definition of Chisholm's which is similar to D.VI.2.
18
It is because I take D.VI.4 to be true that I claimed in the
last chapter, with respect to statements (16), (17) and (18) of that
chapter, that (16) is true and that the truth of (17) implies the
falsity of (18).
19
This treatment of "can" owes its inspiration in part to
Chisholm's treatment of the subject in P&O, pp. 62-A.
20
21
See statement (20b) of Chapter V.
See statement (20c) of Chapter V.
22
We may say: ^ freely^^ (or freely 2 ) acts relative to £ and
t' =df. there is an event £ such that £ freely^
(or freely
2 )
brings £ about actively relative to
t and t ' .
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See note 22
.
If [S wills £] is caused, then this sense of "just be" is
the same as that of "constitute" (see D.IV.ll). if [s wills is
uncaused, however, some other sense must be given.
~
25
The theory of free human action presented in this section
has much in common with, though also much not in common with, Chis-
holm’s account of free human action in P&O
, pp. 61-4—an account
which I shall not go into in detail here. The important common as-
pects are: my account is both indeterministic (see D.VI.2) and "con-
stitutionally iffy" (see D.VI.4 through D.VI.9), as is his.
26
^For example, see C.D. Broad, Ethics and the History of
Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1952), pp . 214-7
(henceforth I shall refer to this book as " EHP ")
; Robert R. Ehman,
"Causality and Agency," Ratio
,
9 (1967), pp . 141-2; and Duane H.
Whittier, "Causality and the Self," The Monist
, 49 (1965), p. 300.
27
See Campbell, IFWPP, pp. 132-4; Taylor, A&P
,
p. 262; Chis-
holm, F&A, pp. 20-1.
2 8
Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp . 83-4 (henceforth I shall refer
to this book as "THA")
; Irving Thalberg, "How Does Agent-Causality
Work?" in Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, ed.
,
Action Theory (Dor-
drecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976), p.
216 (henceforth I shall refer to this article as "HDACW").
29
Campbell, IFWPP, p. 133.
^^Taylor, p. 262.
31
Chisholm, F&A, p. 21; the underlining of "A" has been added.
32
F&A, p. 21.
^^F&A, pp. 21-2.
3 A
Of course, my argument is a two-edged sword that could be
used against me. In response to it someone might say "So much the
worse for the concept of event-causal contribution!" rather than
"So much the better for the concept of direct effectuation!"
Donald Davidson, "Agency," in Robert Binkley, Richard
Bronaugh, and Ansonio Marras, ed.. Agent, Action and Reason (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 15.
^^Taylor, A&P
,
p. 113; see also pp. 60-1, 74, 116-7.
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A&P
,
p. 49.
2 rh ^
referred to the opening paragraphs of Section
2, C apter III, where I argue that the position that I adopt is the
sort of position that Chisholm should have adopted. In this connec-tion, see also "The 'Unmoved' Agent and the Ground of Responsibility "
Th^e Journal of Philosophy
, 64 (1967) by Nani L. Ranken, in which the
author argues that a theory of agent-causation implies that every ac-tion, that is performed, is performed freely. Whether or not this istrue of other theories involving the concept of effectuation, it is
clearly not true of mine. In fact, it is also clearly not true of
Taylor's; for Taylor explicitly addresses himself to this question anddoes not commit himself on the issue of the truth or falsity of deter-
minism (A&P
, pp. 112-115, 130-3). What is unclear on Taylor's account
is how determinism might be true.
39
See Campbell, IFWPP, pp. 130-1; IDFW, pp. 46-7; OSG, pp.
148-153, 167-8.
Wilfrid Sellars, "Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person,"
in Karel Lambert, ed
. ,
The Logical Way of Doing Things (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 242 and 246-7; Goldman, TM, pp.
81-5; Bruce Aune
,
Reason and Action (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 3-8 (henceforth I shall refer to
this book as "R&A") . See also Broad, p. 215.
In this connection, see Richard Taylor, "Thought and Pur-
pose," in Myles Brand, ed.. The Nature of Human Action (Glenview,
Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Go., 1970), p. 267, and A&P
,
pp. 21-2,
60-1; also Roderick M. Ghisholm, "The Agent as Cause," in Myles Brand
and Douglas Walton, ed.
,
Action Theory (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston,
U.S.A. : D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 199-200,
^^Reid, E, pp. 31, 267-8.
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Campbell, IFWPP, pp. 130-2; IDFW
, pp. 46-7.
44
The quotation is from Aune, R&A, pp. 5-6. See also Broad,
EHP
,
p. 215.
For a provocative account of the distinction between ra-
tional and causal explanation, see Taylor, A&P
,
Chapters 10 and 14;
for a comment on this account, see Thalberg, HDACW, pp. 233-5. I
mention the concept of rational explanation briefly in Section 6 of
Chapter IV, where I discuss G.E.M. Anscombe's and Bruce Aune's ap-
proach to the topic of Intentional action.
Recent proponents of this view are Donald Davidson ("Ac-
tions, Reasons, and Causes," in Alan R. White, ed.
,
The Philosophy of
Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) and Goldman (THA ,
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Chapter III, Section 6, and Chapter V). Amongst the opponents ofthxs view are: Reid (E. p. 283ff., and Essay III), j.c. Urmson(Motives and Causes, in Alan R. liliite, ed
. ,
The Philosonhv of A._t^ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968)),i^iam P. Alston
( Motives and Motivation," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1967 v
especially p. 408), and Keith Donnellan ("Reasons and Causes " The*Encyclopedia of Philosophy
. 1967, VII, especially p. 86).
The explanation may have to include an account of the logic
of practical reasoning. For a recent treatment of this issue see
Aune, R&A
,
Chapter IV.
1 have already mentioned that one important use of the pre-
sent theory would be an application to problems concerning the con-
cept of moral responsibility.
Human beings are also cursed with the responsibility of
living up to their potential—but why end this dissertation on a
negative note?
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